J-A05001-22
2022 PA Super 101
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
COLIN LYNN WRIGHT :
:
Appellant : No. 486 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0004124-2019
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MAY 31, 2022
Appellant, Colin Lynn Wright, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on September 24, 2020. We vacate and remand.
On September 24, 2020, Appellant pleaded guilty to simple assault.1 In
exchange for this plea, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend a sentence
of “[two] years [of] probation, plus restitution of $500.00 to [the Pennsylvania
Victims Compensation Assistance Program (“VCAP”)] in Harrisburg.” N.T.
Guilty Plea, 9/24/20, at 2. Further, the parties agreed that the
Commonwealth “reserve[ed] the ability to modify restitution.” Id.
During the plea hearing, Appellant admitted that, on February 20, 2019,
he pushed J.M. (hereinafter “the Victim”) and that, as a result of this assault,
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
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the Victim sustained injuries. Id. at 7; see also Commonwealth’s Amended
Information, 1/29/20, at 1. On September 24, 2020, the trial court accepted
Appellant’s plea and, that day, the trial court sentenced Appellant in
accordance with the negotiated agreement. N.T. Guilty Plea, 9/24/20, at 12.
On September 25, 2020, the Commonwealth filed its “Motion to Modify
Restitution.” The motion declared:
Due to the direct cause of the injury [to the Victim, the
Victim] had to undergo [shoulder] surgery, various medical
procedures, and medical visits. These costs owed by the
[Victim] were covered by The [Phia] Group in the amount of
$51,039.07. Likewise, [VCAP] has covered $5,974.80 of the
[Victim’s] medical expenses. Therefore, the Commonwealth
is requesting that the total amount of restitution be modified
to $57,013.87.
Commonwealth’s Motion to Modify Restitution, 9/25/20, at 1 (citations
omitted).
The trial court later held a hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion.
During the restitution hearing, the Commonwealth called Maribel McLaughlin,
an employee of The Phia Group, as a witness. As Ms. McLaughlin testified, at
the time of the Victim’s shoulder surgery, the Victim was employed by HCR
ManorCare and she received her health coverage “as an employee through
this company.” N.T. Restitution Hearing, 12/15/20, at 15-16. HRC ManorCare
self-insures its employees’ health care benefits through its self-funded
employee benefit plan. Id. The assets of the employee benefit plan are held
in trust and the trust is administered by a third-party administrator, Meritain
Health. Id. Meritain Health, in turn, “work[s] with Aetna, a network, to obtain
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preferred providers to cover negotiated fees, and in this case, WellSpan
[Health] is a preferred provider through that network.” Id. Further, Ms.
McLaughlin testified, the Victim received her shoulder surgery at WellSpan
Health. See id.
Ms. McLaughlin testified that, in total, “the amount charged to the health
plan” for all expenses related to the Victim’s shoulder surgery was $63,716.15.
Id. at 13-14; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2. Ms. McLaughlin testified
that “the self-funded benefit plan through HCR ManorCare” then paid a total
of $51,039.07 for the Victim’s surgical care. N.T. Restitution Hearing,
12/15/20, at 13-14; Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2. She testified that the
self-funded benefit plan paid the lower amount, as it was “[b]ased on the
network [and] . . . based on a negotiated amount.” N.T. Restitution Hearing,
12/15/20, at 14.
As Ms. McLaughlin testified, The Phia Group “contracted with [the third
party administrator, Meritain Health,] to review data and pursue claims for
recovery and reimbursement to health plans.” N.T. Restitution Hearing,
12/15/20, at 11. She further explained that The Phia Group is “merely the
recovery and reimbursement subrogation vendor for HCR ManorCare and
Meritain.” Id. at 16. She testified: “[The Phia Group does] not pay claims.
The claims get paid through the third party administrator, which is Meritain
Health. The funds come out of the trust out of HCR ManorCare health plan.”
Id.
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Next, the Commonwealth called Dr. John Deitch as a witness. Dr. Deitch
testified that he is an orthopedic surgeon and director of sports medicine for
WellSpan Health and that he performed the September 11, 2019 shoulder
surgery on the Victim. Id. at 18-19. As Dr. Deitch testified, following the
February 20, 2019 assault, the Victim: “[w]as evaluated in the emergency
department [on February 20, 2019] and was diagnosed or presented with
what appeared to be a shoulder dislocation. It was reduced in the emergency
department that night.” Id. at 24. As the doctor testified, the medical records
reveal that the Victim suffered a “full dislocation” of her shoulder on February
20, 2019. He testified:
[the medical records from February 20, 2019] indicate[ that
the Victim] was awaiting post-reduction x-ray. The clinician
at the time, based on exam and mechanism per the record,
said likely anterior inferior dislocation. The prescribing
clinician recommended numbing medicine as well as an
antinausea medicine and then performing a shoulder
reduction, in other words, put the joint back in place.
