J-A05036-22
2022 PA Super 97
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM R. LANDIS JR. : No. 611 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered April 16, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0005405-2009
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2022
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Berks County granting Appellee William R. Landis, Jr.’s
post-sentence motion and awarding him a new trial. The Commonwealth
argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Landis was entitled
to a new trial based on his claim that the jury’s verdict was against the weight
of the evidence. We reverse the trial court’s order granting a new trial and
reinstate the judgment of sentence entered on November 12, 2020.
The procedural history of this case is rather extensive as this case has
been heavily litigated over more than a decade, and this is the seventh appeal
before this Court. Landis was charged with first-degree murder, third-degree
murder, and two counts of aggravated assault in connection with the October
28, 2009 shooting death of his wife, Sharon Landis (“the victim”). In addition,
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A05036-22
Landis was charged with one count of Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer,
multiple counts of aggravated assault, and related crimes in connection with
Landis’s conflict with police as they attempted to take him into custody after
finding the victim had been fatally shot.1
After Landis’s first jury trial began on April 1, 2013, the jury convicted
Landis of first-degree murder, but acquitted him of the remaining murder
charge. On May 15, 2013, Landis was sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole.2 Landis appealed the judgment of sentence which this Court affirmed
on April 10, 2014. Commonwealth v. Landis, 1018 MDA 2013, 2014 WL
10936726 (Pa.Super. April 10, 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
On December 22, 2014, Landis filed a petition for relief pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On December
21, 2015, the PCRA court granted Landis a new trial based on his claim that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert testimony to support
a diminished capacity defense. On appeal, this Court affirmed the PCRA
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1 On April 14, 2010, after considering Landis’s pretrial motions, the trial court
dismissed the charge of Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer and severed the
remaining charges related to his conflict with law enforcement. After the
Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal, this Court ultimately reinstated
the charge of Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer. Commonwealth v.
Landis, 48 A.3d 432 (Pa.Super. 2012) (en banc).
2 At sentencing, the parties agreed the Commonwealth would withdraw the
charge of Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer since Landis was sentenced to
life imprisonment so long as the Commonwealth would be allowed to reinstate
the charge if Landis was ever granted a new trial. Thus, the trial court
dismissed the charge of Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer.
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court’s order on November 30, 2016 and the Supreme Court denied the
Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal on July 24, 2017.
Commonwealth v. Landis, 28 MDA 2016, 2016 WL 6995387 (Pa.Super.
November 30, 2016) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v.
Landis,
169 A.3d 1059 (Pa. 2017).3
On September 8, 2020, Landis’s second trial commenced on the first-
degree murder charge,4 and the parties presented extensive testimony over
a five-day period.
On October 28, 2009, Landis contacted the Spring Township Police to
report that his wife had been shot and then hung up the phone. Notes of
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3 On August 28, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reinstate the
charge of Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer as well as the third-degree
murder charge and aggravated assault charges. Landis did not oppose the
reinstatement of Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer charge but claimed the
other charges could not be reinstated as double jeopardy applied.
On October 14, 2017, the trial court entered an order denying the
Commonwealth’s motion to reinstate the charges of third-degree murder and
aggravated assault. On December 24, 2018, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Commonwealth v. Landis, 201 A.3d 768 (Pa.Super.
2018). This Court denied reconsideration on January 7, 2019, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth’s petition for
allowance of appeal on September 4, 2019, and the Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari on March 2, 2020.
4 Prior to trial in this case, on February 22, 2020, the trial court granted
Landis’s pretrial motion to dismiss the charge of Assault of a Law Enforcement
Officer pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. After the Commonwealth appealed that
ruling, the parties proceeded to trial on the first-degree murder charge of
which Landis was convicted in the instant case. Thereafter, on December 17,
2020, this Court vacated the trial court’s order dismissing the charge of
Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer and remanded for trial. See
Commonwealth v. Landis, 501 MDA 2020,
2020 WL 7396932 (Pa.Super.
December 17, 2020) (unpublished memorandum).
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Testimony (N.T.), 9/8/20 – 9/16/20, at 249-51, 319, 463. When the officers
arrived at Landis’s home, they found the deceased victim’s body on the floor
of a second-floor bedroom and noted she had sustained gunshot wounds to
the head and chest. N.T. at 256-58. Officers noticed a bullet shell casing
laying in a laundry basket next to the victim. N.T. at 258.
