Williams v. Standard Oil Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 federal appellate · 41 district · 236 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 429 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * But tire general rule is that the unobjectionable part of a statute cannot be held separable unless it appears that, 'standing alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the Legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall.’ The question is one of interpretation and of legislative intent, and the legislative declaration ‘provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in determining that intent. But it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.’ Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 , 290, 44 S.Ct. 323 , 324 ( 68 L.Ed. 686 ).” (Italics ours.)”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wislar v. United States · Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County

2. ““In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable' that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Webb v. Adams · Demmert v. Smith

3. ““It is settled by recent decisions of this court that a state legislature is without constitutional power to fix prices at which commodities may be sold, services rendered, or property used, unless the business or property involved is ‘affected with a public interest.’ Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522 ; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra; Fairmont Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1 ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 . Nothing is gained by reiterating the statement that the phrase is indefinite. By repeated decisions of this court, beginning with Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 , that phrase, however it may be characterized, has become the established test by which the legislative power to fix prices of commodities, use of property, or services, must be measured. As applied in particular instances, its meaning may be considered both from an affirmative and a negative point of view. Affirmatively, it means that a business or property, in order to be affected with a public interest, must be such or be so employed as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby in effect granted to the public. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra, p. 434. Negatively, it does not mean that a business is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or because the public are warranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its maintenance. Id., p. 430. The meaning and application of the phrase are examined at length in the Tyson case, and”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gwynette v. Myers · Van Winkle v. Fred Meyer, Inc.