Volume 277 — Illinois Reports

<p>1. Waters—limit of rule that the boundary line between States changes with variation in the thread of stream. The rule that the boundary line between States separated by a river changes with the variation of the middle of the channel or thread of the stream applies where the river, by imperceptible accretion and reliction, gradually changes its bed, but the rule does not necessarily apply to a case of sudden avulsion.</p> <p>2. Same—when island remains in original State though channel of river has changed. Where the main channel of a river forming the boundary between two States changes its channel from one side of an island to the other, if the island still remains in such condition that it can be identified as the original island it will remain within the jurisdiction of the State of which it was originally a part. (Beliefontaine Improvement Co. v. Niedringhaus, 181 Ill. 426, distinguished.)</p> <p>3. Same—when owner of island does not lose title by submersion of soil. The owner of land on an island in a river does not lose her title or right to possession by the mere fact that the land is submerged, provided the soil is subsequently reclaimed either by natural or artificial means, and the lapse of time during which the land was submerged does not bar the owner’s rights.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law—meaning of section 16 of article 4 of constitution, prohibiting appropriations of money in private laws. The provision of section 16 of article 4 of the constitution prohibiting appropriations of money in private laws is not intended as a limitation on the power of the legislature to pass a'private or special law nor to prohibit the appropriation of money to a private person or individual, but it recognizes that private laws may be passed and is meant to prohibit appropriations being made in them.</p> <p>2. Same—section 26 of article 4 of constitution is not a limitation on power of legislature to pay just claims against the State. Section 26 of article 4 of the constitution, providing that the State shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity, is not a limitation on the power which the legislature has to allow and appropriate money to pay claims against the State, and there is no provision in the constitution against the payment of a claim which the State is liable for and ought to pay.</p> <p>3. Same—action of court of claims has no effect on power of legislature to pay claims against the State. The power or lack of power in the legislature to appropriate money to pay a claim depends upon the constitution and not upon the action of the court of claims, which is a statutory body not provided for in the constitution, and the action of such body has no effect upon the power of the legislature to pay claims against the State.</p> <p>4. Same—when question whether an appropriation is for public purpose cannot be determined. In a bill to enjoin the expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature for the benefit of individuals, where it is not alleged that the claims are of such a nature that the legislature could not recognize and pay them, and the only charges in the bill are that the appropriations were made in' private laws and that the legislature had no power to allow and pay claims not presented to and allowed by the court of claims, the question whether the claims are such that the appropriations may properly be considered as for a public purpose cannot be determined.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Walker, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. J. F. Gillham, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. James C. Martin, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lawrence county; the Hon. J. C. EaglETOn, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Special assessments—question of benefits is not determined by number of witnesses. A judgment confirming a special assessment after the court has heard the evidence and viewed the premises will not be reversed as not sustained by the proof, even though the witnesses who testified there were no benefits outnumber those who testified that the property was benefited as much or more than the assessment, as the probative force of the view by the court and the location of the improvement must also be considered.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lockwood Honoré, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Municipal corporations—power granted to a city council cannot be delegated. Where a power is expressly delegated to a city council the power must be exercised by it as such body and cannot be exercised by any other body, nor can such power be delegated to others by the council.</p> <p>2. Same—municipal authority must be exercised reasonably by city council. All ordinances passed by a city council in pursuance of powers granted to it must be reasonable and not oppressive or such as arbitrarily discriminate between citizens of the same class, and where special privileges are granted by ordinance they must be open to the enjoyment of all upon the same terms.</p> <p>3. Same—what ordinance is an unlawful delegation'of authority to city officers. An ordinance forbidding any person to enter upon streets or alleys to erect poles or wires or to connect light fixtures of any kind with others already existing in the streets without first obtaining the permission of the mayor and members- of the street and alley committee, but which does not specify the conditions under which such permission shall be granted, is an unwarranted delegation of municipal authority involving the exercise of judgment and discretion.</p> <p>4. Same—when entire ordinance is void because of provision delegating arbitrary authority to city officers. Where a provision of an ordinance is an unwarranted delegation of municipal power because it vests city officers with certain arbitrary authority the entire ordinance is void, provided such provision is an inseparable part of the ordinance and of such a character that the ordinance would not have been adopted without such provision.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Clarence N. Goodwin, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—principal contractor is liable if sub-contractor does not insure his liability under section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation act. By section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation act it is the duty of the principal contractor to see to it that his sub-contractor insures his liability to pay the compensation provided by the act or become liable himself to pay such compensation for injuries to the sub-contractor’s employees, and the word “require,” as used in that section, is not complied with by a mere demand that the sub-contractor insure.</p> <p>2. Same—under paragraph (a) of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act employer’s liability for first aid and medical attention is limited to $200. Under the provisions of paragraph (a) of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act the limit of the liability of an employer for necessary first aid, medical, surgical and hospital services is $200, and it is error for the circuit court to confirm an award of the Industrial Board for such services amounting to a greater sum.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Samuel C. Stough, Judge, presiding.

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. C. F. Irwin,-Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Grundy county; .the Hon. George Bedford, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. JoR A. Davis, Judge, presiding.

<p>1.. TaxES'—the report of the special assessment collector may be amended on the collector's application for judgment. The report of the special assessment collector required to be made on or before April 1 by section 65 of the Local Improvement act may be amended on the application for judgment and order of sale for delinquent assessments, notwithstanding such application is made after April 1.</p> <p>2. Same—objections are waived where not made in time to be obviated by amendment. Objections to a special assessment which could have been obviated by amendment will be considered waived if not made in the trial court in time for the amendment to be made.</p> <p>3. Same—warrant must have been issued for collection of special assessment before application can be made for judgment. An application for judgment and order of sale for a delinquent special assessment cannot be maintained until a warrant shall have been issued for the collection of the assessment.</p> <p>4. Same—clerical error in date of warrant may be corrected. Where through a clerical error the city collector’s warrant" is described in the return as of a date later than the filing of the county collector’s application for judgment, the "error may be corrected in the trial court and will be deemed waived if not called to the trial court’s attention.</p>