The officers were startled to find Landis had barricaded himself in the
basement, and Landis told the officers that he would kill them if they came
downstairs to get him. N.T. at 259-62. When officers indicated that they
were going to get a canine officer, Landis appeared at the basement steps,
pointed a gun to his own head, and reiterated that he would shoot any officer
that tried to come down into the basement. N.T. at 262.
Detective Stephen Brock stayed at the top of the basement stairs and
spoke with Landis from a distance for four or five hours, during which Landis
identified himself and his wife, who was the victim found in the upstairs
bedroom. N.T. at 264, 271. Landis explained that he and his wife had an
argument, she threatened to kill him, Landis grabbed a firearm, and
accidentally shot her. N.T. at 265.
Detective Brock noticed Landis had at least two firearms in the
basement and Landis pointed a gun at Detective Brock on several occasions.
N.T. at 265-269. When Detective Brock asked Landis to put the gun down,
Landis refused to do so and retreated from the detective’s sight. Landis
agreed to surrender numerous times, but then would continue to delay doing
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so for various reasons, indicating he had to make phone calls, find jewelry to
be given to a family member, and put on new clothes. N.T. at 270-276.
The responding officers sought the additional assistance of the Berks
County SWAT team (BCERT). N.T. at 261, 327. Several hours into the
encounter, when Landis appeared unarmed at the bottom of the stairs, the
BCERT team fired a foam round at Landis’s stomach and descended quickly
down the stairs to attempt to take Landis into custody using a Taser. N.T. at
377-78, 422, 423. However, when the Taser was not deployed successfully,
Landis grabbed a firearm and fired two shots, causing the BCERT members,
who were not injured, to run back up the stairs. N.T. at 378, 422-24.
After the standoff which lasted several hours, Landis eventually
surrendered and was taken into custody. N.T. at 277-78. Upon his arrest,
officers recovered two handguns (one of which was loaded) and a large knife
from the basement. N.T. at 561-62.
Detective Brock testified that when he initially began speaking with
Landis in the basement, Landis did not display any indication of intoxication.
N.T. at 274-75. Detective Brock was able to maintain a conversation with
Landis and had no trouble understanding him. N.T. at 274-75. However, as
the night progressed, Landis informed Detective Brock he was “drinking
something.” N.T. at 275. Detective Brock noted that Landis was becoming
more tired and he started to slur his speech, but Detective Brock was always
able to understand what Landis was saying. N.T. at 275-76. Landis later
admitted that he took a sleeping pill during the standoff. N.T. at 1076-77.
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Upon his arrest, officers transported Landis to the hospital where he was
treated for cuts on his hand and a bruise on his abdomen that Landis sustained
when he was struck by the foam round. N.T. at 333, 443. One of the officers
noted Landis smelled of alcohol, his speech was “a bit slurred,” and he
appeared to be tired. N.T. at 557. However, Landis was able to carry on
conversations with officers, his attorney, ambulance personnel, and hospital
staff. N.T. at 334-35, 345, 481-85.
Dr. Supriya Kuruvilla, a forensic pathologist, performed the victim’s
autopsy and determined the cause of her death was the gunshot wound to her
head. N.T. at 748. Based on the characteristic marks of the victim’s wounds
and stippling near the wounds,5 Dr. Kuruvilla was able to determine that the
bullet that entered the left side of the victim’s head was shot from
approximately two feet away. N.T. at 749-52. Dr. Kuruvilla noted the victim
also suffered a gunshot wound to the chest, in which the bullet entered her
left breast, passed through both breasts, and exited her body. N.T. at 753.
In addition, Dr. Kuruvilla noticed stippling on the victim’s right forehead and
palm which were unrelated to the two other gunshot wounds but raised the
possibility that another gunshot was fired that did not hit the victim. N.T. at
754-55. The toxicology report showed the victim did not have alcohol or drugs
in her body at the time of her death. N.T. at 764-66.
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5 Dr. Kuruvilla explained that stippling is a term that forensic pathologists use
to describe unburnt particles of gunshot residue that gets deposited on the
skin in characteristic patterns. N.T. at 750.
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In the bedroom where the victim’s body was found, officers discovered
three spent .380 caliber shell casings and an empty .380 caliber magazine.
N.T. at 837-42. Officers noted bullet holes in the bedroom wall and a defect
in a laundry basket consistent with a .380 projectile going through it. N.T. at
836, 843-49. Officers also recovered a spent .380 caliber casing from the
basement as well as a bottle of vodka with Landis’s fingerprints on it. N.T. at
875-877. Ballistics testing determined that all four casings were fired from
the .380 caliber firearm that was seized from the basement. N.T. at 561-62,
924-926. Additionally, DNA testing revealed that the victim’s DNA was not
found on either of the firearms but Landis’s DNA was found on the weapon
that fired the fatal shots. N.T. at 928-29, 1053-54.
