¶1dissenting:
¶2The affirmance in this case is based upon a finding by the Court that the State disavowed its agreement with *701Brockman after he had substantially performed his obligation under the agreement. I respectfully dissent from that conclusion. While plea agreements are entitled to judicial enforcement where a guilty plea rests upon a promise by the State to drop certain charges or to recommend a limited sentence (or to make no recommendation as to sentence), Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 322 A. 2d 527 (1974), the record in this case is totally devoid of any evidence that a finalized and binding agreement had in fact been reached at that point in the proceedings when the prosecutor declared “. . . there is no deal . . . everything is off.” In my judgment, a review of the record compels this conclusion whether the facts are scrutinized from a contractual viewpoint or as a potential “. . . violation of our time-honored fair play norm, and accepted professional standards,” State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621, at 624 (Iowa, 1974).
¶3The State offered to accept a plea of guilty from Brockman to murder in the second degree, recommend to the court a sentence of no more than ten years and nolle pros all other counts in the indictment; in exchange, Brockman was to provide the State with a sworn deposition and testify before the grand jury and at the trial of whomever he implicated in the deposition as being the author of the murder scheme. To bind the State to its offer, Brockman was required to be truthful and candid in revealing all that he knew of the murder plot. When the offer was first made, Brockman refused it, but his co-defendant Maness accepted it; that same day, Maness fulfilled his part of the bargain by testifying before the grand jury. Brockman had a change of heart overnight and the State agreed to stand by its offer. But after agreeing to accept the State’s offer, Brockman perjured himself in the course of his deposition by denying that he could identify Ward from photographs shown to him. Regardless of his motive, Brockman lied under oath by making a false statement material — indeed crucial — to the performance of the agreement, ie., his ability and willingness to identify his employer in the murder scheme. *702In these circumstances, the State was plainly justified in declining to proceed with the agreement. Manifestly, the State did not have to extend the offer in the first place; it did not have to renew the offer after its initial rejection by Brockman; and most certainly, the State did not have to continue the offer once Brockman had demonstrated bad faith by lying under oath.
¶4Brockman was in no way prejudiced by the agreement’s cancellation, since the bargain was rescinded prior to the entry of any plea. Brockman’s deposition was sealed by the court and not used at his trial, and no evidentiary leads were garnered, insofar as the record discloses, as a result of the taking of the deposition.
¶5In characterizing Brockman’s perjury as a “misstep amounting] to no more than an inconsequential hesitation insufficient to nullify the understanding,” the majority misinterprets the nature and spirit of plea agreements. Treachery and deceit sought to be practiced by either party in the course of the implementation of such, agreements are never in the interest of justice, and while it may be true that parties to plea agreements are often antagonistic and distrustful of each other’s motives, that fact alone hardly justifies compelling a prosecutor to honor an agreement which, as here, has been so plainly undermined by the defendant’s perjury, irrespective of the reason assigned for its commission. Refusing to acknowledge Ward as the person in the photographs was far more significant than a mere “de minimus infraction of his obligations,” as the majority suggests; indeed, it so destroyed Brockman’s integrity for truthfulness as to make it eminently reasonable for the State to decline to vouch for his credibility as a witness at Ward’s trial. The State in every way measured up to the standards of fair play and equity as applied to plea negotiations in Santobelloand Kuchenreuther, and accordingly I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.