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← 276 Ark. 127 - Kellensworth v. State

Kellensworth v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1982

Citation profile

20
cited by 20 later decisions
1
states following
June 1999
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 18 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Irvin v. Dowd · Swindler v. State · Glover v. State · Kellensworth v. State · Andrews v. Lauener

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “It is settled beyond question that a party’s attempt to fabricate evidence is admissible, not merely as an admission under Uniform Evidence Rule 801(d)(2) but as proof relevant to show his own belief that his case is weak. As one court has said, in a case involving a fabricated alibi, “fabrication of evidence of innocence is cogent evidence of guilt.” Harvey v. United States, 215 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir., 1954). In a case similar to the present one, involving the recantation of previous testimony about a fabricated alibi, the court held that the testimony was admissible not merely in rebuttal but as part of the prosecution’s case in chief, a point we do not reach. State v. Thompson, 71 S.D. 319 , 24 N.W.2d 10 (1946). Wigmore states the principle as being based upon one of the simplest of inferences: It has always been understood — the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in human experience — that a party’s falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar conduct is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause’s lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause. Wigmore, Evidenc”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “. . . The Court holds that there is no requirement that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts involved: ‘It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented at court.’”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.