The prosecution presented the testimony of Robert Johnson, who was
qualified as an expert witness in latent fingerprint examination, blood spatter
analysis, and crime scene reconstruction. N.T. at 827. In October 2009, Mr.
Johnson was employed as a Berks County detective and assisted in collecting
evidence at the crime scene. Based on the aforementioned evidence and
statements that Landis made to the defense psychiatrist about the shooting
(which will be discussed infra), Mr. Johnson opined that three separate shots
had been fired from the .380 caliber weapon, the first hitting the laundry
basket, the second passing through the victim’s breasts, and the third passing
through the victim’s head. N.T. at 933-951.
In an attempt to provide context to the events that led to the victim’s
death on October 28, 2009, the prosecution presented the testimony of two
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women, Jamie Brown and Cheryl Johnson, who worked at the Beachcomber
Resort in Pompano Beach, Florida, where Landis had spent several weeks in
September 2009, weeks before the victim’s death. Both women indicated that
Landis had shared personal information with them during his stay.
Ms. Brown, a bartender, testified that Landis had confided in her that he
was not happy in his marriage and wanted a divorce from his wife because
she had gained weight and was not maintaining herself as he would have liked.
N.T. at 496-97. Ms. Brown indicated that Landis had expressed a desire to
marry her upon his divorce, although Landis and Ms. Brown did not have a
romantic relationship. N.T. at 501. Landis gave Ms. Brown a $2,000 tip upon
leaving the resort. N.T. at 498.
Ms. Johnson, another Beachcomber Resort employee, similarly testified
that Landis confided in her during his September 2009 stay. Ms. Johnson
recalled Landis had indicated that his “marriage was pretty much over” and
Landis was “obsessed” about the financial aspect of his imminent divorce as
he did not want to lose his home to his wife. N.T. at 522-53. Ms. Johnson
indicated Landis offered her a condo and desired an intimate relationship with
her, but she declined. N.T. at 520-21, 529. Ms. Johnson shared that Landis
gave her a $4,800 tip upon leaving the resort. N.T. at 525.
On the night of the victim’s murder, Landis called Ms. Brown and told
her that his wife was dead, and said “I killed my wife; someone killed my wife;
I want to kill myself.” N.T. at 499. Ms. Brown recalled Landis sounded drunk
on that call. Thereafter, Ms. Brown told Ms. Johnson to call Landis. When she
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did so, Landis told Ms. Johnson that he shot his wife accidentally during an
argument when they struggled for a firearm. N.T. at 527-28.
The prosecution also presented evidence that the victim stayed at a
hotel on the night before her death. N.T. at 538. James Sieck, general
manager of Homewood Suites, testified that the victim booked a room on
October 27, 2009 and directed hotel staff that she did not want to receive any
calls during her stay. N.T. at 539. Mr. Sieck testified that Landis called over
twenty times asking to speak to the victim, but hotel personnel told him they
could not help him. N.T. at 542. In the morning, Landis arrived at the hotel
and asked to see the victim, but hotel personnel refused to give him access
to the victim. N.T. at 539-45.
Connie Landis, daughter of Landis and the victim, also testified for the
prosecution. Connie indicated that her parents were having an “intense
argument” on the night of the murder about accusations that the victim had
been cheating on Landis. N.T. at 679-82. Connie left the house when she
was unable to stop the argument. N.T. at 670, 683. Connie indicated that
Landis sent Connie a text at 8:43 p.m. during the argument before Connie left
the house and sent her another text at 9:31 p.m. to tell Connie that he had
shot her mother. N.T. at 683-688.
In response, the defense presented multiple witnesses in support of its
theory that Landis shot the victim in self-defense during a heated argument.
In addition, the defense claimed that Landis could not have formed specific
intent to kill the victim as he was intoxicated.
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The defense presented the testimony of Patricia Pieja, who testified that
on October 20, 2009, a week before the victim’s death, the victim called her
crying from the bathroom of a restaurant where she had gone with Landis for
her birthday and had engaged in an argument with Landis. N.T. at 1025. Ms.
Pieja recalled that the victim was very angry and said that she was going to
kill Landis. N.T. at 1025.
The couple’s son, William Landis, III, testified that he was at his parents’
house the night of the murder. N.T. at 1032. When William left the house at
approximately 8:20 p.m., he noted Landis had a smell of alcohol on his breath,
but Landis was not slurring his words. N.T. at 1034-35. William admitted
neither of his parents were agitated when he left their home. N.T. at 1037.