<p>1. ■ Constitutional eaw—the State Auditor is the official examiner of accounts and claims against the State. The duty to determine whether a particular claim constitutes an obligation against the State is implied by the title of the office of the Auditor of Public Accounts, and it is only when the Auditor draws his warrant for what he finds to be a proper charge against the State that it can be paid by the State Treasurer.</p> <p>2. Same—legislature cannot deprive Auditor of the power to audit claims and charges against the State. It is not within the power of the General Assembly to deprive the Auditor of Public Accounts of the power conferred upon him by the constitution to audit claims and charges against the State created in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.</p> <p>3. Same—members of State Board of AgriculHire are not State officers. The members of the State Board of Agriculture are not officers of the State and have no powers or functions as officers.</p> <p>4. Same—■how appropriation may be lawfully paid out of State treasury. An appropriation for a particular purpose can be lawfully paid out of the State treasury only on the presentation of itemized vouchers showing that obligations have been incurred for the particular purpose specified in the appropriation.</p> <p>5. Same—legislature must determine for what purposes money shall be appropriated. The General Assembly must determine to what objects and purposes money of the State shall be appropriated, and it cannot bestow power upon any person or board for the exercise of the discretion of the donee in that respect.</p> <p>6. Same—when gross amotmt appropriated cannot be regarded as a single item. A bill appropriating to the State Board of Agriculture the sum of $153,150, “to be used as follows,” following which is a specification of some forty-four separate purposes, opposite each of which a specific amount is set down, cannot be regarded as merely appropriating the gross amount as a single item, which the Governor must approve or veto as a whole, but the amount set down for each purpose specified must be treated as a separate item of the appropriation.</p> <p>7. Same—Governor may veto particular items in an appropriation. The constitution provides that bills making appropriations shall appropriate to the specified objects, respectively, their several amounts in distinct items and sections, and the Governor has power to veto particular items in such a bill and the items vetoed will not become a part of the law.</p> <p>8. Words and phrases—meaning of the word "item." The word “item” is in common use, and means a separate entry in an account or a schedule, or a separate particular in an enumeration of a total which is separate and distinct from the other particulars or entries.</p>

<p>1. Drainage—acceptance of money for land taken is a release of error in declaring district organized. The acceptance by land owners in a levee drainage district of the sums of money awarded to them as damages for land taken for right of way for ditches operates as a release of error in the order of the court declaring the district organized.</p> <p>2. Same—when payment of interest on an assessment is not a release of errors. The fact that land owners in a levee drainage district have voluntarily paid the 'interest due on their respective assessments does not amount to a release of error in the order declaring the district organized even though they appeared and participated in the proceeding to assess benefits, in which the court ordered the assessment to be paid in installments.</p> <p>3. Same—introducing evidence on question of benefits is not a release of errors. The fact that land owners in a levee drainage district appear in the proceeding to assess benefits and introduce evidence touching that question does not amount to a release of their right to review, on writ of error, the order of the court declaring the district organized even though the court confirmed an assessment to be paid in installments, pursuant to which order contracts were let and a large part of the work completed and paid for out of a sale of bonds, where there is nothing to show that the land owners did anything to induce such action.</p> <p>4. Same—when signing a petition does not bar right to review order organizing district. Signing a petition for the organization of a drainage district and the construction of drainage ditches does not bar the right to review an order which does not organize the district as prayed for in the petition but organizes another district with different boundaries.</p> <p>5. Same—mere delay in suing out writ of error is not a bar to the writ. Mere delay, short of the statutory period of three years, in suing out a writ of error to review a proceeding to organize a drainage district is not a bar to the right to sue out the writ in the absence of any element of estoppel.</p> <p>6. Same—what cannot be made the basis of a plea of release of errors. A plea of release of errors cannot be based upon facts which existed before the alleged errors were committed.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Shelby county; the Hon. William B. Wright, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—meaning of the word "casual,” as used in section 5 of Workmen’s Compensation act. The word “casual,” as used in section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation act in regard to casual employment, means “occasional,” “irregular” or “incidental,” as distinguished from stated or regular, and the word “or,” immediately following, cannot be construed to mean “and,” as the context does not require such meaning.</p> <p>2. Same—what is a casual employment as intended by section J of the Workmen’s .Compensation act. A plasterer engaged by the owner of a building for one job lasting only three or four days, although he had been employed by the same owner at irregular intervals during several previous years to perform similar jobs, is engaged in a casual employment as intended by section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, and his personal representative can not recover under such act for his death from accidental injury while so employed.</p> <p>3. Same—when question of construction of Workmen’s Compensation act is not waived by stipulation and need not be formally pleaded before Industrial Board. Where the question of the meaning of a provision of the Workmen’s Compensation act is discussed at length before the Industrial Board and passed upon by it such question is not waived in the trial court by a stipulation that the parties are both under the terms of the act, nor is it necessary that such question has been raised in a formal pleading on the hearing before the board before it can be raised on review. ( Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11, distinguished.)</p> <p>4. Statutes—statutes are to be construed according to intention expressed therein. A statute should receive a liberal but reasonable construction in order to carry out its purpose and objects according to the spirit of the act, but the court should not give it a construction clearly outside of the legislative intention.</p> <p>Duncan, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>1. - Architects—corporation may contract to furnish architectural work if it is done by a licensed architect. Under section 5 of the act for the licensing of architects, (Hurd’s Stat. 1916, p. 92,) which provides that a corporation shall not be licensed to practice architecture “but the same may employ licensed architects,” a corporation may contract to furnish architectural work provided the work is done by or under the supervision of a regularly licensed architect, as the words quoted would not be necessary to authorize a corporation to employ architects for its own structures.</p> <p>2. Same—what is not practicing architecture within the meaning of statute. Making contracts for architectural work and collecting compensation therefor is not practicing architecture within the meaning of the statute for the licensing of architects, provided the work is done by or under the supervision of a licensed architect.</p> <p>3. ' Same—purpose of the statute for the licensing of architects. The purpose of the statute for the licensing of architects is not to protect architects but to protect the public against incompetent architects, from whose services damage may result to the public by reason of improperly constructed buildings.</p>

<p>Drainage—the drainage commissioners may be compelled to restore bridge removed from highway. The provision of section 55 of the Levee act which requires the highway commissioners to construct, at their own expense, a bridge over a natural depression, channel or water-course which has been removed by a drainage district in the construction of ditches is unconstitutional, and the drainage commissioners may be compelled to restore a bridge so removed. (People v. Block, 276 Ill. 286, followed.)</p>

