Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Percy W. Phillips and Betty R. Phillips (Husband and Wife)’s Empirical Analysis
1960
Citation profile
37 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 62 later decisions — most recently November 2009 · most notably Jaglom v. Commissioner (1962), Pounds v. United States (1967)
37 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Gregory v. Helvering · Commissioner v. Tower · Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. P G Lake · Hort v. Commissioner · United States v. Isham
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“* * * We believe, however, that we are required to adopt the view that since the amounts receivable upon maturity or surrender of the endowment policy unquestionably would have been taxable as ordinary income, the taxpayer may not convert such income into capital gain by a bona fide sale of the contract which is the means of producing such ordinary income. The cash value of the policy was equivalent to the reserve value which, in turn, was computed on the basis of three percent compound interest. The sale of the policy was, as said by Mr. Justice Douglas in Lake, `essentially a substitute for what would otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income'. Manifestly, the consideration paid by taxpayer's partners was `not for an increase in the value of income-producing property.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“* * * Simply because the lease was `property' the amount received for its cancellation was not a return of capital, quite apart from the fact that `property' and `capital' are not necessarily synonymous in the Revenue Act of 1932 or in common usage. Where, as in this case, the disputed amount was essentially a substitute for rental payments which § 22(a) expressly characterizes as gross income, it must be regarded as ordinary income, and it is immaterial that for some purposes the contract creating the right to such payments may be treated as `property' or `capital.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.