The couple’s other daughter, Barbara Landis, received several calls from
Landis on the night of her mother’s death. N.T. at 1043-44. Barbara recalled
hearing police officers in the background and noted that her father sounded
panicked and his speech was difficult to understand. N.T. at 1044-45.6
The defense also offered the testimony of Dr. Larry Rotenberg, who was
qualified as an expert in forensic psychiatry. N.T. at 1068. Dr. Rotenberg
conducted psychiatric evaluations of Landis in 2010 and 2018, during which
he administered psychological tests to Landis. N.T. at 1073-74. In addition,
Dr. Rotenberg reviewed police reports, family interviews, and Landis’s medical
____________________________________________
6 Barbara claimed that, after the investigation was complete, she found a shell
casing in the bedroom where the victim was shot. The shell casing was not
admitted into evidence or discussed by the defense. N.T. at 1047.
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records from the hospital the morning of his arrest and also from the Berks
County prison. N.T. at 1072-75. Dr. Rotenberg focused on the fact that
Landis’s blood test on the morning after the victim’s murder showed he had a
blood alcohol level (BAC) of .23 and the test also revealed the presence of
cocaine. N.T. at 1076. Dr. Rotenberg pointed out Landis’s BAC was likely
higher upon his arrest over an hour earlier. N.T. at 1076.
Based on this information, Dr. Rotenberg opined that Landis did not
have the mental capacity to form a specific intent to kill the victim, but rather
was operating under a diminished capacity. N.T. at 1075. Further, Dr.
Rotenberg made a diagnosis that, during the time of his stand-off with police,
Landis experienced a brief psychotic disorder that was brought on by the
stress of the victim’s death. N.T. at 1078-82.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor presented Dr. Rotenberg with his
expert report in which he recorded Landis’s account of the events that
occurred immediately prior to the victim’s death. Dr. Rotenberg documented
that Landis had claimed to be in his daughter’s bedroom fixing her phone when
he initiated a conversation with the victim about the possibility of divorce.
N.T. at 1089. Dr. Rotenberg indicated in his report that Landis recalled that
the victim “blew up” and attacked him after Landis informed the victim of the
amount of alimony he planned to give her and the retainer fee his attorney
was going to charge for the divorce. N.T. at 1091.
Dr. Rotenberg acknowledged that he reviewed the expert report of the
prosecution’s forensic psychiatrist, Dr. John O’Brien, who found Landis had
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the capacity to form specific intent to kill the victim, as he had engaged in
intentional acts at the time of the victim’s death in fixing a phone, engaging
the victim in a conversation about the financial aspects of a proposed divorce,
and calling 911 after the victim had been shot. However, Dr. Rotenberg
asserted that consideration of Landis’s rational acts before the victim’s death
did not change his expert opinion that Landis was so intoxicated that he lacked
the capacity to form the specific intent to kill the victim. N.T. at 1101-1109.
In addition, while Landis’s blood tests showed a BAC of .23 and the
presence of cocaine at 6 a.m. on the morning of October 29, 2009, more than
ten hours after the victim had been shot the previous evening, Dr. Rotenberg
admitted there was no way to tell if Landis drank the alcohol and/or snorted
the cocaine before the victim’s death or during his subsequent standoff with
police which had lasted multiple hours. N.T. at 1114-1115.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of Dr. John O’Brien,
who was also qualified as an expert in forensic psychiatry. N.T. at 1132-35.
In forming his opinion, Dr. O’Brien conducted a clinical interview with Landis
and conducted a cognitive capacity screening examination to look for evidence
of brain damage. In addition, Dr. O’Brien reviewed investigative materials
related to the victim’s death, Landis’s medical records from the hospital and
prison, and Dr. Rotenberg’s reports. N.T. at 1136-38.
Dr. O’Brien specifically noted that he was not expressing an opinion on
whether Landis had the intent to kill, which he acknowledged was a question
for the jury to determine. N.T. at 1139-40. However, Dr. O’Brien opined that
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Landis was capable of forming the intent to kill the victim at the time of her
death. N.T. at 1140.
In reaching this conclusion, Dr. O’Brien observed that Landis had no
symptoms of any psychiatric condition or cognitive impairment. N.T. at 1141.
Dr. O’Brien acknowledged Landis had a history of using alcohol and cocaine
but noted that it did not appear to rise to the level of a substance abuse
disorder as his drug use did not impair his daily life functioning or his ability
to serve as the owner and director of a successful trucking company. N.T. at
1141-42.
