State v. Canova’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 68 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 81 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"First, the characterization of the crime; and, second, such description of the particular act alleged to have been committed by the accused as will enable him to properly defend against the accusation. In statutory crimes, where the statute includes the elements necessary to constitute a crime, the first of these requirements is gratified by characterizing the offense in the words of the statute; the second requires such definite and specific allegations as reasonably to put the accused on notice of the particular act charged, to enable him to prepare a defense and plead the judgment in any subsequent attempted prosecution.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Brown v. State · State v. Morton

2. “"(i) to put the accused on notice of what he is called upon to defend by characterizing and describing the crime and conduct; (ii) to protect the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense; (iii) to enable the defendant to prepare for his trial; (iv) to provide a basis for the court to consider the legal sufficiency of the charging document; and (v) to inform the court of the specific crime charged so that, if required, sentence may be pronounced in accordance with the right of the case. .. . [I]n order to place an accused on adequate notice, two different types of information ought to be provided by the charging document. First, it is essential that it characterize the crime, and second, it should furnish the defendant such a description of the par ticular act alleged to have been committed as to inform him of the specific conduct with which he is charged.... As to the former of these dual requisites, where a statutory offense is alleged, it has generally been held in Maryland that, at least where the terms of the statute include the elements of the criminal conduct, the crime may be sufficiently characterized in the words of the statute... . [I]n reference to the informative aspect of a charging document, failure of the accusation to contain information sufficient to advise the accused of the particular conduct alleged to have been committed renders the allegation subject to attack, and this requirement exists quite independent of the necessity to include all th”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Morton

3. “In Blondes v. State, 16 Md. App. 165, 184 , 294 A.2d 661 (1972), the Court of Special Appeals said that Art; 27, § 23 is not"... more all inclusive than common law bribery.” The court observed that upon a literal reading of the constitutional mandate set out in Art. Ill, § 50, ". . . no directive was given that the offense of bribery be provided for by statute; rather it directed legislative enactment of a statute to punish that common law crime....” Id. at 182. It found that the statute was declaratory of the common law. We agree that the statute embodies the basic elements of the common law without extending its boundaries to persons outside the ambit of the common law. With respect to the bribe-giver or briber, the statute now in effect speaks of "any person”, and like the common law, anyone not entirely without criminal capacity, see Matter of Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 100 , 299 A.2d 856, 858 (1973), may be a briber. With respect to the bribe-taker or bribee, however, the statute designates classes, and only a person within one of those classes is a potential bribee. [Id. at 490-91.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spector v. State