<p>Appear from the Circuit Court of Wabash county; the Hon. J. C. Eagreton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign county ; the Hon. William K. Whitfield, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Freehold—when a freehold is not involved. A demurrer to a bill to compel the removal of fences from an alleged public highway admits the allegation of the bill that the locus in quo is a public highway, and no freehold is therefore involved on an appeal from a decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill, and if the only questions raised on the appeal are whether the bill states sufficient facts for a court of equity to entertain jurisdiction or whether the remedy is at law the cause must be transferred.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Pope county; the Hon. A. W. LEWIS, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Contracts—when contract for re-conveyance of land may be rescinded. A contract whereby one of the parties to an exchange of lands agrees to re-convey the property acquired by him to a trustee for the creditors of the other party provided he shall receive back his own property in the condition it was at the time of the exchange may be rescinded, even though the deeds have passed, where such party discovers that between the time of the agreement and the exchange of the deeds such creditors have incumbered his own property with judgment liens, which they decline to release.</p> <p>2. Costs—when costs should not be adjudged against the cross-complainant. Wheré a person, acting in good faith, files a cross-bill in a creditors’ bill proceeding and alleges a rescission of his contract to re-convey certain property to a trustee for the creditors because the latter refuse to release judgment liens placed by them upon the property he was to receive in exchange for the conveyance, the fact that he thereafter accepts the releases of such lien's and abandons his claim fo'r rescission without making any additional or unnecessary costs does not justify adjudging costs against him from the time of his acceptance of the releases although the original bill and cross-bill are both dismissed for want of equity.</p>

<p>1. Freehold—the right to a charge on land is a mere lien and not a freehold interest. The right to a charge on land is a mere lien and not a freehold interest, and where the only assignment of error argued in the Supreme Court is that the trial court erred in decreeing that a certain bequest was a charge upon the real estate of the deceased no freehold is involved on appeal.</p> <p>2. Same'—freehold must be involved in the points assigned for error on appeal to Supreme Court. Even though a freehold is involved in the original judgment or decree, yet if it is not embraced in the points assigned for error the appeal should be taken to the Appellate Court.</p>

<p>1. Wills—restrictions as to power of alienation are not favored and will be construed strictly. Restrictions in wills as to the power of alienation are not favored and will be construed with the utmost strictness, to the end that the restraint shall not be extended beyond the express stipulation.</p> <p>2. Same—when a power of sale will be implied in a will. ■ A power of sale will be implied where the language of a will shows an intent to create such power or where such power is necessary in order to carry out its provisions.</p> <p>3. Same—real estate may be included in word "fund” as used in will. The word “fund,” used in a will, ordinarily means money or negotiable papers readily convertible into cash, but it will be held to include real estate if such appears to be the testator’s intention.</p> <p>4. Same—when use of word "fund” indicates intention of testator that real estate be converted into money. Where a testator gives all the residue of his estate, both real and personal, to a charitable use, “to be a permanent fund, the rents, issues, profits or income of which shall be used year after year,” the use of the word “fund” indicates an intention to have the real estate converted into money, and the words “rents, issues, profits” do not necessarily mean that the real estate shall never be sold.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of McLean county; the Hon. James C. Riley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frederick A. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law:—when court may assume, in prosecution for causing an abortion, that the removal of a foetus had been proved. In a prosecution for causing an abortion, where the attending physician testifies that an abortion had occurred and that he found a portion of the placenta in the uterus, it must conclusively follow that a foetus had been expelled from the womb, and it is not error for the court to assume such fact in putting a hypothetical question to one of the witnesses.</p> <p>2. Same—when it is not error for the court to remark that the witness did not understand meaning of a word. During the cross-examination of the complaining witness in a prosecution for causing an abortion it is not error for the court to remark that the witness did not understand the meaning of a word used by counsel in one of his questions, where the court could observe the witness and from her demeanor see that she failed to understand.</p> <p>3. Same—for purpose of impeachment a witness may be questioned as to dates testified to at preliminary hearing, more than a year before. In order to lay a foundation for an impeachment the complaining witness in a prosecution for causing an abortion may be questioned as to certain dates which she testified to at a preliminary hearing a year and a quarter before, but the error in forbidding this line of inquiry will not require a reversal where the guilt of the defendants is so conclusively shown that it is not possible the error could have influenced the jury,</p> <p>4. Same—what is proper modification of instruction on the presumption of innocence. An instruction that the defendant “is presumed by the law to be innocent, and this presumption is evidence in her behalf and protects her from a conviction until her guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt,” is properly modified by striking out the words “is evidence in her behalf and," and as modified correctly states the law as to the presumption of innocence.</p> <p>5. Same—when refusal of correct instruction as to the material allegations of an indictment is not prejudicial error. An instruction which states that the material allegations of an indictment for causing an abortion are that the woman was pregnant, that while pregnant she aborted, that the abortion was produced by criminal means and that the criminal means were employed by the defendant, and that proof of all these allegations beyond a reasonable doubt is essential to a conviction, contains a correct statement of the law; but the refusal to give such instruction is not prejudicial error, where the first three allegations are conclusively proved and as to the fourth the defendant is amply protected by other instructions on the presumption of innocence and degree of proof required.</p> <p>6. Same—when verdict that defendant is “guilty of abortion” is sufficient in prosecution for causing an abortion. In a prosecution for causing an abortion, a verdict that the defendant is “guilty of abortion in manner and form as charged in the indictment” is sufficient where the woman who aborted is not the'defendant, as it is the rule that verdicts should receive a reasonable construction, and should not be set aside unless there is doubt as to their meaning or a failure to find upon some material issue involved.</p>