Dr. O’Brien testified that it was not appropriate for Dr. Rotenberg to
diagnose Landis as having a brief psychotic disorder that caused Landis to
react violently towards the arresting officers as Landis did not exhibit psychotic
symptoms, and further, the psychological diagnostic manual requires the
exclusion of drug/alcohol use before this diagnosis is made. N.T. at 1142-43.
Dr. O’Brien emphasized that Landis’s behavior near the time of the
victim’s death reflected that he was capable of formulating and carrying out
intentional tasks, such as fixing his daughter’s phone, engaging the victim in
a conversation about the financial aspects of their divorce, being fully aware
that there was a gun in the room where the victim was shot, calling 911, and
making numerous phone calls thereafter. N.T. at 1145-46.
However, Dr. O’Brien suggested there was “documentation in the
investigative interviews” that Landis discussed with two witnesses in Florida
his “intention to kill his wife in the weeks proceeding the offense” and told
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them “he was going to kill his wife.” N.T. at 1146. Notably, the defense did
not object or cross-examine Dr. O’Brien as to the accuracy of this statement.7
After the trial concluded on September 16, 2020, the jury convicted
Landis of first-degree murder. On November 12, 2020, Landis was sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
On November 23, 2020, Landis filed a post-sentence motion seeking a
new trial. Specifically, Landis claimed that he was entitled to a judgment of
acquittal as the Commonwealth had not met its burden to present sufficient
evidence to show that he had the specific intent to kill the victim.
In the alternative, Landis asked the trial court to grant a new trial as
the jury’s verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence.
Specifically, Landis asked the trial court to give more weight to the testimony
of Dr. Rotenberg than the testimony of Dr. O’Brien, which Landis deemed to
be speculative, as Dr. O’Brien had incorrectly stated that Landis had told Ms.
Brown and Ms. Johnson in Florida before the victim’s death that he planned to
kill his wife.
On January 19, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a response to Landis’s
post-sentence motion indicating that it had presented sufficient evidence of
Landis’s specific intent to kill, given that he had fired multiple shots at the
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7 It is important to note that when Dr. O’Brien testified, the jury had already
heard the testimony of Ms. Brown and Ms. Johnson, the two female witnesses
from Florida. Therefore, at this point in the trial, the jury knew precisely what
the women had told police in their pre-trial interviews and in their trial
testimony recalling the relevant events.
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victim, used a deadly weapon on vital parts of the victim’s body, only Landis’s
DNA was found on the firearm in question, and Landis showed consciousness
of guilt in threatening and shooting at the police when they attempted to take
him into custody.
With respect to the weight of the evidence claim, the Commonwealth
indicated that the jury was free to weigh the competing opinions of the
testifying experts to determine which expert testimony to believe and how
much weight to give to each expert opinion. The prosecutor stated that Dr.
O’Brien was honestly mistaken in testifying that Landis had discussed his
intent to kill the victim with other individuals before her death, and the
prosecutor argued that this inaccurate statement was not sufficient to
overturn the jury’s verdict in this case.
On April 16, 2021, the trial court entered its order granting Landis’s
post-sentence motion and awarding a new trial. In reviewing Landis’s
challenge to the weight of the evidence, the trial court decided Dr. O’Brien
had given false testimony and that Dr. O’Brien’s expert opinion was rendered
incompetent when he testified to facts not supported by the record.
That is, the trial court was referring to Dr. O’Brien’s inaccurate testimony
as to Ms. Brown and Ms. Johnson, the two Florida resort employees, who had
not testified that Landis had told them he planned to kill his wife. As such,
the trial court substituted its own conclusions of Dr. O’Brien’s credibility for
that of the jury by stating Dr. O’Brien “misled the jurors with lies, speculation,
and undocumented opinions,” adding the trial court’s own conclusion that “the
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jurors were unable to make a knowing decision based on the facts, the
evidence, and the expert reports.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/21, at 19.
The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal and complied with the trial
court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), in which it raised the following claim:
The Trial Court respectfully erred in granting the post-sentence
motion and awarding a new trial where the weight of all evidence
presented at trial by the Commonwealth including the psychiatric
testimony presented on rebuttal by Dr. John O’Brien, was
sufficient to support the conviction for Murder in the First Degree,
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
Concise Statement, at 1.
