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274 U.S. 284

Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, State Tax Commissioner

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 21, 1927.

Decided May 16, 1927.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1927-05-16

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““By the terms of the statute, the tax is to be calculated on the value of the article produced, and that value is to be shown by the gross proceeds of its sale. . . . “We are warranted in presuming that the Legislature did not mean to include, as an element of value, so much of the gross proceeds of the sale of an article in interstate commerce as is represented by the cost of transportation, and we restrain the operation of the statute accordingly. This presumption and this limitation are strengthened by the concluding sentence of the statute, whereby the measure of the tax is declared to be the value of the product in this state, regardless of place of sale or delivery outside of state. If the sale of a commodity produced in this state imposes on the seller delivery in another state, then the sale price necessarily includes the cost of the delivery. Such sale price would not reflect the worth of the commodity in the state, but the worth within the state plus the cost of transportation. If the taxation value of the products named in the statute be limited to their value in the state, and before they enter interstate commerce, the statute does not manifest a purpose to violate article 1 of the federal Constitution, and we so hold.””

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Commonwealth, Moore v. State Bd. of Charities and Corrections

““Counsel admit that without violating the commerce clause the state may lay a' privilege or occupation tax upon producers of natural gas reckoned according to the value of that commodity at the well. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 , 39 S. Ct. 522 , 63 L. Ed. 1084 ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 , 43 S. Ct. 83 , 67 L. Ed. 237 ; Oliver Iron Min. Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 , 43 S. Ct. 526 , 67 L. Ed. 929 . But they insist that, accepting the statute under consideration as construed by the highest court of the state, plaintiff m error will be subjected to an unlawful direct tax upon gross receipts derived from interstate commerce. This argument rests chiefly upon certain language excerpted from the opinion below. But we review the final decree and must accept the statute as authoritatively construed and applied. The plain result of the opinion and final decree is to require that the tax be computed upon the value of the gas at the well, and not otherwise. If, hereafter, executive officers disregard the approved construction and fix values upon any improper basis appropriate relief may be obtained through the courts.””

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Commonwealth, Moore v. State Bd. of Charities and Corrections

Relies on Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. · Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord · American Mfg Co v. City of St Louis

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · 8–0 · Decided 1927-05-16

How this case has been cited

Cited by 178 later decisions (64 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2004 · most notably Parker v. Brown (1943), Toomer v. Witsell (1948)

16 federal appellate · 21 district · 59 state decisions — followed in 14 states

810192719301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP APPEALS OP THE STATE OP WEST VIRGINIA.

¶2ISA state court’s construction of a state statute is to be gathered from the application made of it as shown by the final decree in connection with the opinion rather than by excerpts selected from the opinion. P. 288.

¶32. West Virginia “ annual privilege tax ” on the business of producing .natural gas in the State, computed on the value of the gas produced “ as shown by the gross proceeds derived from the sale thereof by the producer” — the measure of the tax being otherwise stated as “ the value of the entire production in this State, regardless of the place of sale, or the fa,ct that deliveries may be made to points outside the State,” — is not unconstitutional as respects gas transported to and sold in other States, since it is construed as requiring the tax to be computed on the value of the gas at the well, before it enters interstate commerce, which is valid. P. 288.

¶43. The contention that the tax violates due process by taxing gross receipts from interstate commerce beyond the jurisdiction of the State, therefore, is without basis. P. 288.

¶5*2854. The exemption from gross proceeds of $10,000, allowed by the statute in all cases, does not violate the equal protection clause · Case Law">Equal Protection Clause. P. 289.

¶6102 W. Va. 272, affirmed.

¶7Error to a decree- of -the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which reversed a decree enjoining Hall, Tax Commissioner, and Lee,' Attorney General, from enforcing against the plaintiff, Hope Natural Gas Com- ■ pany, the taxing act discussed in the opinion.

¶8Mr. John W. Davis, with whom Messrs. H. D. Rummel, Arthur E. Young, Charles Powell, Kemble White, Anthony F. McCue, S. E. W. Burnside, and Edward M. Borger were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

¶9Mr. Fred O. Blue, with whom Messrs. Howard B. Lee, Attorney General of West Virginia, and T. C. Townsend were on the brief, for defendants in error.

¶10Mr. Justice McReynolds

¶11delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶12This writ brings up a decree by the Supreme Court of Appeals, West Virginia, which construed § 2-a, c. 1, Acts of the Legislature, Extraordinary Session 1925,* and sus*286tained it against objections based upon § 8, Art. I, Federal Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. , The grounds relied upon for reversal are without merit and the decree must be affirmed.

