¶1MEMORANDUM
¶2I. Introduction
¶3Before the court at a hearing on November 9, 2011, were both the Plaintiffs Assented to Motion for Approval of Class Action Settlement for Massachusetts Subclass [# 41] and Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class [#30]. Following the hearing, in an Order dated November 10, 2011, Plaintiffs Assented to Motion for Approval of Class Action Settlement for Massachusetts Subclass was ALLOWED. Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class [# 30] was taken under advisement. After careful consideration of both the arguments presented at the November 9, 2011, hearing and the papers filed by the parties, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class [# 30] is this day DENIED for the reasons set forth below.
¶4II. Background
¶5A. Factual Background
¶6Plaintiffs Abdel Abla and Erwin Aguilar were employed as servers at the Maggiano’s Little Italy Restaurant in Boston, Massachusetts, which is owned by Defendants.
¶7Plaintiffs allege that, although this gratuity/service charge appears to be a tip for the wait staff, less than the entire amount of the charge was remitted to the servers who worked at the private events.
¶8Plaintiffs brought this action on behalf of themselves, a national class, and a Massachusetts sub-class.
¶9Plaintiffs brought three counts on behalf of both the national class and the Massachusetts sub-class for: (1) tortious interference with contractual and/or advantageous relations; (2) quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; and (3) breach of implied contract.
¶10B. Procedural Background
¶11This matter was filed by Plaintiffs on March 3, 2010, and was originally before Judge Gertner, who dealt with early motions and discovery. The Amended Complaint was filed on March 8, 2011, and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) was filed on May 5, 2011. On June 21, 2011 the case was reassigned to this court.
¶12On November 9, 2011, the parties came before the court for a fairness hearing on the proposed settlement of the Massachusetts sub-class. On November 10, 2011, an order was issued approving the settlement.
¶13By the terms of the settlement, the Defendant is required to pay $1,250,000 into a “qualified settlement fund.”
¶14As a condition of the settlement, Plaintiff Abla agreed to a general release of all claims against Defendants.
¶15III. Discussion
¶16The class action lawsuit is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical [numerosity requirement]; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class [commonality requirement]; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [typicality requirement]; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class [adequacy requirement].22
¶17A party seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) must also show that:
(1) the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that (2) a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.23
¶18It is undisputed that, “[t]he moving party bears the burden of establishing the elements necessary for class certification: the four requirements of 23(a) and one of the several requirements of Rule 23(b).”
¶19A. Plaintiff Is not an Adequate Class Representative under Rule 23(a).
¶20In order to justify a departure from the general rule that litigation is to be conducted by and on behalf of the named parties, “a class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.”
¶21The adequacy analysis has two steps. “The Court must determine, ‘first, whether any potential conflicts exist between the named plaintiffs and the prospective class members, and, second, whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel will prosecute their case vigorously.’”
¶22In the Overka case, Judge Young certified a national class of sky caps challenging a baggage handling fee imposed by their employer American Airlines.
¶23In this case, Plaintiff Aguilar has settled the majority of his claims against Defendants, retaining only his common law claims arising between March 1, 2004 and March 1, 2007.
¶24This arrangement pushes the edges of what Rule 23 allows, leading to the conclusion that Plaintiffs partial settlement renders him an inadequate class representative under Rule 23(a). While Plaintiff Aguilar does still have live common law claims, he has obtained a substantial settlement from Defendants, including settlement of those claims for which he was entitled to treble damages under Massachusetts law.
¶25In light of the settlement, it can no longer be fairly said that Plaintiff has the same interest in zealously pursuing the litigation *57as members of the proposed national class. Plaintiff Aguilar has only select common law claims remaining. But, members of the proposed national class may have live claims under the tip and wage laws of other states. Trial of this case as a national class action risks precluding potential class members in other states from recovering under the tip and wage laws of those states when the named class representative has already received satisfaction for his statutory tip and wage law claims.