We first address Landis’s argument that the Commonwealth waived its
argument that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Landis’s post-
sentence motion raising a weight of the evidence claim. Landis asserts the
Commonwealth’s concise statement was too vague and did not concisely
identify the error that it intended to raise on appeal with sufficient detail to
allow the trial court to address it.
It is well-established that “[a]ny issues not raised in a 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Laboy, 230 A.3d
1134, 1138 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lord,
719 A.2d
306, 309 (Pa. 1998)). In addition, “when an appellant fails adequately to
identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the
trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent
to those issues.” Commonwealth v. Dowling,
778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa.Super.
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2001) (stating “[w]hen a court has to guess what issues an appellant is
appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review”).
Our Supreme Court addressed a similar claim in its recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d 1209, 1224–25 (Pa. 2021):
In all events, it bears noting that the purpose of Rule 1925
is to facilitate appellate review and to provide the parties and the
public with the legal basis for a judicial decision. See
Commonwealth v. Parrish, ––– Pa. ––––, ––––, 224 A.3d 682,
692 (2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632,
638, 868 A.2d 379, 382 (2005)). If that basis is evident from the
record, the trial court need not issue an opinion explaining it. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (requiring an opinion only where “the reasons
for the order [appealed from] do not already appear of record”).
The function of the concise statement is to clarify for the judge
who issued the order the grounds on which the aggrieved party
seeks appellate review – so as to facilitate the writing of the
opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (“If the judge entering the order
giving rise to the notice of appeal ... desires clarification of the
errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order
directing the appellant to file of record ... a concise statement of
the errors complained of on appeal[.]”).
In Commonwealth v. Laboy, 594 Pa. 411,
936 A.2d 1058
(2007) (per curiam), this Court faced a situation comparable to
the present controversy. The defendant's Rule 1925(b) statement
was exceedingly brief in setting forth an evidentiary-sufficiency
claim. Nevertheless, the common pleas court issued a Rule
1925(a) opinion resolving the claim on its merits. The Superior
Court found the claim waived due to its brevity and did not
address its merits. This Court held that the Superior Court should
have afforded the requested sufficiency review, as the trial
transcript was short, it was fairly evident from context that the
sole legal issue was whether the defendant was vicariously liable
for his co-defendant's actions, and “the common pleas court
readily apprehended Appellant's claim and addressed it in
substantial detail.” Id. at 415,
936 A.2d at 1060.
Here, the trial transcript is admittedly much longer than in
Laboy. Nevertheless, the weight-of-the-evidence claim was
readily understandable from context. Appellant's theory, for which
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he provided his own supporting testimony, was that he was
innocent of all charges in relation to the three adult victims
because he did not physically attack or steal from any of them,
and his intercourse with all of them was consensual. Further, and
as noted, in his post-sentence motion Appellant articulated the
evidentiary-weight claim at some length as to the three adult
victims, and those were the same individuals he mentioned in his
Rule 1925(b) statement. The common pleas court summarized the
victims’ credited testimony contradicting Appellant's theory and
determined that the verdicts were not contrary to the weight of
the evidence. Thus, as in Laboy, the trial court had no difficulty
apprehending the claim as set forth in the concise statement and
addressing its substance.
This latter circumstance is particularly salient because, as
explained, the concise statement's purpose is to assist the trial
judge in apprehending the issues and authoring an opinion
accordingly for the benefit of the parties, the appellate court, and
the public. If a concise statement's explanation of a particular
issue is overly long, moreover, the appellant runs the risk of
invoking the waiver rule on that basis. See Pa.R.A.P
1925(b)(4)(iv) (prohibiting “lengthy explanations as to any
error”); 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing, among other things, that
failure to raise issues in accordance with paragraph (b)(4) results
in waiver); 1925(b)(4)(ii) (mandating issues be stated concisely);
cf. Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 595 Pa. 366,
384 n.19, 938 A.2d 417, 428 n.19 (2007) (plurality) (observing
that Rule 1925 as revised “now explains that frivolous or
redundant issues continue to provide grounds for waiver, and
clarifies that a lengthy explanation of the claimed error(s) should
not be provided in the statement”).
In light of these principles, we find that the brevity of
Appellant's weight-of-the-evidence claim as set forth in his
concise statement represents a good-faith attempt to comply with
Rule 1925’s concision requirement, and that it did not prevent
meaningful appellate review. That being the case, the
intermediate court should have considered the claim on its merits.
Accord Commonwealth v. Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 916
(Pa.Super. 2018) (applying Laboy to reach an issue set forth in a
“boilerplate” concise statement where the trial court readily
apprehended the issue).
