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← 274 F. Supp. 116 - Rice v. Simpson

274 F. Supp. 116 - Rice v. Simpson’s Empirical Analysis

1967

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
December 2015
most recently cited

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2015 · most notably North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), United States v. Gerard (1974)

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 13 state decisions

170196719701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Johnson v. Zerbst · Gideon v. Wainwright · Carnley v. Cochran · Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance · Patton v. State of North Carolina

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"[T]here can be no increase in a sentence in a criminal case after the sentence is imposed.... To deny such protection to convicted criminals who elect to exercise their post-conviction remedies and do so successfully is unfair discrimination and does nothing except to serve to limit the use of post-conviction proceedings in the Alabama state courts by prisoners. It denies the prisoner the protection of his original sentence as a condition to the right of his appealing his conviction or exercising his post-conviction remedies."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “As we have recently held, a defendant’s right of appeal must be unfettered. Worcester v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 Cir., 1966, 370 F. 2d 713 . So far as sentence is concerned, this principle cannot be restricted to those situations in which a defendant, in deciding whether to appeal, must contemplate the certainty of an increased sentence if he obtains a new trial and is convicted again. Not only must he not be faced with such certainty, Worcester v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, he likewise should not have to fear even the possibility that his exercise of his right to appeal will result in the imposition of a direct penalty for so doing. * * * But, equally, the judge should not be permitted to change his mind by deciding that he had been too lenient the first time, as was suggested here during oral argument, or, if a new judge, by having a different approach towards sentencing. * * * Such possibilities, if they had to be recognized, might well be substantial deterrents to a decision to appeal, (footnotes omitted).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “would be a violation of [Mewborn’s] rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.