Id. at 26-27.
Dr. Deitch testified that he first met with the Victim on June 6, 2019.
He testified that he did not immediately recommend surgery “because we
needed to get further information to help plan the surgery.” Id. at 29. The
doctor thus “order[ed an] MRI arthrogram.” Id. He testified that, after
meeting the Victim in June 2019, the Victim experienced “multiple dislocations
or subluxations unrelated to the February incident.” Id. The doctor testified
that he eventually arrived at the opinion that the Victim required surgery. As
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he testified: “[the February 20, 2019] dislocation as well as other[
dislocations] precipitated chronic recurrent shoulder instability for which [the
Victim] required surgery.” Id. at 24 and 25.
The Victim also testified at the restitution hearing. As the Victim
testified, before the February 20, 2019 assault, she suffered one prior
shoulder dislocation in November 2017. However, she testified: “I had no
issues between November of 2017 and February of 2019. Yeah, I had no
shoulder problems, nothing. Like, I healed fine. Everything was fine.” Id. at
36-37. The Victim testified that, after Appellant assaulted her on February
20, 2019, her shoulder “wouldn’t stay stable. Like, I couldn’t even reach my
arms out to give my kids a hug. My arm would just, like, fall out of [the]
socket. Just movement like that, it would just fall out.” Id. at 37. She
testified that she finally met with Dr. Deitch “because I didn’t know what else
to do. Like, it wouldn’t stay stable. There was nothing I could do. You know,
I couldn’t function. I couldn’t work. I couldn’t do anything.” Id.
On February 23, 2021, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to modify restitution and ordered Appellant to pay restitution, as part
of his direct sentence under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106, in the following amounts:
$51,039.07 to The Phia Group and $5,000.00 to VCAP. See N.T. Restitution
Hearing, 2/23/21, at 22 and 25. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He
raises three issues on appeal:
[1.] Did the trial court err when it modified the sentenc[ing]
order when it determined that [The Phia Group] was a victim
under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)?
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[2.] Did the trial court err when it modified the sentenc[ing]
order by failing to apply the “but for” test to identify damages
which occurred as a direct result of the crime and which
should not have occurred but for [Appellant’s] criminal
conduct?
[3.] Did the trial court err when it modified the sentenc[ing]
order because the modification was speculative and
unsupported by the record?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Our Supreme Court has explained:
in the criminal context, generally speaking, restitution is the
requirement that the criminal offender repay, as a condition
of his sentence, the victim or society, in money or services.
It is well established that the primary purpose of restitution
is rehabilitation of the offender by impressing upon him or
her that his [or her] criminal conduct caused the victim's loss
or personal injury and that it is his [or her] responsibility to
repair the loss or injury as far as possible. Thus, recompense
to the victim is only a secondary benefit, as restitution is not
an award of damages. Although restitution is penal in nature,
it is highly favored in the law and encouraged so that the
criminal will understand the egregiousness of his or her
conduct, be deterred from repeating the conduct, and be
encouraged to live in a responsible way.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 981 A.2d 893, 895-896 (Pa. 2009) (footnotes
and citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court ordered restitution as a part of Appellant's
direct sentence, in accordance with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106. See, e.g., Trial
Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 19; Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. In relevant part,
Section 1106(a) reads:
(a) General rule.--Upon conviction for any crime wherein:
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(1) property of a victim has been stolen, converted or
otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially
decreased as a direct result of the crime; or
(2) the victim, if an individual, suffered personal injury
directly resulting from the crime,
the offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in
addition to the punishment prescribed therefor.
...
(c) Mandatory restitution.--
(1) The court shall order full restitution:
(i) Regardless of the current financial resources of the
defendant, so as to provide the victim with the fullest
compensation for the loss. The court shall not reduce
a restitution award by any amount that the victim has
received from the Crime Victim's Compensation Board
or other government agency but shall order the
defendant to pay any restitution ordered for loss
previously compensated by the board to the Crime
Victim's Compensation Fund or other designated
account when the claim involves a government
agency in addition to or in place of the board. The
court shall not reduce a restitution award by any
amount that the victim has received from an
insurance company but shall order the defendant to
pay any restitution ordered for loss previously
compensated by an insurance company to the
insurance company.
