Volume 276 — United States Reports

Held: that it was respondent’s imperative duty to return the excess to the parties who paid it, whether they required it or not, together with six per cent, interest thereon from the date when the decision of this Court fixing the amounts allowable was announced; and that his conduct in retaining the excess was not “upright and according to law ” — the words of the oath taken at his admission to practice before this Court.

Held: The means by which the state court was induced to delay exercise of its jurisdiction to appoint receivers and the failure to reveal the facts to the federal court, constituted a fraud on both courts. P. 56. (2) Vindication of the cause of comity and good faith as between the two courts should not be limited to punitive proceedings against the lawyer whose pledge to the state court was broken. P. 54.

Held: That as items definitely specified by § 15 (6) of the amended Act to Regulate Commerce were not considered, the order must be annulled. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway, 265 U. S. 274 , distinguished. P. 115.

Held: The evidence is not sufficient to warrant a finding that defendant failed in any duty owed plaintiff in respect of the distance between tracks. Carriers, like other employers, have much freedom of choice in providing facilities and places for their employees, and courts will not prescribe the space to be maintained between tracks nor leave such questions to the uncertain and varying opinions of juries. P. 169. 2.

Held: that the right of action for his death was controlled by the state, and not by the maritime, law, since, though the death occurred in the water, the occurrence which was the sole, immediate and proximate cause of it and gave rise to the cause of action, was on the wharf, which was to be deemed an extension of the land. P. 181. 6 La. Ct. App. 284, affirmed.

Held: The taking of private property for public use is against the common right, and authority so to do must be clearly expressed. The agreement does not empower the town to establish a public hackstand on the company’s land.

Held: in the same district, that a partnership might be adjudged a bankrupt although one partner, being a minor, could not be so adjudged. 9 Neither of two incidental questions upon which the lower federal courts have differed in opinion — whether a partnership can be deemed insolvent as an entity when the individual partners are solvent, and whether a bankruptcy court which has adjudged a partnership a bankrupt may take…

Held: the statute is to be construed as not *241 affecting the obligation of the surety, we think it plain that the liability on the bond, qua contract, is not affected by the county treasurer’s breach of duty. The bond contains no limitation of the amount which the treasurer may deposit. The district court was therefore right in allowing a recovery of the full amount of the bond.

Held: that a party complaining of the mileage tax does not establish discrimination against interstate commerce by the mere difference of the *246 taxes, but must prove that in actual practice the tax complained of falls with disproportionate economic weight upon him. P. 251. 5.

Held: That the state court’s construction of the taxing Acts as imposing a succession tax, and of the trust instrument as creating a power of appointment within the Act of 1909, would be accepted by this Court. P. 269.

Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), was a property rights case in balancing the rights of a property owner against a social policy that is not unreasonable.

Held: that the dismissal must be taken as a holding that the case was not appealable of right; and that, since the petitioners had omitted to apply for leave to the Court of Appeals, the judgment of the Appellate Division was not that of the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had, and the writ of certiorari must therefore be dismissed. P. 286.

Held: at the option of the lessor, to be bound for another year, under an agreement implied in law, regardless of his actual intention, Railroad Co. v. West, 57 Ohio St. 161 , 165, 168; Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio St. 344 , 349. Not having affirmatively continued the lease beyond the actual period of occupancy, the Government cannot, under the doctrine of the Leiter case, be bound for a longer term.

Held: That a motion by the defendants to vacate the consent decree could not be sustained upon the ground that there was no case *312 or controversy to afford jurisdiction, since (a) an injunction may issue to prevent future wrongs though no right has yet been violated; and (b) because, if the court, having jurisdiction of the subject and the parties, erred in deciding that there was a controversy, the error could have…

Held: that the change was made from 9-10-19 to 2-10-19, which would carry the original and correct date of this test to the later date of September 10, 1919, or three or four days later than the reading of the paper by Dr. Kratz to the American Chemical Society, and after Weiss had been informed by his colleague Daniels of Kratz’s blackboard statement of the results of his discoveries.

J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), is a landmark case in the United States in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that congressional delegation of legislative authority is an implied power of Congress that is constitutional so long as Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to guide the executive branch. Congress has the authority to legislate and regulate commerce and customs dues. § 315 of the Tariff Act (42 Stat. 858) delegated authority to the Executive to raise the rate fixed by the statute (the "flexible tariff provision").

Held: That the master of the Newport was presumptively negligent and, in the absence of clear exonerating evidence, was personally hable. P. 460. 2. The Svea was not at fault in maintaining her course and speed, pursuant to the fundamental rule of the International Rules for Navigation at Sea.

United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463 (1928), was a Supreme Court case in which the court ruled that in order to receive the full benefits of citizenship, the widow of an alien who died after declaring his intent to become a citizen, but before being naturalized, must file her petition within the time frame set by law, at the time being 7 years after the declaration of intent was filed. This case established that when applying for citizenship, the action undertaken by an alien to become naturalized is to be understood to also be "as though taken by the widow herself."

Held: that the action lay because it was brought to enforce the common law duty of the carrier to furnish cars, Midland Valley *484 R. R. Co. v. Hoffman Coal Co., 91 Ark. 180 , 189, — a duty confirmed by the statutes of the State (Crawford & Moses Arkansas Digest, 1921, § 895), and recognized by the Interstate Commerce Act.

Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Company v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Company, 276 U.S. 518 (1928), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court refused to hold that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state common law. Ten years later, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Court reversed course, and overturned Swift v. Tyson.

Held: That plaintiff had no cause of action against the city for negligence or misrepresentation. P. 542. 2. He was charged through the transcript when he bought the bonds with notice of the invalidating facts, and must be held to have known the law. P. 541. 3.

Held: in response to questions from the Circuit Court of Appeals: 1. That the Secretary of the Interior, when the land was purchased, had no power to exempt it from such taxation. P. 577. 2. The tax was not a forbidden tax upon a federal instrumentality.

Held: that the only transaction entered into with respect to the property was the purchase of the land and the erection of the house, regardless of the use which might afterwards be made of it, and that these acts did not appear to be a transaction entered into for profit.