274 N.J. Super. 15 - State v. Green’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Both the Sixth Amendment and our Constitution (N.J. Const, art. I, ¶ 10) direct that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to the assistance of ‘counsel’ in his defense. We do not equate the counsel to which these constitutional provisions refer with a ‘member of the bar in good standing,’ in common parlance. As we see it, R.R.’s default in payment of the requisite assessment and his resulting decertification differ from a disciplinary suspension or disbarment. While we do not endorse the attorney’s gross inattention to our rules, this oversight had no connection with the lawyer’s character, intellectual acuity, or dedication to the client’s interest. ‘[Suspensions used to wring money from lawyers’ pockets do not stem from any doubt about their ability to furnish zealous and 'effective assistance.’ Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668, 670 (7th Cir.1991). Lawyers who do not pay their assessments violate a legal norm, but not one established for the protection of their clients. Ibid. [ 274 N.J.Super. at 26 , 643 A.2d 18 (emphasis added) ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 914 F. Supp. 1115 - Abdallah v. Pileggi

2. ““We discern no sound basis to adopt less rigorous standards merely because it is shown that a defendant’s trial attorney was drug dependent. A perse rule would create a presumption against the competence of attorneys with drinking or drug problems and would invite convicted defendants to delve into the personal lives of their lawyers on the basis of mere speculation. It bears repeating that convicted prisoners are strongly motivated to attack the competency of trial counsel. The ‘rubber-stamp’ familiarity and ‘monotonous regularity’ of such claims are well-known to appellate judges. [Citation omitted.] We recognize that there are both good attorneys and bad attorneys and that even the best of counsel malee mistakes. However, we are satisfied that the two-part test adopted in Strickland ... is sufficiently protective of a defendant’s rights. The critical inquiiy is whether, for whatever reason, counsel’s performance was deficient and whether the mistakes made prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” 274 N.J. Super. at 30 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 42 Kan. App. 2d 1057 - Johnson v. State

3. “[t]he reasons for suspension can be so varied in kind and degree that imposition of a per se rule is inappropriate.” Green, supra, 274 N.J.Super. at 28 , 643 A.2d 18 . 8 We reject the Appellate Division’s earlier reference that this case presented a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Allegro