dissent">THOMPSON, Justice,

dissenting.

I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the appropriate level of discipline in this case is a two-year suspension. As the facts as set out in the majority opinion show, Respondent was an experienced attorney who, despite being familiar with the constraints on dealing with trust funds, wrote numerous checks to himself (totaling more than $100,000) from a client’s trust fund over a period of two years for his own personal and business expenses without disclosing his actions to the client. Throughout that time, Respondent ignored repeated requests from the beneficiary of the estate for information as to the status of the estate and he refused to provide an accounting of the funds he held in his capacity as a fiduciary. Clearly, a dishonest or selfish motive is established by these facts which, in and of themselves, are sufficient to justify disbarment. See In the Matter of David A. Swift, 273 Ga. 539 (544 SE2d 114) (2001); In the Matter of Wallace D. Washington, 270 Ga. 60 (504 SE2d 704) (1998); In the Matter of Roy L. Allen, 268 Ga. 752 (493 SE2d 706) (1997) (voluntary surrender). Given the large amount of money involved in this case, the fact that Respondent’s misappropriations continued over a two-year period, his selfish motive, his persistent *57refusal to account for his actions thereby forcing his client to retain another attorney and file a grievance, and his substantial experience in the practice of law, I believe that the aggravating factors outweigh the factors in mitigation and that the appropriate level of punishment is disbarment.

Decided June 7, 2004.William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Elizabeth M. Williamson, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.James E. Spence, Jr., for Shelfer.

I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.

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