<p>1. Banks—what allegations in bill against a director show that he was a non-resident. Where a bill by stockholders charging a director with negligence alleges that for five years he was out of the State within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations but that during that period he came into the State about three times a month it must be inferred that he was a non-resident, as otherwise such allegations are irreconcilable.</p> <p>2. Same—duties of a bank director vary according to the circumstances. The duties of a bank director vary according to the business, circumstances and situation of every individual bank, and it is not possible to specify what particular things he must do in order to avoid the imputation of negligence in the management of the bank’s affairs.</p> <p>3. Same—when bank directors are liable for losses to stockholders. Generally speaking, bank directors are liable to stockholders for losses where such losses are the proximate result of a breach or neglect of duty on their part, but they are not insurers and are not necessarily liable for every loss which happens to occur.</p> <p>4. Same—when stockholders cannot complain of acquiescence of director in misappropriations of the president. Stockholders can not complain of acquiescence by a director in misappropriations by the president of the bank where they allege in their bill charging such director with negligence that such misappropriations were not hidden or concealed and that any business man of ordinary intelligence could have ascertained the condition of affairs, since, being stockholders and members of the corporation, they are likewise responsible.</p> <p>5. Same—when stockholders may be said to have acquiesced in transactions of officers of bank. Means of knowledge within reach of stockholders by the exercise of slight diligence is in legal effect equivalent to knowledge of the doings of the officers of a bank, and long delay by a stockholder with full knowledge, or at least with sufficient notice or means of knowledge, of his rights, and a recognition of transactions or acts inconsistent, with their repudiation, is an acquiescence on the part of such stockholder.</p> <p>6. Same—non-resident director not necessarily held to same degree of care as residents. A non-resident director of a corporation is not necessarily, and regardless of the particular circumstances, held to the same degree of care and attention to the business of the corporation as is required of resident directors.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—when proof of previous acts is admissible on trial for murder by producing abortion. On a trial for murder by producing an abortion, previous acts of the accused of the same character may be proved as tending to show criminal intent and guilty knowledge. '</p> <p>2. Same—accused may waive constitutional right to meet witnessses face to face. In a criminal case, where a written but; unsworn statement is admitted in evidence by agreement, the accused cannot thereafter contend that it was error to admit the statement because it violated her constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face and cross-examine' them, as objections to evidence based on such constitutional ground may be waived.</p> <p>3. Same—when statement of court and instruction as to purpose of admitting evidence are erroneous. On a trial for murder in producing an abortion, where the evidence of a previous charge of that character against the accused does not show she was guilty, but, in fact, shows that she was exonerated by the coroner’s jury, it is prejudicial error for the court to state before the jury that such evidence was admitted to show the knowledge and intent of the accused and to give an instruction to the same effect.</p> <p>4. Same—what is improper. cross-examination as to previous conviction of crime. Where the accused has stated, in answer to her counsel’s question, that she has never been convicted of any crime, it is error to permit the State’s attorney, over objection, to inquire of the accused if she did not know that the Supreme Court had reversed a conviction.</p> <p>5. Same—instructions which define murder and malice are not proper in"prosecution for causing abortion resulting in death. In a prosecution under section 3 of the Criminal Code for causing an .unnecessary abortion resulting in the death of the patient, it is error to give instructions stating the statutory. definition. of murder and defining the terms “malice” and “malice aforethought,” as malice is not an element of the crime specified in said section 3..</p> <p>6. Same—burden of proof does not rest on the accused at any time. In a criminal trial the accused is entitled to the benefit of the presuijiption of innocence throughout the trial and until the evidence establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof does not at any time rest upon him.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles county; the Hon. John H. Marshall, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M, L. Mc-KineEY, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. George A. Sentel, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Municipal corporations—grant to a telephone company is binding upon it when accepted. A grant tó a telephone company of the right to erect and maintain a telephone system in a village upon' condition that the company “will furnish telephone service to the users thereof at a reasonable charge,” is binding upon the company when accepted and the performance of the services to the public as specified in the grant may be compelled by mandamus.</p> <p>2. Same—right of a telephone company to use streets may be questioned by quo warranto. The right of a telephone company to exercise the license or privilege of using the streets of a city or village may be questioned by an information in the nature of quo warranto, and such a proceeding is properly brought by the public prosecutor either of his own accord or at the instance of any individual whom he may name as relator.</p> <p>3. Same—grant to corporation for an indefinite time is limited to life of corporation. A grant to a telephone corporation, for an indefinite time, of the right to use the streets and alleys of a village for its corporate purposes is limited to the life of the corporation.</p> <p>4. Same—public or quasi public corporations cannot transfer their corporate powers and privileges without legislative authority. Public or quasi public corporations, such as telegraph and telephone companies, which owe duties to the public as well as to their stockholders, have no right to transfer their corporate powers and privileges, and thereby disable themselves from performing their public duties, without legislative authority, but such legislative authority is implied when the grant is to the corporation and its successors and assigns.</p> <p>5. Same—when grant to telephone company is not assignable. A grant to a telephone company, alone, and not to its successors and assigns, of the right to maintain and operate a telephone system in a village for an indefinite time and upon certain terms is not assignable, and a purchaser of all the property of the company does not acquire its license to use the streets.</p> <p>6. Same—statutory power of telegraph or telephone corporation to mortgage property or franchises does not imply authority to sell. The statute giving a telegraph or telephone company the right to make a mortgage or trust deed upon its real and personal property does not imply authority to sell and transfer such property and its franchises and licenses.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Highways—a bill to enjoin commissioners of highways from opening public road must be brought in county where the land is situated. A bill to enjoin commissioners of highways from opening a public road and thereby trespassing on complainant’s land, although a suit in personam, affects real estate within the meaning of section 3 of the Chancery act, and such proceeding must be brought in the county where the land is situated.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Arnold Heap, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors—a judgment is reviezved on the record, alone. The Appellate Court reviews the judgment of a trial court upon the record, alone, and the Supreme Court reviews the judgment of the Appellate Court in the same way, the question in each case being whether the court whose judgment is under review committed error to the prejudice of the appellant or plaintiff in error.</p> <p>2. Same—zuhen parties cannot complain of judgment. Parties who procure an erroneous decision of a court or who acquiesce therein cannot complain of it.</p> <p>3. Same—Supreme Court cannot consider questions not raised in Appellate Court. Questions' not raised in the trial court or the Appellate Court cannot be considered by the Supreme Court as grounds for reversal, where the facts upon which such questions arise have existed throughout the controversy.</p> <p>4. Injunction—injunction cannot be disregarded even though the zmrit itself is void. The fact that a writ of injunction is void for want of a date, signature and seal does not render the injunction void nor justify the defendants in disregarding it after they have notice of it.</p> <p>5. Contempt—zsohen proceeding to punish for contempt is civil. A bill to enjoin the keeping of a house of ill-fame as being a nuisance is a civil suit, and an information in such suit charging contempt in violating the injunction is also civil, and the defendants are not entitled to purge themselves by their sworn answers as in the case of criminal contempt, but the-answers may be contradicted and disproved.</p> <p>6. Same—zdolation of an injunction may be shozvn by a preponderance of evidence. In a proceeding to punish for contempt in violating an injunction civil rights, only,'are involved, and the violation of the injunction may be established by a preponderance of the evidence, as proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in civil cases.</p>

