278 Ga. App. 605 - Rolfe v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To establish the necessary reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop, the totality of the circumstances must show that the officer had specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, provided a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 314 Ga. App. 107 - Jones v. State · 296 Ga. App. 481 - Taylor v. State

2. “The Fourth Amendment allows a police officer to stop persons ... to investigate the officer’s reasonable suspicion “that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (101 SC[t] 690, 66 LE2d 621) (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (88 SC[t] 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968); Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994). To establish the necessary reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop, the totality of the circumstances must show that the officer had “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, . . . [provided] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (Punctuation omitted.) Vansant, supra at 320 . Although an investigative stop cannot be based on an officer’s mere hunch that criminal activity is afoot, “[t]his process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 273 (122 SC[t] 744, 151 LE2d 740) (2002). In considering the totality of the circumstances in each case, a court must avoid evaluating the facts in isolation. Even where each in a series of acts may be susceptible to an innocent explanation, taken together they may collectively am”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sims v. the State