Rogers, 250 A.3d at 1224–25.
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Similarly, in this case, the Commonwealth’s weight of the evidence claim
was easily understandable from context. The Commonwealth challenged the
trial court’s decision to award Landis a new trial after it had granted Landis’s
post-sentence motion which asserted that his first-degree murder conviction
was against the weight of the evidence.
The Commonwealth filed a response to Landis’s post-sentence motion
and contested Landis’s suggestion that the entirety of Dr. O’Brien’s testimony
was not worthy of belief based on his incorrect statement as to Ms. Brown and
Ms. Johnson. The trial court found Landis was entitled to a new trial on the
weight of the evidence claim on the grounds that it found Dr. O’Brien’s expert
testimony was incompetent. As the Commonwealth’s concise statement has
not impeded meaningful review, we decline to find the Commonwealth’s
weight of the evidence claim waived.
The following principles are applicable to a challenge to the weight of
the evidence:
“A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319,
744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (2000); Commonwealth v. Brown,
538
Pa. 410, 435,
648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (1994). A new trial should
not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or
because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a
different conclusion. Widmer, 560 Pa. at 319–20, 744 A.2d at
752. Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to determine that
‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater
weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all
the facts is to deny justice.’” Id. at 320,
744 A.2d at 752 (citation
omitted). It has often been stated that “a new trial should be
awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as
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to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to
prevail.” Brown, 538 Pa. at 435,
648 A.2d at 1189.
Commonwealth v. Clay,
64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013).
In other words, “[a] weight of the evidence claim concedes that the
evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the ground
that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a
guilty verdict shocks one's sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79
A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013).
This Court’s standard of review in evaluating a trial court’s ruling on a
weight of the evidence claim is different than the standard of review applied
by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise
of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Brown, 648
A.2d at 1189. Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the
findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50,
354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1976). One
of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new
trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or
was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321–22, 744 A.2d at 753 (emphasis added).
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the
trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on
a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In
describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have
explained:
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The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion
within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed
to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the
judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result
of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Widmer, 560 Pa. at 322,
744 A.2d at 753 (quoting Coker v. S.M.
Flickinger Co., 533 Pa. 441, 447,
625 A.2d 1181, 1184–85
(1993)).
Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055.
Further, our Supreme Court has clarified that:
[t]o determine whether a trial court's decision constituted a
palpable abuse of discretion, an appellate court must “examine
the record and assess the weight of the evidence; not however,
as the trial judge, to determine whether the preponderance of the
evidence opposes the verdict, but rather to determine whether the
court below in so finding plainly exceeded the limits of judicial
discretion and invaded the exclusive domain of the jury.” Where
the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial court has
acted within the limits of its judicial discretion.
Id. at 1056 (quoting Brown, 648 A.2d at 1190 (citation omitted)) (emphasis
in original).8
____________________________________________
8 The dissent contends that the Commonwealth waived its weight of the
evidence claim by failing to properly frame its issue for our review by arguing
how the trial court abused its discretion in this case. However, the
Commonwealth sets forth the appropriate standard of review in its brief and
argues that the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the
jury in finding the weight to be given to Dr. O’Brien’s testimony. We see no
reason to find the Commonwealth’s challenge to be waived on this basis.
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In this case, in reviewing Landis’s post-sentence motion in which he
claimed the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the trial
court failed to review all the evidence presented at trial. Rather, the trial court
instead solely focused on the expert testimony presented by the prosecution
rebuttal expert, Dr. O’Brien and made its own personal characterization of that
testimony.
The trial court granted Landis a new trial and found Dr. O’Brien had
given false testimony when Dr. O’Brien asserted that there was documentation
in the police investigative reports that Landis had discussed with Ms. Brown
and Ms. Johnson his intent to shoot his wife before the victim’s death. The
trial court concluded that Dr. O’Brien’s expert opinion was not competent as
his incorrect statement showed that Dr. O’Brien had based his opinion on facts
not in the record.
Further, the trial court concluded that the defense had been unfairly
surprised by Dr. O’Brien’s statement as his expert report was not entered as
an exhibit at trial and criticized Dr. O’Brien for testifying without notes of his
evaluation of Landis.
Noting that the issue of whether Landis had diminished capacity at the
time of the victim’s death was the crucial issue in both of his trials, the trial
court decided that the only competent expert report was that of Dr.
Rotenberg, who opined that Landis was incapable of forming the specific intent
to kill the victim.
