¶1I respectfully dissent. The Legislature has provided that persons such as petitioner be afforded “a reasonable opportunity and right” to defend themselves. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6085, italics added.) In my view, the record establishes that petitioner was afforded such an opportunity.
¶2The record shows that the State Bar initially made repeated and exhaustive efforts to contact petitioner and advise him of the charges *737against him and the pending disciplinary hearing. In May 1977, following issuance of the State Bar’s initial disbarment decision, petitioner requested and was granted a de novo hearing, based upon his claim that he had received no prior notice of the proceedings against him. The date set for the new hearing was continued at petitioner’s request by reason of his incarceration in federal prison. Based upon his assurances that he would be available to attend a hearing at any time after April 8, 1978, the State Bar rescheduled the hearing for April 13, 1978, after first advising petitioner on January 24, 1978, that no further continuances would be granted. Nevertheless, on April 11, two days prior to the hearing, petitioner notified the State Bar that he would be unable to attend and that he requested a further continuance. His request was properly refused.
¶3At the hearing, the State Bar received and considered affidavits and argument from petitioner responding to the witnesses’ testimony and the charges against him. Petitioner has failed to indicate what additional evidence, if any, he would have presented or how he was substantially prejudiced by the manner in which the hearing was conducted.
¶4The majority appears to hold that petitioner had an absolute right either to appear at the disciplinary hearing or to obtain a continuance pending his incarceration. Yet section 6085 guarantees only a “reasonable” opportunity to appear and defend oneself at disciplinary hearings, and in my view petitioner was afforded that right in this case. Petitioner had assured the State Bar that he would be available, and he was well aware of the State Bar’s intention to refuse any further continuances. Under such circumstances, the State Bar was fully justified in proceeding in his absence.
¶5The majority acknowledges that the primary purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public. In this case, the events which led to the charges against petitioner occurred as early as 1974. We have been sensitive to the necessity of avoiding unnecessary delays in the disposition of bar disciplinary matters. Surely the public interest is ill-served by requiring the State Bar to grant repeated continuances or hold de novo hearings extending far beyond the time when the events in question occurred, merely to accommodate an incarcerated offender.
¶6*738I would adopt the State Bar’s recommendation that petitioner be disbarred.
¶7Clark, J., concurred.