¶1Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
¶2Robert P. Miller, Daytona Beach, for respondent.
¶3PER CURIAM.
¶4Petition for writ of certiorari was filed in this cause by the State of Florida based upon the conflict between the decision sub judice of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 272 So.2d 889, and our decision in State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So.2d 129 (1971). Fla. Const., Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(3), F.S.A. Oral argument was dispensed with pursuant to F.A.R. 3.10(e), 32 F.S.A.
¶5The District Court affirmed, per curiam, the order of the trial judge discharging respondent from criminal prosecution under Rule 1.191, Cr.P.R. (now 3.191), 33 F.S.A. The basis of the discharge was a demand *481 for speedy trial filed by respondent fifty-three days before any indictment, information or trial affidavit had been filed against him. Respondent was discharged only twenty-five days after an information had been filed.
¶6In State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, supra, we held:
"Under the provisions of Rule 1.191, ... the 60-day period does not begin to run until a demand for trial by the defendant has been filed in accordance with the provisions of the rule after defendant has been charged with a crime by indictment, information or trial affidavit." (Emphasis added.)
¶7We see no reason to recede from our above-quoted decision. We therefore reverse the District Court with directions to remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶8It is so ordered.
¶9CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.