(ii) If restitution to more than one victim is set at the
same time, the court shall set priorities of payment.
However, when establishing priorities, the court shall
order payment in the following order:
(A) Any individual.
(A.1) Any affected government agency.
(B) The Crime Victim's Compensation Board.
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(C) Any other government agency which has
provided reimbursement to the victim as a result
of the defendant's criminal conduct.
(D) Any insurance company which has provided
reimbursement to the victim as a result of the
defendant's criminal conduct.
(E) Any estate or testamentary trust.
(F) Any business entity organized as a nonprofit or
not-for-profit entity.
(G) Any other business entity.
...
(h) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following
words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in
this subsection:
...
“Business entity.” A domestic or foreign:
(1) business corporation;
(2) nonprofit corporation;
(3) general partnership;
(4) limited partnership;
(5) limited liability company;
(6) unincorporated nonprofit association;
(7) professional association; or
(8) business trust, common law business trust or
statutory trust.
...
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“Insurance company.” An entity that compensates a
victim for loss under an insurance contract.
“Insurance contract.” A contract governed by the
insurance laws of the state in which it was issued or a
plan of benefits sponsored by an employer or employee
organization.
...
“Restitution.” The return of the property of the victim
or payments in cash or the equivalent thereof pursuant to
an order of the court.
“Victim.” As defined in section 103 of the act of
November 24, 1998 (P.L. 882, No. 111), known as the
Crime Victims Act. The term includes an affected
government agency, the Crime Victim's Compensation
Fund, if compensation has been paid by the Crime
Victim's Compensation Fund to the victim, any insurance
company that has compensated the victim for loss under
an insurance contract and any business entity.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106 (effective October 24, 2018) (footnote omitted).2, 3
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2 Appellant committed his crime on February 20, 2019. Therefore, the current
version of Section 1106 applies to this case.
3 Section 1106(h) declares that the term “victim” includes the relevant
definition “in section 103 of the . . . Crime Victims Act.” In relevant part, 18
P.S. § 11.103 defines the terms “direct victim” and “victim” as follows:
“Direct victim.” An individual against whom a crime has been
committed or attempted and who as a direct result of the criminal
act or attempt suffers physical or mental injury, death or the loss
of earnings under this act. . . .
“Victim.” The term means the following:
(1) A direct victim.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We have explained that, under the plain terms of Section 1106(a), the
sentencing court “is statutorily required to impose restitution . . . when the
Commonwealth has established that the defendant committed a crime, the
victim suffered injury to person or property, and there exists a direct causal
nexus between the crime of which defendant was convicted and the loss or
damage suffered by the victim.” Commonwealth v. Weir, 201 A.3d 163,
170 (Pa. Super. 2018). Further, Section 1106 demands that the trial court
order “full restitution . . . to provide the victim with the fullest compensation
for the loss.”
Id. Our Supreme Court has, however, held:
Because [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106] imposes restitution as part of
a sentence, its penal character must not be overlooked and
it would seem to us that restitution can be permitted under
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106 only as to losses for which the defendant
has been held criminally accountable. This is in keeping with
the well established principle that criminal statutes must be
strictly construed. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1).
Commonwealth v. Harner, 617 A.2d 702, 705 (Pa. 1992) (some citations
omitted).
____________________________________________
(2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct victim,
except when the parent or legal guardian of the child is the
alleged offender.
(3) A minor child who is a material witness to . . . [certain
crimes and offenses] committed or attempted against a
member of the child's family. . . .
(4) A family member of a homicide victim . . . except where
the family member is the alleged offender.
18 P.S. § 11.103.
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We turn now to consider the precise nature of Appellant's challenges to
the trial court's restitution order. In discerning the nature of a challenge to
the imposition of restitution, we have held:
the appellate courts have drawn a distinction between those
cases where the challenge is directed to the trial court's
[statutory] authority to impose restitution and those cases
where the challenge is premised upon a claim that the
restitution order is excessive. When the court's authority to
impose restitution is challenged, it concerns the legality of
the sentence; however, when the challenge is based on
excessiveness, it concerns the discretionary aspects of the
sentence.
