¶1ON REHEARING
¶2Defendant earnestly insists that our decision in this case is wrong and respectfully asks that we answer questions, or arguments, posed in brief which defendant filed in support of application for rehearing.
¶3First, defendant says:
“. . . . let us suppose in this case Appellant with the written consent of his insurance company made a settlement with Appellee and that Appellant’s insurance company is now bringing this suit through Appellant, in accordance with the terms of the policy, to recover the amount of the settlement. Would Plaintiff then be entitled to qualify the jury as to the Plaintiff’s insurance company? . . . .”
¶4We do not clearly understand how an action in name of plaintiff could be maintained against defendant if plaintiff had agreed to a settlement with defendant, or how either plaintiff or insurer would be interested in bringing an action against defendant if a settlement had been made, because we understand the expression, “made a settlement,” to mean that the parties agreed on the amount of damage and that defendant paid to plaintiff the agreed amount. Defendant may intend to suppose that defendant had not paid the agreed amount.
¶5Second, defendant says:
“. . . . If Appellant was requested in writing by Appellant’s insurance company to take action against this Defendant in order to recover and to reimburse Appellant’s insurance company expenses, costs and attorney’s fees incurred, as well as the recovery of any settlement made with Appellant by Appellant’s insurance company, would Appellant be entitled to have the jury qualified as to Appellant’s insurance company? On Page 506 of said opinion, this Court decided that Appellant’s insurance company is interested in the results of this suit. This Court said 'the Company stands to gain or lose as a result of the verdict’ (Page 505 of the Opinion) if the insurance company through a Plaintiff is attempting to gain does this not prejudice the Defendant by allowing the Plaintiff to qualify the jury as to the insurance company ?”
¶6Third, defendant says:
“. . . . Suppose Appellant’s insurance company had already arbitrated and paid Appellant and this was a subrogation suit to recover the amount it had paid Appellant. Should the jury be qualified as to Plaintiff’s insurance company? All of the foregoing could be factual. In this event, is this Court saying that when an insurance company is attempting, through a Plaintiff, to recover from the Defendant sums it has expended for Plaintiff’s benefit, the Plaintiff has the right to qualify the jury as to Plaintiff’s own insurance company? . . . .”
¶7■ We note in passing that Subdivision 12 of § 55, Title 30, refers to “an insurance company” interested, etc., and that the stat*8ute gives the right of challenge to “either party.”
¶8As defendant says, his three contentions rest on supposed factual situations. We think it sufficient answer to say that the transcript does not show that any of the three supposed situations existed in this case.
“If we were to express an opinion based on facts not shown by the record in this case, that opinion would be dicta and would not be binding in subsequent cases. This court has quoted with approval the following statement of this rule:
“ ‘ … It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision.’ … ” State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 341, 186 So. 487, 496, 121 A.L.R. 283.
“When another case involving different facts comes before us, it will be our duty to decide that case according to the law applicable to the facts then presented.” Wilkinson v. Rowe, 266 Ala. 675, 680, 681, 98 So.2d 435, 440.
¶9Defendant argues further that even if the court erred in refusing to inquire whether any juror was interested in Dixie, such error, for aught that appears, would be without injury.
¶10We take this to mean that defendant is saying that, in order to justify a reversal for the error in refusing to qualify jurors as to their connection with Dixie, plaintiff should be required to show that one of the veniremen was an officer, stockholder, or employee of Dixie. It may be that defendant is arguing that plaintiff should further show that one of the jurors who tried the case was such an officer, stockholder, or employee.
¶11We are of opinion that plaintiff should not be required to carry such a burden. In Duke v. Gaines, 224 Ala. 519, 522, 140 So. 600, 602, in holding that plaintiff had a right to examine jurors, this court said:
“Clearly it is the right of the plaintiff to have ascertained whether there is an insurance carrier for the purpose of qualifying the jury, and, if so, his right is to ascertain whether jurors are interested by reason of connection with such company.
“In Citizens’ L., H. & P. Co. v. Lee, 182 Ala. 561, 62 So. 199, it was remarked that if the trial court and counsel for plaintiff knew none of the jurors were interested, any examination would be improper, or in bad faith, merely designed to prejudice the case by injecting the insurance company as the party to pay. We approve this announcement. But since that decision, section 8662 of the Code has been enacted, conferring on the parties the right to examine jurors touching their interests, etc. Morgan Hill Paving Co. v. Fonville, 222 Ala. 120, 130 So. 807; Mays v. State, 218 Ala. 656, 120 So. 163.
“In the face of this statute we cannot hold the defendant may take some other method of proving the qualifications of the jurors, cutting off this statutory right to qualify them in the usual manner.”
¶12Neither do we think plaintiff can be deprived of the right conferred by the statute; § 8662 of Code 1923, § 52, Title 30, Code 1940; by holding denial of such right to be without injury unless plaintiff assumes and carries the burden of showing affirmatively that one or more of the veniremen was then an officer, stockholder, or employee of an interested insurer.
¶13In refusing to hold harmless the error of requiring a party to strike from a list of *928 jurors when the law provided for 24, this court said:
“With respect to the nonapplication of rule of practice 45 to this case, it is not the policy of this court to apply that wholesome and useful rule in such a way as to nullify positive laws which can be upheld only by their compulsory observance.” Brilliant Coal Co. v. Barton, 203 Ala. 38, 40, 81 So. 828, 830.
“In order that the practice prescribed by the Legislature may be preserved, we deem it necessary that the judgment in this case be reversed for the erroneous practice here shown.” Brilliant Coal Co. v. Barton, supra, at page 39, 81 So. at page 829.
¶14We are of opinion that the foregoing quotations apply to this case and that we should adhere to our original ruling.
¶15Opinion extended.
¶16■Application overruled.