¶26B. Plaintiff Fails to Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
¶27Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court is given a non-exhaustive list of factors by which to evaluate the Rule’s predominance and superiority requirements:
(A) the class members’ interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.41
¶28In order to establish predominance, Plaintiffs must “demonstrate that the proposed class is ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’ ”
¶29In the present case, it is clear that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied. The evidence before the court demonstrates that banquet contracts often differ between different restaurant locations, and even between different events at the same restaurant.
¶30*58Plaintiffs attempt to assert common law claims for unjust enrichment/quantum meruit, tortious interference, and breach of implied contract in the twenty-one states where Maggiano’s restaurants exist.
¶31Similar problems of individual inquiries beset Plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment/quantum meruit and tortious interference. The lynchpin of a claim for unjust enrichment is that the enrichment was, in fact, unjust.
¶32The requirement of superiority, like the predominance criterion, “ensures that resolution by class action will ‘achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote ... uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.’”
¶33In this case, the balance of the factors weighs in favor of denying class certification. First, in the event that class certification is denied, potential members of a national class will not be left without an av*59enue to pursue a remedy. As the court’s approval of the settlement of the Massachusetts subclass demonstrates, the potential class members from each restaurant are sufficiently numerous to warrant certification of state-wide classes capable of seeking redress for the injuries alleged.
¶34The evidence submitted to the court shows that this matter is more appropriately dealt with on a state-wide basis. Defendants have submitted numerous documents and affidavits, which establish that the service charge policy was implemented differently at different restaurant locations.
¶35The settlement of the Massachusetts subclass must also be considered in determining the superiority of a class action on these claims in this venue. After the settlement of the Massachusetts sub-class, only one named plaintiff remains.
¶36IV. Conclusion
¶37For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class [#30] is DENIED.
¶38AN ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED.
¶39ORDER
¶40After a hearing on November 9, 2011, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class [# 30] is DENIED.
¶41IT IS SO ORDERED.
¶42. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶¶ 4-5.
¶43. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶ 4.
¶44. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶¶ 10-11.
¶45. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶ 11.
¶46. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶¶ 11-14.
¶47. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶¶ 14-17.
¶48. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶¶ 4-5, 34-35.
¶49. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶ 34.
¶50. Am. Compl. [# 26] ¶ 35.
¶51. Am. Compl. [# 26] at 9-10.
¶52. Am. Compl. [# 26] at 10.
¶53. Order [# 42].
¶54. Order [# 42] at 1.
¶55. [# 41-1] at 7.
¶56. [#41-1] at 3.
¶57. [# 41] at 4. (“For purposes of this calculation, the amount of service charges received between March 1, 2007, and November 30, 2010, shall be trebled, in recognition of the treble damages available during the statute of limitations period for the Massachusetts sub-class members' statutory Tips Law claim.”)
¶58. [# 41-1] at 3.
¶59. [#41-1] at 4.
¶60. See [# 41-1] at 9.
¶61. [#41-1] at 15.
¶62. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979)).
¶63. Overka, 265 F.R.D. 14 at 17 (D.Mass.2010).
¶65. In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 337, 341 (D.Mass.2003) (citing Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2003)).
¶66. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.
¶67. In re Credit Suisse-AOL Securities Litigation, 253 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D.Mass.2008) (quoting Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2003)).
¶68. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2550 (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977)).
¶70. In re Credit Suisse, 253 F.R.D. at 23.
¶71. Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir.1985) (citing Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir.1979); Ferraro v. General Motors Corp., 105 F.R.D. 429, 431 (D.N.J.1985)).
¶72. Id.(quoting Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 957 F.Supp. 306, 326 (D.Mass.1997)). See also Overka, 265 F.R.D. at 19 ("The adequacy requirement has two factors: (1) that no potential conflicts exist between the named plaintiff and the class members and (2) that 'counsel chosen by the representative party is qualified, experienced, and able to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation.' ”) (quoting Andrews, 780 F.2d at 130).