<p>1. Construction—each section of a statute will be given effect, if possible. In construing statutes each section or part, will be looked to and given effect, if possible, and the intent of the lawmakers ascertained from a consideration of the entire act.</p> <p>2. Same—words of a statute importing the plural number may include the singular, and vice versa. To give effect to the legislative intention, words importing the singular number may be applied to several persons or things and words importing the plural number may include the singular.</p> <p>3. Workmen’s compensation—section 24 and paragraph (h) of section ip of Compensation act apply to different classes of cases. Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation act of 1913, requiring a written claim for compensation to be made within six months after payments have ceased, applies only where there is a continuance of the disability beyond the time for which compensation has- been agreed upon or awarded, and such section is wholly for the benefit of thq employee, while paragraph (h) of section 19 is for the benefit of both employee and employer and applies where the disability has recurred or increased within eighteen months from the time of the agreement or award or where the disability has ceased.</p> <p>4. Same—paragraph (h) applies though compensation is paid in one installment. Paragraph (h) of section 19 of the Workmen’s Compensation act of 1913, providing for a review by the Industrial Board of an agreement or award providing for compensation “in installments,” applies though the agreement or award provides for but one payment.</p> <p>5. Same—no written claim for compensation needed under paragraph (h) of act of 1913. Under paragraph (h) of section 19 of the Workmen’s Compensation act of 1913 the filing of a petition to review an agreement or award within eighteen months from the time the agreement or award was made is all that is required, and the provision of section 24 requiring a written claim for compensation within six months after payments have ceased does not apply.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors—when an appeal may be treated as a ■writ of error. Where appellants are entitled to review by writ of error and the appellees have joined in error and filed briefs, the appeal will be treated as a writ of error.</p> <p>2. Same—Supreme Court cannot review proceeding assessing damages for land to be taken in laying out new road. No freehold is involved in a proceeding in the circuit court, on appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace, to assess damages for land to be taken in laying out a new road, since the procedure in the cir: cuit court is not under the Eminent Domain act but is governed by the provisions of the act on roads and bridges, under which the commissioners may or may not determine to lay out the road after the damages have been fixed.</p> <p>3. Same—when a freehold becomes involved in a proceeding to lay out a new road. It is the final action of the commissioners, or of the county superintendent of highways in case of appeal to him, which is conclusive in determining whether a new road is to be laid out, and a certiorari proceeding to review the order of the commissioners or of the county superintendent of highways in laying out a new road involves a freehold.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—conversations between conspirators after the conspiracy is ended not competent. Conversations between conspirators after the conspiracy is ended are not competent against conspirators not present, but the admission thereof in evidence on the trial of the latter for receiving a bribe as part of a conspiracy to secure police protection for certain criminals is not necessarily ground for reversal.</p> <p>2. Same—when judgment of conviction will not be reversed on the evidence. A judgment of conviction in a criminal case will not be reversed on the ground that it is not supported by the evidence, where the evidence in the record is such that the jury could not reasonably have returned a verdict other than that of guilty.</p> <p>3. Same—record need not be free from error in order to sustain conviction. A defendant charged with crime should be accorded all the rights which the law entitles him to, and errors denying him substantial rights require a réversal of a judgment of conviction; but it is not essential in order to sustain a conviction, where the evidence of guilt is clear, that the record be free from all error.</p> <p>4. Other questions herein involved are discussed at length and decided in People v. Halpin, 276 Ill. 363.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Bureau county; the Hon. Richard M. Skinner, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John P. McGoorty, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Christian county; the Hon. Thomas M. Jett, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. C. N. Goodwin, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Special assessments—when question whether lands have been legally annexed to a city cannot be raised on application for judgment for taxes. Except as to the first attempt by a city to exercise its franchise the question whether lands over which the franchise is being exercised have been legally annexed to the city can not be raised on application for judgment for taxes or a delinquent special assessment but only in a proceeding by quo warranto in the name of the People, in which a judgment will be conclusive and binding upon all. (People v. Hausen, 276 Ill. 204, distinguished.)</p> <p>2. Same—what misdescription of land assessed will not deprive court of jurisdiction. Where land specially assessed lies in an addition known as “Barley & Pfitzenmeyer’s East Park addition,” the omission of the words “East Park” from the description of the land will not deprive the court of jurisdiction of an application for judgment for the assessment, where there is no evidence that there is any other addition of that name or that the land could not be found by a surveyor having such description as a guide.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of McLean county; the Hon. James C. Riley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Equity—when court of equity will not lend its aid. A court of equity will not lend its aid to a complainant unless justice and equity require that' relief shall be granted, nor will its aid be given to foster a multiplicity of suits in the future.</p> <p>2. Taxes—when statute requiring the county treasurer to accept taxes on parts of lots will not be enforced. Section 162 of the Revenue act, requiring the county treasurer to receive taxes on parts of lots, will not be enforced to aid a scheme to enable the owner of some fifteen hundred lots to avoid payment of taxes thereon by conveying undivided interests therein, ranging from a 1 /50th to a i/5oooth part, in order to deter bidders at tax sales from buying the lots because of the existence of such undivided interests.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—when question whether lands have been legally annexed to city cannot be settled on collector’s application for judgment. Where the record shows that there has been an attempted annexation which has been acquiesced in, the question whether the lands have been legally annexed to the city will not be considered on application for judgment and order of sale for a special assessment and taxes, but such question should be settled by a proceeding by quo warranto, wherein a judgment will be conclusive and binding upon all parties interested in the dispute.</p> <p>2. Same—county collector’s report need not show nature of the warrants authorising collection of the special assessment. The city collector’s report, containing a description of the nature of the warrants, is not a necessary part of the evidence to make a prima facie case on application by the county collector for judgment and order of sale for a special assessment, and it is not necessary that the county collector’s sworn statement contain any description of such warrants.</p>

