Frost v. Corporation Commission’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

174 federal appellate · 66 district · 301 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 749 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Appellant, having complied with all the provisions of the statute, acquired a right to operate a gin in the city of Durant by valid grant from the state acting through the corporation commission. While the right thus acquired does not preclude the state from making similar valid grants to others, it is, nevertheless, exclusive against any person attempting to operate a gin without obtaining a permit or, what amounts to the same thing, against one who attempts to do so under a void permit, in either of which events the owner may resort to a court of equity to restrain the illegal operation upon the ground that such operation is an injurious invasion of his property rights. * * * The injury threatened by such an invasion is the impairment of the owner's business, for which there is no adequate remedy at law."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McCarthy v. Public Service Commission of Utah · Title Ins. Ass'n v. Board of Ins. Com'rs

2. ““ * * * A corporation organized under the act of 1919, however, has capital stock, which, up to a certain amount, may be subscribed for by any person, firm or corporation; is allowed to do business for others ; to make profits and declare dividends, not exceeding 8 per cent, per annum; and to apportion the remainder of its earnings among its members ratably upon the amount of products sold by them to the corporation. Such a corporation is in no sense a mutual association. Like its individual competitor, it does business with the general public for the sole purpose of making money. Its members need not even be cotton growers. They may be — all or any of them — bankers or merchants or capitalists having no interest in the business differing in any respect from that of the members of an ordinary corporation. The differences relied upon to justify the classification are, for that purpose, without substance. The provision for paying a portion of the profits to members or, if so determined, to nonmembers, based upon the amounts of their sales to or purchases from the corporation, is a device which, without special statutory authority, may be and often is resorted to by ordinary corporations for the purpose of securing business. As a basis for the classification attempted, it lacks both relevancy and substance. Stripped of immaterial distinctions and reduced to its ultimate effect, the proviso, as here construed and applied, baldly creates one rule for a natural person and a differe”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Texas v. United States · Community Public Service Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission

3. “The purpose of the clause in respect of equal protection of the laws is to rest the rights of all persons upon the same rule under similar circumstances, (citations omitted)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Standard Oil Co. · Brisker v. Metropolitan Dade County