State v. Wilson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

100 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 101 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[I]t was not 'immediately apparent to the police that they [had] evidence before them.’ This element, in essence, amounts to a requirement that police have probable cause to believe the evidence is incriminating before they seize it. As the court said in United States v. Gray, supra, 484 F.2d at 356, '[I]t must be "immediately apparent” to the police that the object is in fact incriminating or the seizure of the object would be without probable cause and would turn the search into a general or exploratory one.’Accord, United States v. Clark, supra, 531 F.2d at 932; United States v. Wilson, supra, 524 F.2d at 598-99; United States v. Truitt, 521 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1975); see United States v. Golay, 502 F.2d 182, 184-86 (8th Cir. 1974). Stated another way, to be subject to seizure, the object must be one for which the police could have obtained a warrant because they had probable cause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 467-68 . "In the context of another exception to the warrant requirement, the 'hot pursuit’ doctrine, the Supreme Court has indicated what information a police officer must possess before he can be said to have probable cause to seize evidence: '... There must, of course, be a nexus — automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband — between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Thus in the case of "mere evidence,” probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will a”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Boone · Riddick v. State

2. ““the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’ ””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Klingenstein v. State · 144 Md. App. 333 - Nero v. State

3. “"This doctrine serves to supplement a previously justified intrusion, such as a search warrant for other property, and permits a warrantless seizure. Id. at 466 . The exception, on the other hand, may not be used to expand a justified, but limited, intrusion into a general exploratory search of a person's belongings until something incriminating at last emerges. Id. at 466-67 . To confine the exception within these boundaries, the Court prohibited the use of any evidence seized outside the warrant unless (1) the police have a prior justification for the intrusion; (2) they find the evidence in plain view; (3) they find it inadvertently; and (4) it is `immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them,' id. at 466-71 ." Wilson, 279 Md. at 194-195 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Boone · 74 Md. App. 377 - Coomes v. State