State v. Carroll’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “When a request is made for a circumstantial evidence instruction, the trial judge may exercise discretion and deny the request when the crime and the identity of the perpetrator are established by direct evidence and the circumstances introduced are merely corroborative. State v. Jenkins, 270 S.C. 365 , 242 S.E.2d 420 (1978); State v. Simmons, 269 S.C. 649 , 239 S.E.2d 656 (1977). It has been held that an instruction on circumstantial evidence is not necessary when the evidence is introduced only to show intent. Belcher v. State, 504 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1250 (1961). Intent is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must ordinarily be proved by circumstantial evidence, that is, by facts and circumstances from which intent may be inferred. State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295 , 185 S.E.2d 607 (1971). When all the salient facts of the prosecution’s case, including the facts from which intent is inferred, are proved by direct evidence, the prosecution is not relying on circumstantial evidence to an extent requiring a special jury instruction. We hold that a trial judge may refuse to give an instruction on circumstantial evidence when the State relies on direct evidence to prove the acts of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator and on circumstantial evidence to prove intent. The trial judge acted within his discretion in refusing to give the requested instruction.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Salisbury