Brooks v. Briley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The weight of authority and the better reasoned approach require that Sec. 2283 prohibits the enjoining of these state proceedings and that Sec. 1983 is not an `expressly authorized' exception to Sec. 2283. To hold otherwise would be to create a vast exception to Sec. 2283 and would do violence to the principles of comity and federalism which underlie it * * *. Furthermore, it is clear that the prohibition under Sec. 2283 against enjoining state court proceedings cannot be avoided by seeking a declaratory judgment. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 9 Cir., 189 F.2d 505 , cert. den. 342 U. S. 905 , 72 S.Ct. 294 , 96 L.Ed. 677 . The same principles of comity and federalism require that when injunctive relief is not appropriate, neither is relief appropriate under the declaratory judgment statute."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Masson v. Slaton · 302 F. Supp. 1383 - Koen v. Long

2. ““ * * * There is no showing of irreparable injury which is requisite to justify federal equitable relief, or of the special circumstances that would warrant federal disruption of the normal pattern of raising constitutional defenses in the course of state criminal proceedings. There is a fully adequate remedy available to the plaintiffs in the defense of their state court proceedings. If the challenged laws * * * are void for vagueness or overbreadth, the state courts are fully capable of so ruling, and there is no reason in this case to suppose that they would not do so. Or, as an alternative, the state courts may find that the laws, although facially challengeable, may be saved by an appropriate limiting construction. * * * “While the Dombrowski opinion contains language which may be susceptible of the interpretation that abstention is never appropriate where statutes regulating expression are properly challenged for facial vagueness or overbreadth, we do not believe that the Supreme Court has committed itself to such a doctrinaire position where, as here, there is no predicate for finding either a bad faith invocation. or use of criminal laws, or chilling effects or irreparable injury if state, criminal proceedings are allowed to continue. * * * ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Vick v. Schiro

3. ““It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to engage in disorderly conduct, which is defined as the use of rude, boisterous, offensive, obscene or blasphemous language in any public place; or to make or to countenance or assist in making any improper noise, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion, or to conduct oneself in a disorderly manner, in any place to the annoyance of other persons.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Baxter v. Ellington