<p>1. Freehold—when freehold is involved in action for damages from operation of elevated railroad. In an action for damages to real estate by reason of the construction and operation of an elevated railroad, where the defendants deny, by plea, plaintiffs’ intestate was the owner of the premises, and the plaintiffs reply to such plea and introduce deeds establishing a prima facie case of ownership, an appeal from a judgment for damages may be taken directly to the Supreme Court on the ground that a freehold is involved, even though the evidence of ownership is not contradicted.</p> <p>2. Damages—beneñt from increased travel should be considered in determining whether premises are damaged by operation of elevated railroad. Benefits which accrue, by reason of the increased travel facilities and the increased number of people brought to the premises and other property in the neighborhood by the construction and operation of an elevated railroad should be considered in determining whether the property has been damaged by such construction and operation. (McCoy v. Union Elevated Railroad Co. 271 Ill. 490, Geohegan v. Union Elevated Railroad Co. 266 id. 482, and Brand v. Union Elevated Railroad Co. 258 id. 133, adhered to.)</p> <p>3. Same—when judgment for damages from operation of elevated railroad must be reversed. A judgment for damages to adjacent property from the construction and operation of an elevated railroad must be reversed where the plaintiffs’ only witness bases his testimony on what he considers a detriment to the use of the property rather than on a decrease in the sale value, while five credible witnesses for the defendants testify that the market valué of the property did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased after the construction and operation of the railroad.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. F. W. Burton, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Injunction—power to enjoin the beginning of suit is sparingly exercised. It is only where it clearly appears that the beginning of a suit in a foreign State will result in a fraud, gross wrong or oppression that a court of equity will interfere with the general right of a person to begin his suit in any jurisdiction he sees fit and restrain him from the prosecution of such suit.</p> <p>2. Sams—what is not, of itself, ground for enjoining prosecution of suit in a foreign State. The mere fact that an action has been begun in Illinois on a policy of insurance is not, of itself, ground for enjoining the plaintiff from beginning another suit on the same policy against the same defendant in a foreign State, notwithstanding it will inconvenience the insurance company to defend the suit in the foreign State and that the double litigation will cause it added expense.</p> <p>3. Sams—permitting a citizen to be sued in foreign State not a violation of guaranty of trial by jury. The constitutional guaranty of the right of trial by jury, which in Illinois contemplates a unanimous verdict, is not violated by declining to enjoin the prosecution of a suit against a citizen of Illinois in a foreign State which recognizes a verdict concurred in by three-fourths of the jury, even though a suit has already been begun in Illinois on the same cause of action against such citizen.</p> <p>4. Actions and dssensss—when pendency of another suit can not be pleaded in abatement. A person has the legal right to bring his action in any court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties, and while it is true that where there are two suits in the same jurisdiction the pend-ency of the suit first brought may be pleaded in abatement of the other, such is not the case where the suits, though on the same cause of action, are in different jurisdictions.</p> <p>5. Sams—a suit on a policy of insurance is a transitory action. A suit on a policy of insurance is a transitory action, which may be brought against the company in any State where it is doing business and has agents upon whom process can be served.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of McLean county; the Hon. James C. Riley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Fornoff, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments—when land owners are not entitled to complain of insufficient notice of public hearing. The provision of the Local Improvement act requiring the notice of a public hearing to contain the substance of the resolution adopted by the board of local improvements is to enable persons to whom the notice is addressed to be heard by said board, and where it does not appear that any of the objectors were not present at the hearing on account of any failure to state just how a street was to be widened or the particular pieces of property to be taken, they are not entitled to complain that the notice was not sufficient nor that there was no notice at all.</p> <p>2. Same—notice of public hearing need not state how street is to be widened. Where the substance of a resolution adopted by the board of local improvements is the widening of a street, which improvement is to be considered at a public hearing, the notice of hearing need not state on which side of the street the addition to the width is to be made nor describe the property to be condemned.</p> <p>3. Same—when ■ widening a street is a local improvement although it may also benefit the general public. Where the primary purpose and effect of an improvement are to improve the locality it is a local improvement although it may also benefit the general public, and the widening of a street which is so narrow as to be inconvenient for street uses in connection with private property is an immediate advantage to the locality and is a local improvement.</p> <p>4. Same—what does not show that an improvement is designed primarily to benefit the general public. The fact that the commissioners have assessed against the city for public benefits one-half of the entire cost of an improvement does not change its character as a local improvement if primarily it is a material advantage to adjacent property, and the fact that the widening of a street was included in a general plan for improving the city, evolved by a commission of private citizens appointed by the city council, does not show that the improvement was designed primarily to benefit the general public.</p> <p>5. Same—attorney for board of local improvements is a public officer. The office of attorney for a board of local improvements is a public one created by law, of a permanent nature and with continuing duties, and the attorney appointed to such office is an officer of the city and may file the petition for a special assessment.</p> <p>6. Same—when fact that existing sidewalks and pavement are sufficient is not a good objection. In a special assessment proceeding for the widening of a street, objections that the existing sidewalks are sufficient for the street as it is and that the present narrow pavement is in good condition are not good, where the present sidewalks and pavement will not fit the new conditions after the street is widened.</p> <p>y. Eminent domain—petitioner in condemnation may limit the use as a basis for condemnation. The petitioner in a condemnation proceeding has a right to specify the manner, method of use and limitations of the use of the property as a basis for the condemnation, and where a city has so limited the use by an agreement with a railroad company it cannot disregard the agreement without the payment of damages to the company in a subsequent condemnation proceeding.</p> <p>8. Same—in widening a street by means of viaduct the city may agree that certain railroads shall enjoy the use of the ground surface. In a condemnation proceeding for the widening of a street where the city intends to construct a viaduct, it may, without violating any rule of law, enter into a contract that certain railroad companies shall enjoy the use of the ground surface under the elevated street.</p> <p>9. Same—what publication is sufficient where an ordinance provides that it shall take effect after its passage and publication. An ordinance not of the character required by statute to be published but stating that it shall take effect after its passage and publication is sufficiently published in the journal of the proceedings of the city council, where that is the usual mode of publishing ordinances not required to be otherwise published.</p> <p>10. Same—what does not constitute taking of property for private use of railroads. A condemnation ordinance for the widening of a street and the construction of a viaduct does not seek to, take property for a private and not a public use merely because the city has agreed that certain railroads shall enjoy the right to maintain structures under the viaduct on the land condemned, not interfering in any manner with the public easement. (Ligare v. City of Chicago, 139 Ill. 46, distinguished.)</p> <p>1.1. Same—assessment for private benefits need not necessarily be reduced because assessment for public benefits is increased. The fact that the court increases the assessment against the city for public benefits in order to make the total assessment equal the total compensation to be paid for taking and damaging private property does not necessarily operate to reduce the private benefits and require the reduction of the assessments against private property.</p>