Commonwealth v. Oree, 911 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also
In re M.W.,
725 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. 1999) (holding that, when an issue
“centers upon [the court's] statutory authority” to impose the sentence, as
opposed to the “court's exercise of discretion in fashioning” the sentence, the
issue implicates the legality of the sentence); Commonwealth v. Walker,
666 A.2d 301, 307 (Pa. Super. 1995) (“challenges alleging that a sentence of
restitution is excessive under the circumstances have been held by this court
to be challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing”).
First, Appellant claims that the trial court lacked statutory authority to
order that he pay restitution to The Phia Group, as The Phia Group is neither
a victim nor an insurance company. Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant’s claim
implicates the legality of his sentence, as the challenge “centers upon [the
court's] statutory authority” to impose the sentence of restitution. See In re
M.W., 725 A.2d at 731. We note that “[l]egality of sentence questions are
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not waivable and may be raised sua sponte [on direct review] by this Court.”
Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 118 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).
Further, since Appellant’s claim implicates the legality of his sentence, the
claim “presents a pure question of law.” Commonwealth v. Petrick,
217
A.3d 1217, 1224 (Pa. 2019). As such, “our scope of review is plenary and our
standard of review de novo.”
Id.
Appellant’s claim requires that we “interpret[] the provision of the
Crimes Code which mandates restitution.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 981
A.2d 893, 897 (Pa. 2009). To do so, “we necessarily turn to the Statutory
Construction Act. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501 et seq.” Brown, 981 A.2d at 897. As
our Supreme Court has explained:
The Statutory Construction Act provides that the object of our
interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1921(a). The General Assembly's intent is best expressed
through the plain language of the statute. When the words
of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to
look beyond the plain meaning of the statute “under the
pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b).
Therefore, only when the words of a statute are ambiguous
should a court seek to ascertain the intent of the General
Assembly through consideration of statutory construction
factors found in Section 1921(c). 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
Finally, penal statutes are to be strictly construed. 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1928 (b)(1).
The need for strict construction, however, does not require
that the words of a penal statute be given their narrowest
meaning or that legislative intent be disregarded. It does
mean, however, that, if an ambiguity exists in the verbiage
of a penal statute, such language should be interpreted in the
light most favorable to the accused. More specifically, where
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doubt exists concerning the proper scope of a penal statute,
it is the accused who should receive the benefit of such doubt.
Finally, the Crimes Code itself supplies guidance as to the
construction of the provisions of the Code: “The provisions of
this title shall be construed according to the fair import of
their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing
constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general
purposes stated in this title and the special purposes of the
particular provision involved.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 105.
Brown, 981 A.2d at 897-898 (some citations and quotation marks omitted).
The case at bar is not one where “property of a victim has been stolen,
converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially
decreased as a direct result of [a] crime.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a)(1).
Rather, in this case, restitution was ordered because the Victim “suffered
personal injury directly resulting from the crime.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1106(a)(2). Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court was required to order
that Appellant pay restitution under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a)(2). As noted
above, Section 1106(a)(2) declares: “[u]pon conviction for any crime wherein
. . . the victim, if an individual, suffered personal injury directly resulting from
the crime, the offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in addition to
the punishment prescribed therefor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a)(2).
Section 1106(c) goes on to declare that the trial court “shall order full
restitution . . . [r]egardless of the current financial resources of the defendant,
so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for the loss.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1)(i). Further, as our Supreme Court has held, “as
evinced by the [ever] broaden[ing] Section 1106, the General Assembly not
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only expressed an increased focus on the importance of mandatory restitution,
it believed that criminal offenders should provide restitution to the victim
directly, and to entities incurring expenses on the victim’s behalf.” Brown,
981 A.2d at 900. Thus, included in the definition of “victim” is “any insurance
company that has compensated the victim for loss under an insurance
contract.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(h).
In this case, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay restitution, to The
Phia Group, in the amount of $51,039.07. On appeal, Appellant claims that
the trial court lacked statutory authority to order that he pay restitution to
The Phia Group, as The Phia Group is neither the “victim” nor an “insurance
company.” We agree.
The testimony at the restitution hearing reveals that HRC ManorCare
self-insures its employees’ health care benefits through its self-funded
employee benefit plan. N.T. Restitution Hearing, 12/15/20, at 15-16.
