State v. Sinclair & Sinwellan Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

47 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Every person who, with intent to cheat and defraud another, shall obtain money, credit, goods, services, release from any debt or obligation for services, or for materials or labor in the construction or repair of any building or buildings, wares or anything of value, five hundred dollars or more, by means of a check ... upon any bank ... where the drawer or drawers thereof, shall not have provided for the payment... and the same be not paid upon presentation, shall be deemed to have obtained such money, credit, goods, services* release, wares, or things of value by means of a false pretense .... Where the value of such money, credit, goods, services, release, wares, or anything of value is less than five hundred dollars, such person, upon conviction, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... The giving of the aforesaid worthless check ... shall be prima facie evidence of intent to cheat or defraud; provided that if such person shall be a bona fide resident of the State of Maryland and shall deposit with the drawee of such paper ... within ten days thereafter funds sufficient to meet the same, with all costs and interest which may have accrued he shall not be prosecuted under this section, and no prosecution either by presentment, indictment or otherwise, shall be instituted or commenced until after the expiration of said period of ten days.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Brooks v. State

2. “Nor, as we see it, did the appellees by that [bad] check obtain “anything of value” from [the payee]. Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where the general words in a statute, such as “other thing of value,” used in § 144, follow the designation of particular things or classes of subjects, such as “money, credit, goods, wares,” etc., the general words in the statute will usually be construed to include only those things of the same class or general nature as those specifically antecedently mentioned. This rule is based on the supposition that if the legislature had intended the general words to be considered in an unrestricted sense it would not have enumerated the particular things. See Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130 , 48 A.2d 754, 761 (1946). See also Culotta v. Raimondi, 251 Md. 384, 387 , 247 A.2d 519, 521 (1968). The rule is applied more strictly in the construction of penal statutes—such as is Art. 27, § 144—since the rule, in its solicitude for life and liberty, requires that penal statutes be narrowly construed. Smith v. Higinbothom, supra, citing State v. Fleming, 173 Md. 192, 196 , 195 A. 392, 393 (1937); and Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 [ 56 S.Ct. 395 , 80 L.Ed. 522 ] (1936)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Heffernan v. State

3. “Every person who shall obtain money, credit, goods, wares or anything of value, of the value of one hundred dollars or more, from another by means of a check, draft or any other negotiable instrument of any kind, with intent at the time of giving such instrument”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Heffernan v. State