Neill v. Gibson’s Empirical Analysis
278 F.3d 1044 · 2001
Citation profile
69 federal appellate · 3 district · 9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 136 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2025 · most notably Cargle v. Mullin (2003), 33 Cal. 4th 382 - People v. Brown (2004)
69 federal appellate · 3 district · 9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · United States v. Olano · Williams v. Taylor · Coleman v. Thompson · Delaware v. Van Arsdall
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 136 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“`look to the merits of the omitted issue.'”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage“[the en bane court, therefore, expressly disavows the use of the 'dead-bang winner' language to imply requiring a showing more onerous than a reasonable probability that the omitted claim would have resulted in a reversal on appeal.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The Napue and Brady errors cannot all be collectively analyzed under Napue’s “reasonable likelihood” standard, as that would overweight the Brady violations. On the other hand, they cannot be considered in two separate groups, as that would fail to capture their combined effect on our confidence in the jury’s decision. To resolve this conflict, we first consider the Napue violations collectively and ask whether there is “any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” If so, habeas relief must be granted. However, if the Napue errors are not material standing aloné, we consider all of the Napue and Brady violations collectively and ask whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding Would have been different.” At both stages, we must ask whether the defendant “received ... a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Reis-Campos v. Biter
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.