Gattis v. Snyder’s Empirical Analysis
278 F.3d 222 · 2002
Citation profile
32 federal appellate · 3 district · 15 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 70 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2022 · most notably Lambert v. Blackwell (2004), Jacobs v. Horn (2005)
32 federal appellate · 3 district · 15 state decisions — followed in 11 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Batson v. Kentucky · Williams v. Taylor · Barker v. Wingo · Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case or if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from the Supreme Court’s precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[A]fter the defendant makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the state may raise the affirmative defense that the strike would have been exercised on the basis of the gender-neutral reasons and in the absence of the discriminatory motive. If the state makes such a showing, the peremptory challenge survives constitutional scrutiny.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We regard none of the four factors identified above (length of delay, reason for de lay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant) as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused’s interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Harris v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.