277 Ill. App. 3d 811 - People v. Rivera’s Empirical Analysis
1996
Citation profile
52 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently March 2026 · most notably 192 Ill. 2d 548 - People v. Williams (2000), 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080 - People v. Jura (2004)
52 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 122 Ill. 2d 176 - People v. Enoch · 79 Ill. 2d 564 - People v. Carlson · 169 Ill. 2d 1 - People v. Keene · 141 Ill. 2d 40 - People v. Smith · 154 Ill. 2d 272 - People v. Ward
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““It is undisputed that an officer may testify to his investigatory procedures, including the existence of conversations, without violating the hearsay rule. This is true even if a logical inference may be drawn that the officer took subsequent steps as a result of the substance of that conversation. [Citation.] The defendant argues that the testimony in this case exceeds that allowed by Gacho, since [the officers] testified to the substance of Colvin’s statements. Gacho stated that, ‘[h]ad the substance of the conversation *** been testified to, it would have been objectionable as hearsay.’ [Citation.] However, this language is not applicable to the facts of this case. In Gacho, the defendant was convicted of murder, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery, and was sentenced to death. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of his trial, inter alia, because of alleged hearsay in a police officer’s testimony and improper references to this testimony during closing argument. This occurred when the officer, while detailing his investigation, testified to a conversation he had with the surviving victim in which the victim identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. This is the dispositive factual difference between Gacho and the instant case. In Gacho, the substance of the conversation would have gone to the very essence of the dispute: whether the defendant was the man who committed the crime. Thus, if the substance of the conversation came into evidence it would”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[h]earsay testimony identifying the defendant as the one who committed the crime cannot be explained away as `police procedure,' even where the trial judge limits the evidence to a nonhearsay purpose.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"`Officer Brown wasn't there when the shooting occurred either, but Officer Brown told you he was out there covering the scene, he received information, went to a nearby location, just a couple of blocks away and Officer Brown makes an arrest. He sees these guys, brings them over there. One guy has a checkered shirt with the war colors on it. Brings them over, has a conversation with some citizens and he runs these guys into the detectives.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Rivera, 277 Ill.App.3d at 818 , 214 Ill.Dec. 575 , 661 N.E.2d 429 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.