¶2For the reasons explained in Justice Carley’s dissenting opinion, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s affirmance of this appeal. I write separately, however, to note that the majority’s analysis in Division 2 regarding the trial court’s decision to admit the victim’s personal journal entries regarding her upcoming divorce litigation is in conflict with this Court’s precedent governing the admissibility of out-of-court statements under the necessity exception to the rule against hearsay. First, the majority improperly treats other evidence corroborating the journal’s contents as indicators of the journal’s reliability.12 This Court has recently held that evidence corroborating out-of-court statements does not indicate reliability but rather is considered only when determining whether any error in admitting the statements was harmless.13
¶3Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the nature of statements made in anticipation of or preparation for divorce litigation that suggests they will necessarily be truthful.14 Spouses who, as here, face the likelihood of divorce may often be inclined to make self-serving statements that tend to portray the marital relationship in an inaccurate or biased light.15 Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, I can discern no strong indicators of reliability that militated in favor of the journal entries’ admission into evidence. To the contrary, it appears that the hearsay declarant was under great stress due to her relationship and also was using illicit drugs. There being no real indicia of reliability associated with the journal entries, I believe that the trial court erred in admitting them under the necessity exception.
¶4I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent.
