Harkin v. Brundage’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

254 federal appellate · 59 district · 51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 534 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * As between two courts of concurrent and co-ordinal e jurisdiction, the court which first obtains jurisdiction and constructive possession of property by filing the bill is entitled to retain it without interference and can not be deprived of its right to do so, because it may not have obtained prior physical possession by its receiver of the properly in dispute.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg · 444 F. Supp. 1071 - Tweel v. Frankel

2. ““In this country, in which in every state we have courts of concurrent jurisdiction under the federal and the state authority, it is of the highest importance that conflict of jurisdiction should be avoided. It can only be avoided by forbearance and comity, and by enforcing upon the parties and counsel, engaged the utmost good faith and the fullest disclosure in one jurisdiction with reference to what are the exact facts relevant to litigation in a corresponding case in the other. This is especially true with respect to receiverships. The desire of those who represent an embarrassed corporation to seek a refuge from active and urgent creditors under the protecting arm of an officer of the court, leads to strenuous efforts to frame a case which may under equity practice justify a receiver. More than this, circumstances which should have no influence lead the pax ties in interest to prefer one court to another in the selection of the person to be appointed as receiver, with the hope on behalf of those in charge of the embarrassed corporation that the appointment may fall to one whose conduct will be in sympathy with, rather than antagonistic to, the previous management of the corporation, in the hands of which the embarrassment has arisen. As the Court of Appeals says, there should be no ‘friendly’ receiverships, because the receiver is an officer of the court and should be as free from ‘friendliness’ to a party as should the court itself. Nor should there be any competition or”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. C. T. C. Inv. Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corp. · Cosmopolitan Hotel, Inc. v. Colorado National Bank

3. “We therefore shall direct the district court to reverse its action in denying the motion to surrender through its receivers the property of the estate still in its custody to the state court receivers. But the surrender should be only on condition that the state court receivers produce an order from the state court confirming all that has been done in the sale of the property, the disposition of the assets and the distribution thereof as if it had been by its own decree and shall so shape the pleadings and its orders that the case may proceed in the state court as a creditor's bill and a liquidation of all the debts, to enable it to proceed to the complete distribution of all remaining assets in liquidation, as it would have had to do, in view of the insolvency, in a continued administration under the stockholder's bill. The federal court should, before surrender, fix and pay the compensation due to its officers for the work done by them, and, in doing so, should take care to fix the compensation within limits which are plainly reasonable * * *.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Perfection Garment Co. v. Crosby Stores, Inc.