¶73. See Overka, 265 F.R.D. at 19 n. 3.
¶74. Overka, 265 F.R.D. at 24.
¶76. [# 41-1] ¶ 4.
¶77. See [# 41-1] ¶ 20.
¶78. [#41-1] ¶ 15 (indicating that the parties’ intent is to have the settlement of the sub-class have no effect on the certification of the national class).
¶79. See [# 41-1] ¶ 4 (retaining claims only outside of the statute of limitations for the tip and wage law).
¶80. See [#41-1] ¶ 16 ("Aguilar's receipt of settlement funds under this settlement may be used for the limited purpose of an offset to any damages that Aguilar may become entitled to as part of the purported National Class.”).
¶81. See settlement agreement [# 41-1]; see also Reppert v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 55-59 (1st Cir.2004) (finding class settlement under 50 states’ laws precluded class members' subsequent suit for additional damages).
¶82. Overka v. American Airlines, 265 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D.Mass.2010).
¶83. Overka, 265 F.R.D. at 19 (quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997)).
¶84. In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 337, 343 (D.Mass.2003) (citing 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778 (2d ed.)).
¶85. Overka, 265 F.R.D. at 19 (quoting Margaret Hall Foundation, Inc. v. Atlantic Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 1987 WL 15884, at *4 (D.Mass. 1987)).
¶86. See Hoffman Aff. Ex. A (Machul Tr. at 8:7— 9:20) [# 34-1],
¶87. See Hoffman Aff. Exs. B-F [# 34-2—# 34-6]; see also Abla Tr., Hoffman Aff. Ex. G (Abla Tr. at 56:2-19) [# 34-7]; Hoffman Aff. Ex. A (Machul Tr. at 50:23-52:17) [# 34-1],
¶88. Hoffman Aff. Ex. A (Machul Tr. at 51:20-52:10) [#34-1]; Hoffman Aff. Exs. B-F [# 34-2—# 34-6].
¶89. Hoffman Aff. Ex. H (Aguilar Tr. at 38:6-39:16) [# 34-8],
¶90. See banquet check [# 30-1]; Hoffman Aff. Ex. G (Abla Tr. at 37:22-38:4) [# 34-7],
¶91. See Am. Compl. [# 26] at 8-11.
¶92. See Am. Compl. [# 26] at 10.
¶93. See De Giovanni v. Jani-King Int'l, Inc., 262 F.R.D. 71, 77 (D.Mass.2009) (Plaintiffs would need to establish that the "terms of the contracts were the same for all class members.”); see also Bielass v. New England Safe System, Inc., 617 F.Supp. 682, 684 (D.Mass.1985) (terms of implied contract can only be inferred from the total circumstances).
¶94. See Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 906 F.2d 11, 15 (1st Cir.1990).
¶95. [# 33] at 12.
¶96. See Higgins v. MetLife Ins. Co., No. 06-12317 (D.Mass. Dec. 22, 2008) (Zobel, J.) (Hoffman Aff. Ex. M) [#34-13]; see also Babineau v. Federal Express Corp., 576 F.3d 1183, 1194-95 (11th Cir.2009) (denying certification because quantum meruit is "highly individualized” and requires that a plaintiff demonstrate an "expectation of compensation.”).
¶97. See supra n. 45-49.
¶98. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-24, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (finding that the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is "far more demanding” than the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)).
¶99. Relafen, 218 F.R.D. at 346 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615, 117 S.Ct. 2231.)
¶101. 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 13:11 (4th ed.).
¶102. See Order Approving Sub-Class Settlement [# 42].
¶103. See e.g., Hoffman Declaration Exh. A-F [# 34-1—# 34-6],
¶104. See PI. Reply in Support of Class Certification [# 36] at 6.
¶105. See also discussion of predominance requirement supra.
¶106. See settlement agreement [# 41-1].
¶107. See settlement agreement [# 41-1],