<p>Original petition for habeas corpus.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—purpose of sections 6 and 2p of Workmen’s Compensation act. Sections 6 and 29 of the Workmen’s Compensation act must be construed together, and when so construed they mean that no employee who is under the provisions of the act shall receive more and that no employer under the act shall pay more for an injury to such an employee arising out of and in the course of the employment than the amount of compensation fixed by the act.</p> <p>2. Same—Workmen’s Compensation act is not founded on the theory of negligence. The Workmen’s Compensation act is a departure from the common law and is not founded on the theory of negligence but on the theory that injuries to workmen and deaths caused by accident in any business shall be regarded as incident to the business and the expense thereof shall be borne by the business.</p> <p>3. Same—sections 6 and 2p of Workmen’s Compensation act do not constitute class legislation. The Workmen’s Compensation act is elective for both employer and employee, and the provisions of sections 6 and 29 of the act do not constitute class legislation but constitute a part of the contract entered into by the election to accept the provisions of the act.</p> <p>4. Same—legislature may take away right to recover damages for wrongful death. The right to recover damages for wrongful death is statutory and is subject to the control of the legislature, which may limit or take away such right, in its discretion; and no vested rights of the widow or next of kin of an employee are violated by the provisions of sections 6 and 29 of the Workmen’s Compensation act prohibiting any common law action for damages for injury or death where the injured or deceased employee was under the act and was injured or killed in the course of his employment.</p> <p>5. Same—title of Workmen’s Compensation act is sufficient to include provisions of section 2p. The title of the Workmen’s Compensation act is sufficiently comprehensive and specific to include all the provisions of section 29, since the title indicates that the law deals with compensation for injuries or death suffered in the course of employment, and any provision of the act reasonably connected with the purpose mentioned in the title is properly included in the act.</p> <p>6. Same—when pleas do not present a good defense to an action for damages for wrongful death. In an action against an interurban company for negligently causing the death of a person not in its employ, pleas setting up that the defendant had elected to be bound by the Workmen’s Compensation act, and that the decedent and his employer were under the act because the character of the employer’s business was extra-hazardous, and that the decedent was killed while engaged in the line of his duty as an employee, are not sufficient, where they fail to allege what the decedent’s duties were or what he was doing at the time of the injury.</p> <p>7. Statutes—when the provisions of a statute can be said to be germane to the act. The subject of an act is the matter which constitutes its groundwork and may include many things which grow out of it or any matter which may be said to be reasonably subservient to it, and any provision which tends to accomplish the legislative purpose or in any reasonable sense to promote the object of the act is germane to it.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Sheridan E. Fry, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Piatt county; the Hon. George A. Sentel, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. Arthur W. Deselm, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wabash county; the Hon. J. C. EaglETon, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. WindES, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Public utilities—extent of the authority of the Public Utilities Commission over public utility corporations. Under the Public Utilities act the Public Utilities Commission has supervision of the issuance of stocks and other evidences of indebtedness of public utility corporations and may control the consolidation of one public utility with another, and no public utility can transact any business until it has obtained from the commission a certificate of convenience and necessity; but the Public Utilities act does not give the commission any power to grant corporate franchises.</p> <p>2. Same—prior to the Public Utilities act a grant of a corporate franchise included the right to issue full amount of capital stock. Prior to the passage of the Public Utilities act the grant of corporate franchises by the State to all corporations for pecuniary profit included the right to issue the full amount of the authorized capital stock, but since the passage of said act the grant of the right to be a public utility no longer carries with it the unqualified right to issue stock but such right is subject to the control of the Public Utilities Commission.</p> <p>3. Same—section 31 of Public Utilities act repeals former statutory provision for incorporation fees of public utilities. Section 31 of the Public Utilities act repeals by implication, so far as public utility corporations are concerned, the former statutory provisions for the payment of fees for issuing or increasing the capital stock of corporations.</p> <p>4. Statutes—when a statute will be repealed by implication. It is the duty of courts to so construe acts that both shall be operative, and to justify holding that a subsequent provision repealed a former one by implication there must be repugnance between the two acts; but repeals by implication, although not favored, are not necessarily within any prohibition of the constitution.</p> <p>5. Same—that construction of a statute will be adopted which it may be reasonably assumed was contemplated. The primary object in construing statutes being to give effect to the true intent and meaning of the. legislature, courts will presume that absurd consequences or those leading to great injustice were not intended and a construction will be adopted which it may reasonably be assumed was contemplated.</p> <p>6. Same—when earlier statute will be in part superseded by the provisions of a later act. Where the effect of a later statute is not to entirely abrogate a former one but merely to withdraw from the operation of the former act a portion of the cases included within its terms, leaving it in. force as to cases not provided for by the later law, the earlier act will be in part superseded by the effect of the provision of the later statute.</p> <p>7. Same—statute will not be construed to provide double taxation unless clearly intended. Double taxation will never be presumed in construing statutes, and before that effect will be given a statute it must unmistakably appear that the legislature so intended it.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Ford county; the Hon. T. M. Harris, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding..</p>

<p>Taxes—quit-claim. deed executed during period of redemption by holder of certificates of purchase at tax sale does not convey or assign the certificates. Where the holder of a tax deed, who also holds several certificates of purchase at subsequent tax sales of the land, executes a quit-claim deed before the time for redemption from the subsequent tax sales has expired and uses no words in the deed expressing an intention to convey after acquired legal or equitable rights, the quit-claim deed does not convey or assign the certificates, and in a proceeding by the quit-claim grantee to register title the holder of the certificates is entitled to be reimbursed for moneys expended in subsequently obtaining tax deeds thereon. (Scovil v. Kelsey, 46 Ill. 344, criticised.)</p> <p>Carter, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—lexicographers’ definition of "inmate” does not determine the meaning of that term as used in section 57a-i of the Criminal Code. Section 57a-! of the Criminal Code, providing for the punishment of an inmate of a house of ill-fame, uses the word “inmate” in a restricted sense, and the definition ordinarily given that word by recognized lexicographers does not determine its meaning.</p> <p>2. Sams—a man is not an “inmate” of a house of prostitution as that term is used in section 57a-! of Criminal Code. A house of ill-fame or assignation is a house where women prostitute themselves by offering their bodies to an indiscriminate intercourse with men, and the words “an inmate of a house of ill-fame or assignation for the practice of prostitution,” used in section 57a-! of the Criminal Code, refer to one who is there- for the purpose of plying her business, and necessarily refer to a woman.</p>