Self-funded employee benefit plans are governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. See, e.g.,
FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52 (1990). The assets of the employee
benefit plan are held in trust, pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 1103, and the trust is
administered by a third-party administrator, Meritain Health. N.T. Restitution
Hearing, 12/15/20, at 15-16; see also
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (“[e]xcept as
[otherwise provided,] all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in
trust by one or more trustees”).
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The Victim received health care coverage through her employment at
HRC ManorCare. N.T. Restitution Hearing, 12/15/20, at 15-16. The Victim
testified that, as a direct result of Appellant’s February 20, 2019 assault, she
required shoulder surgery. N.T. Restitution Hearing, 12/15/20, at 36-37.
Maribel McLaughlin, of The Phia Group, testified that the funds for this surgery
came directly “out of the trust out of HCR ManorCare health plan” and that
the trust paid a total of $51,039.07 for the Victim’s surgical care. Id. at 13-14.
Ms. McLaughlin’s testimony also clarified The Phia Group’s role in paying
health care claims on behalf of beneficiaries of the HCR ManorCare health plan.
She testified that The Phia Group is “merely the recovery and reimbursement
subrogation vendor for HCR ManorCare and Meritain” and that “[The Phia
Group does] not pay claims.” Id. at 16.
Our restitution statute defines the terms “insurance company” and
“insurance contract” in the following manner:
“Insurance company.” An entity that compensates a victim
for loss under an insurance contract.
“Insurance contract.” A contract governed by the
insurance laws of the state in which it was issued or a plan of
benefits sponsored by an employer or employee organization.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(h).
Further, Section 1106 specifically declares:
The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount
that the victim has received from an insurance company but
shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for
loss previously compensated by an insurance company to
the insurance company.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1)(i) (emphasis added); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1106(h) (defining the term “victim” as including “any insurance company
that has compensated the victim for loss under an insurance contract”).
Simply stated, The Phia Group did not compensate the Victim in this
case for a loss and The Phia Group was not operating “under an insurance
contract” with the Victim. As such, The Phia Group does not qualify as an
“insurance company” under Section 1106. Rather, in this case, it appears as
though the trust established pursuant to HCR ManorCare’s self-funded
employee benefit plan “compensate[d the V]ictim for loss under an insurance
contract,” where the “insurance contract” was “a plan of benefits sponsored
by [the Victim’s] employer,” HCR ManorCare.4
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4 The ERISA preemption provision is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). In
relevant part, Section 1144 declares:
(a) Supersedure . . .
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions
of this subchapter and subchapter III shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. . . .
(b) Construction and application
...
(2)(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose
of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Further, although Ms. McLaughlin testified that The Phia Group
contracted with the third-party administrator of the trust, Meritain Health, to
“pursue claims for recovery and reimbursement” that were expended by the
trust, the plain language of Section 1106(c)(1)(i) only permits restitution to
go “to the insurance company” – not to a separate company that pursues
“recovery and reimbursement” on behalf of the insurance company. 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Our interpretation of Section
1106’s plain language is bolstered by the fact that Section 1106 is a penal
____________________________________________
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of
any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
...
(4) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any generally applicable
criminal law of a State.
29 U.S.C. § 1144.
Section 1144(b)(2)(B) declares that an employee benefit plan and a trust
established under such a plan may not “be deemed to be an insurance
company” under ERISA.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). However, Section
1144(b)(4) declares that ERISA does not preempt “any generally applicable
criminal law of a State.”
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
The issue of whether Pennsylvania’s criminal restitution statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1106, completely falls within ERISA’s anti-preemption provision has not
been briefed in this case and a decision on the issue is unnecessary to resolve
Appellant’s claims.
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statute and thus must be “strictly construed in favor of the defendant.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, 221 A.3d 631, 636 (Pa. 2019).
Thus, since The Phia Group is not an “insurance company” and did not
pay any claim in this case, The Phia Group was not entitled to restitution under
the plain language of Section 1106. We must, therefore, vacate Appellant’s
judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.5, 6
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/31/2022
____________________________________________
5 Since we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, Appellant’s remaining
claims are moot.
6 Our holding does not mean that the trial court is precluded from ordering
Appellant to pay restitution for losses previously compensated by an insurance
company. We simply hold that restitution must be ordered in accordance with
Section 1106 and that The Phia Group is not eligible under that provision to
receive payment since it is neither an “insurance company” nor a “victim”
under the statute.
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