¶13The original proceeding challenged the validity of the tax prescribed by § 2-a and sought an injunction to prevent defendant State officers from attempting to enforce it. The chief objection rested upon the direction of the statute, that, “ The measure of this tax is the value of the entire production in this State, regardless of the place of sale or the fact that deliveries may be made to points outside the State.” The trial court held that the tax would substantially burden and interfere with interstate commerce and ordered an appropriate injunction.

¶14In an opinion, 102 W. Va. 272, indicating very definite purpose to follow rulings here, the court below, as shown by the authoritative head note; declared: “ Under Section *2872a, Chapter 1, supra, the State may take into consideration the gross proceeds of a commodity produced in this State and sold in another State, but only for the purpose of determining the value of such commodity within the State and before it enters interstate commerce.” And among other things it there said—

“ If’ the taxation value of the products named in the statute be limited to their value in the State, and before they enter interstate commerce, the statute does not manifest a purpose to violate Art. I of the Federal Constitution, and' we so hold.” “ We therefore hold, under the facts in this case, that the defendants may not treat the gross proceeds of plaintiff’s sales outside the State as the worth of its gas within the State, but that they may enforce the Act upon the value thereof within the State, and before it enters interstate commerce. The injunction herein will be accordingly so modified.”

¶15The final order directed: “That the decree of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, pronounced in this cause on the 25th day of May, 1926, in so far and in so far only as it enjoins the defendants from enforcing against the plaintiff the provisions of Sec. 2-a of . . . by imposing a tax upon the natural gas produced by the plaintiff, based upon the value thereof within the State and before it enters interstate, commerce, be and the same hereby is modified and corrected so .as to permit defendants to impose and enforce against the plaintiff a tax,'under said section, upon the natural gas so produced by it, based upon the value thereof within the State and before it enters upon interstate commerce, and that in' all other respects said decree as hereby modified and corrected be and the same hereby is affirmed.”

¶16The chief business of plaintiff in error is production and purchase of natural gas in West Virginia and the continuous and uninterrupted transportation of this through pipe lines into Pennsylvania and Ohio, where it is sold, deliv*288ered and consumed. The corporation owns three thousand, one hundred and seventy-eight producing wells located in twenty-five counties of West Virginia, from which it took in the year ending June 30, 1925, more than twenty-three billion cubic feet of gas. And during the same period it purchased from other producers more than twenty-five billion cubic feet. Most of this passed into interstate commerce by continuous movement from the wells.

¶17Here it has been argued that the challenged Act burdens interstate commerce and therefore conflict's with Section 8, Article I, of the federal Constitution. Also, that to enforce the Act would deprive plaintiff in error of property without due process of law and deny equal protection of the laws.

¶18Counsel admit that without violating the commerce clause the State may lay a privilege or occupation tax upon producers of natural gas reckoned according to the value of that commodity at the well. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172; But they insist that, accepting the statute under consideration as construed by the highest court of the State, plaintiff in error will be subjected to an unlawful direct tax upon gross receipts derived from interstate commerce. This argument rests chiefly upon certain language excerpted from the opinion below. But we review the final decree and must hecept the statute as authoritatively construed and applied. The plain result of the opinion and final, decree is to require that the tax be computed upon the value of the gas at the well, and not otherwise. If, hereafter, executive officers disregard the approved construction and fix values upon any improper basis appropriate relief may be obtained through the courts.

¶19The suggestion concerning deprivation of due process goes upon the assumption that the imposition is upon *289gross receipts from interstate commerce, in reality upon property beyond the State’s jurisdiction. As already pointed out, this assumption conflicts with the definite ruling of the highest court of the State.

¶20The claim that equal protection of the laws has been denied rests upon the assertion, first, that an unlawful tax has been imposed upon the gross proceeds from sales regardless of their place and, second, that the exemption of ten thousand dollars from gross income by § 2-h creates undue inequality. The true meaning of the statute and the thing actually taxed oppose the first assertion. We cannot say that the Legislature acted either arbitrarily or unreasonably by authorizing the deduction. Nothing indicates a purpose to extend different treatment to those of the same class; no actual unreasonable inequality has been shown. Plaintiff in error is permitted to deduct ten thousand dollars; the same privilege, and nothing more, is extended to all other producers. Lake Superior Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577; Swiss Oil Corporation v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407.

¶21Affirmed.

¶22The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this cause.

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