<p>Appeal from the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. James C. Martin, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Foell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Public utilities—when railroad company may be compelled to build a spur-track to elevator or other industry adjacent to its right of way. Even though an industry is located adjacent to the right of way of a railroad company, making it unnecessary to construct a track from the industry to the right of way, as provided in section 45 of the Public Utilities act, the railroad company may nevertheless be compelled, if the business justifies the expense, to build a spur-track to such industry, provided the hazard of operating the railroad is not materially increased.</p> <p>2. Same—rights of railroad company and owner of industry as to constructing spur-track are relative. While a railroad company cannot' be compelled to construct a spur-track to a point arbitrarily selected by the owner of ari industry adjacent to the right of way without regard to the questions of increased hazard of operation and the amount of prospective business, neither can the company arbitrarily refuse to construct such a track upon such reasonable terms as may be prescribed by the Public Utilities Commission.</p> <p>3. Same—when railroad company cannot claim order of commission is not due process of lavo. Where a railroad company is notified of the hearing before the Public Utilities Commission on a complaint filed with the commission and appears and participates in such hearing, it cannot claim that .the order issued by siich board after such hearing is not due process of law.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—tax-payer may pay part of his taxes which he admits to be due. A tax-payer has a right to pay a part of his taxes which he admits to be due, and it is the duty of the collector to receive the money and apply for judgment only for the amount unpaid, and a penalty can be added to that part, only, which is found to be due and unpaid.</p> <p>2. Same—a tax-payer is not obliged to set down in tax bill the items for which he is paying. Where a tax-payer pays a part of his taxes which he admits to be due and states that he intends to pay all taxes except specified ones, he is not obliged to set down in the tax bill the items for which he is paying but is entitled to a receipt for the taxes paid, all the items of which appear in the collector’s book.</p> <p>3. Same—when tax collector’s refusal to accept a check in payment of taxes is not justified. A tax collector’s refusal to accept a cashier’s check in payment of taxes cannot be subsequently justified on the ground that it was not legal tender, where he invited payment by check when he sent out the tax bill and where his= refusal was not based on such ground but upon another ground which was insufficient.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John IT. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Eminent domain—owner must be compensated where property is actually taken. Where property is actually taken for an improvement the owner must be compensated to the .extent of its actual value, without regard to whether his remaining property is benefited or damaged.</p> <p>2. Same—a railroad company should be compensated for land taken for the location of pillars to support a viaduct over its tracks. Where land belonging to a railroad company is taken for the location of pillars to support a viaduct for a street over the railroad tracks the company is entitled to compensation for the land actually taken, without regard to whether there is a damage or benefit to the remainder of its property or whether there is or is not an interference with the use of the remaining land for the purposes to which it was devoted.</p> <p>3. Other questions in this case are controlled by the decisions in City of Chicago v. Lord, {ante, p. 397,) and Same v. Same, 276 Ill. 571.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Augustus A. Partlow, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments-—when judgment of village officers as to necessity for improvement is conclusive. If there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an improvement is necessary or as to its character and extent the judgment of the president and board of trustees of a village is conclusive upon the question, and it is only where the evidence is clear and satisfactory that their action has been oppressive and without reasonable grounds that their judgment will be set aside.</p> <p>2. Same—evidence as to benefits and damages has no bearing on the hearing of legal objections. Evidence as to the benefits to certain pieces of property and the damage to others has no bearing on the question raised by a legal objection that the ordinance is unreasonable, unjust and oppressive because of the excessive cost of the improvement, since both the village and the property owners have a right to a trial by jury on the question of benefits.</p> <p>3. Same—ordinance may refer to statute for manner in which division into installments may be made. An ordinance for a local improvement 'may refer to the statute for the manner in which the division of the assessment into installments shall be made'without repeating the language of the statute, which is definite and specific, and the fact that the commissioners fail to follow the directions of the statute does not invalidate the ordinance.</p> <p>4. Same—decision of court as to apportioning public and private benefits cannot be reviewed. The decision of the county court upon the question of apportioning the benefits between the public and the private property assessed is made conclusive by the statute and is not subject to review.</p> <p>5. Same—duty of county court where distribution of cost of improvement is unjust. The fact that the distribution of the cost of the improvement between the public and private property as made by the ordinance is inequitable and unjust does not authorize the county court to dismiss the petition but it is the duty of the court to so modify the distribution as to make it equitable and just.</p> <p>6. Same—when false particular of description of an improvement will not invalidate the ordinance. Where an ordinance provides for the construction of a system of sewers “within the village” and goes on to describe the improvement in detail, being a system of sewers in the village but including an outlet sewer to be constructed beyond the boundaries of the village, the false particular of the description as being “within the village” will not avoid or-make uncertain the description of the improvement so as to invalidate the ordinance.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph H. Fitch, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon.' John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Deeds—the question of delivery is primarily one of intention. No particular form or ceremony is required to constitute a good delivery of a deed, and it is sufficient if the intention of the grantor that the deed is to become operative immediately and that he has surrendered all control over it is clearly manifested.</p> <p>2. Same—when delivery of deed to third party to be given to grantee at grantor’s death is a valid delivery. Where a grantor executes a deed and places it in the hands of a third party, to be delivered unconditionally to the grantee upon the death of the grantor, and the grantor surrenders all control over the deed, there is a valid delivery, and the conveyance is not open to the objection that it is in the nature of a testamentary disposition and void because not executed with the formality required by statute.</p> <p>3. Same—deed to be delivered at the grantor’s death takes effect immediately, if such intention is manifested. A deed handed to a third party for delivery to the grantee at the grantor’s death takes effect not at the death of the grantor but immediately, if such act is attended with circumstances clearly evincing such intention on the part of the grantor, and the reservation of a life estate in the grantor raises a presumption of such intention.</p> <p>4. Same—when bank holding deed for delivery is agent of the grantee. Where a grantor delivers a deed to a bank to be delivered at his death to the grantee, with circumstances indicating an intention that the deed take effect immediately, the bank holds the deed as agent of the grantee.</p> <p>5. Same—when deeds will not be held to have been made to defraud existing creditors. Where a father makes deeds to each o'f his children, reserving a life estate in himself, and retains for himself sufficient property to cover his personal liabilities, and where the joint estates of himself and his sons, with whom he is jointly liable, are then sufficient to cover such joint liability, the deeds will not be held to have been made for the purpose of defrauding existing creditors.</p> <p>6. Same—Conveyances act places subsequent 'creditors on same footing as subsequent purchasers as regards notice. Section 30 of the Conveyances act places subsequent creditors on the same footing as subsequent purchasers in regard to notice of existing deeds, and the question of fraud as to subsequent creditors must be determined by the question whether a subsequent purchaser woufd have been charged with notice under, the same circumstances.</p> <p>7. Same—actual occupation of land is notice equal to record of deed. The actual occupation of land is notice equal to the record of the deed or other instrument under which the occupant claims, and a purchaser cannot excuse himself by merely obtaining information as to how the possession was originally obtained, but is bound to inquire of the person in possession by what tenure he holds and what interest he claims, open possession being sufficient to charge such purchaser with notice of all legal and equitable claims of the occupant.</p> <p>8. Same—notice which puts an ordinarily prudent person upon inquiry-is sufficient to bind a subsequent purchaser. Whatever circumstance is sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent person upon inquiry which would lead to the truth is in all respects equal to and must be regarded as such notice of a former conveyance as will bind a subsequent purchaser.</p> <p>9. Same—when bank holding deeds in escrow is ptit upon inquiry as to their contents. Where a grantor deposits deeds with a bank in an envelope, on the outside of which is written a statement that the deeds are placed in escrow with the bank and directing the bank to keep the deeds safely until the grantor’s death and then deliver them to the several grantees named therein, if living, or to the remainder-men if any of the grantees are dead, and the bank accepts the deeds after the cashier has been advised that the deeds are not to be withdrawn and has indorsed on the envelope the words “cannot be withdrawn,” the bank is put upon inquiry as to the contents of the deeds in its subsequent dealings involving the credit of the grantor and is charged with notice of what such inquiry would have revealed.</p> <p>Cartwright, Carter and Dunn, JJ., dissenting.</p>