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However, the issue before the trial court was whether the jury’s verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. It was the jury’s function to make
credibility determinations as to all the witnesses and to resolve discrepancies
in their testimony. It was not for the trial court to overturn the jury’s verdict
simply because it would have made a different credibility finding as to one
single witness.
As our Supreme Court stated in Widmer:
[w]here a trial court offers nothing more than the assertion that
on the same facts he would have arrived at a conclusion different
from the verdict of the jury, a challenge to the weight of the
evidence cannot be sustained. To permit such a broad
interpretation of discretion would result in adding each and every
trial judge in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as the thirteenth
juror in every case.
Widmer, 744 A.2d at 754.
To the extent that it was proper for the trial court to evaluate whether
Dr. O’Brien’s expert testimony was competent,9 we note that the trial court
____________________________________________
9 We point out that the trial court failed to recognize that Landis has never
asserted that he was entitled to a new trial solely on the basis of Dr. O’Brien’s
erroneous testimony. Landis has never claimed Dr. O’Brien’s expert opinion
should have been declared incompetent on the basis of his mistaken
testimony. At trial, Landis did not object to Dr. O’Brien’s testimony and did
not bring Dr. O’Brien’s incorrect statement to the trial court’s attention until
he cited it in his post-sentence motion, in which Landis merely claimed that,
due to this inaccuracy, Dr. O’Brien’s testimony was not entitled to as much
weight as the opinion of defense expert Dr. Rotenberg.
However, the Commonwealth has not challenged the trial court’s sua
sponte decision to find Dr. O’Brien’s expert testimony to be incompetent. As
such, we may not assert this ground for relief on the Commonwealth’s behalf.
See Commonwealth v. Wolfel, 233 A.3d 784, 790 (Pa. 2020) (stating “the
Commonwealth waived its challenge to Appellant's failure to raise a claim
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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did not observe precedent observing that, in determining whether expert
testimony should be rendered incompetent, courts must evaluate whether the
expert opinion had an adequate factual basis. Sullivan v. Werner Co., 253
A.3d 730, 752 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). See also Newcomer v.
Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Ward Trucking Co.),
692 A.2d
1062, 1066 (Pa. 1997) (concluding that an expert opinion cannot be solely
based on inaccurate or false information). See also In re Nevling,
907 A.2d
672, 675 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006) (stating that “the opinion of a medical expert
must be reviewed as a whole and inaccurate information will not render the
opinion incompetent unless the opinion is dependent on those
inaccuracies”).10
However, the trial court made no attempt to evaluate Dr. O’Brien’s
expert opinion as a whole to determine whether his opinion was dependent
solely on his inaccurate statement or whether it was grounded in an adequate
basis of record fact relating to his evaluation of Landis as well as Landis’s
behavior before the victim’s murder.
In finding Dr. O’Brien’s testimony to be incompetent, the trial court,
based on its own personal conclusion, stated that Landis was unfairly surprised
____________________________________________
under Article I, Section 8, by failing to challenge the suppression court's
explicit invocation of that provision before the Superior Court”).
10 “This Court is not bound by the decisions of the Commonwealth Court.
However, such decisions provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to
our colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.”
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 591 n. 6 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citations
omitted).
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by Dr. O’Brien’s testimony and assumed that the Commonwealth failed to
provide the defense with Dr. O’Brien’s expert report. However, the parties
agree Dr. O’Brien’s report was provided to the defense in pretrial discovery
although the report was never entered into evidence.
In addition, while the trial court criticized Dr. O’Brien for not retaining
his notes of his evaluation of Landis as his secretaries had “pulled the file”
after the case had gone on for an extended period of time, the trial court cited
no precedent finding that an expert’s testimony is invalidated when the expert
did not retain his notes from his evaluation or if his expert opinion is not
entered into evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court plainly exceeded the
limits of judicial discretion and invaded the exclusive domain of the jury. See
Clay, supra. The trial court did not review the evidence presented at trial as
a whole, merely reassessed the credibility of the prosecution’s expert witness
based on one incorrect statement that the witness made, and completely
disregarded the expert’s testimony without determining if the expert’s opinion
had an adequate factual basis.
While the jury was free to weigh the testimony of the competing experts
as well as the basis for their expert opinions, the trial court substituted its own
credibility determination for that of the jury and simply overturned the jury’s
verdict as it indicated that it would have arrived at a different conclusion.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Landis’s post-sentence motion based on his weight of the evidence claim.
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Order reversed. Reinstate the judgment of sentence previously entered
on November 12, 2020. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Olson joins the Opinion.
Judge Kunselman files a Dissenting Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2022
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