State v. Evans’s Empirical Analysis
1976
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 6 district · 269 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 290 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2022 · most notably Engle v. Isaac (1982), Tichnell v. State (1980)
6 federal appellate · 6 district · 269 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Mullaney v. Wilbur · Cupp v. Naughten · Leland v. Oregon · Dorsey v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 290 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Of course, nothing in Mullaney per se precludes the use of traditional presumptions or logical inferences arising from established facts; what Mullaney precludes is the use of such presumptions or inferences only when they operate, ultimately, to relieve the State of its burden of persuasion in a criminal case, i.e., its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts necessary to constitute the offense when the issue of their existence becomes an issue in the case. State v. Hankerson, 288 N. C. 632 , 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975); Evans v. State, supra. “The court in Evans was careful to point out that the burden of initially producing ‘some evidence’ on the issue of mitigation or self-defense (or of relying upon evidence produced by the State) sufficient to give rise to a jury issue with respect to these defenses, is properly cast upon the defendant. Once the issue has been generated by the evidence, however, the State must carry the ultimate burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on that issue. Nothing in Mullaney in any way purports to circumscribe this well-established procedure; indeed in Mullaney the Court recognized that many states do require the defendant to make a threshold showing that there is ‘some evidence’ indicating that the defendant acted in the heat of passion before the prosecution is required to negate this element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See 421 U. S. at 701-02 (n. 28). In other words, the prosecution need not in the first i”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“1. Assault with intent to murder is an assault under circumstances such that if the victim should die, the crime would be murder. 2. Malice is that which separates murder from manslaughter. 3. One may infer malice from the directing of a deadly weapon at a vital part of the human anatomy.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"[with] any defense theory of justification, excuse or mitigation, including ... entrapment ... a jury instruction ... which cast upon the defendant the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence... was constitutionally defective... since it shifted the burden to the defendant to prove justification or excuse ....” State v. Evans, supra at 207.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.