Volume 28 — Connecticut Reports

[ *2 ] ^Assumpsit, for coal sold to the defendants as partners. It was claimed in defense that the partnership between tbe defendants bad been previously dissolved and sufficient notice of the dissolution given.

Debt, on a judgment of the court of common pleas of the state of Ohio. The case was tried on the general issue closed to the court. It appeared by the record of the judgment, which was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, that the suit in which it was rendered was brought to the October Term of the court, in the county of Lorain, in the year 1847, and that actual service was made upon the defendant, who appeared in court by S. Bagg, bis attorney, and filed a plea in defense.

£ *34 J *Trover. The plaintiff claimed title to the property in question as the trustee in insolvency of one Joshua Sands. The defendant claimed title under a purchase from the insolvent, a short.time before his assignment in insolvency. The case was tried on the general issue closed to the court, and the following facts were specially found by the court.

Action of book debt, to recover for certain beef cattle sold to the defendants, Walter Searles and Charles M. Valentine, as partners. The defendant Valentine suffered a default, and Searles assumed the defense and claimed that the cattle were purchased by Valentine after the dissolution of a previously existing partnership between Valentine and himself, and that he was not liable.

Motion in error from a judgment of the superior court reversing an order of a court of probate.

This was a case submitted to the superior court, under the statute with regard to amicable suits, upon an agreed statement of facts. The parties were the Hope Mutual Life Insurance Company, a corporation located in Stamford in this state, and at this time insolvent, and William T. Minor, Esq., receiver of the company, as plaintiffs, and Nathaniel Weed as defendant.

Action on the case, for injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a passenger in the cars of the defendants, by means of their negligence and of the wrongful acts of their servants.

Action on the case, for injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a passenger in the cars of the defendants, by means of their negligence and of the wrongful acts of their servants. • The declaration contained four counts, the first of which was as follows: In a plea of the case, whereupon the plaintiff declares and says, that on the first day of November, 1855, and for a long time before, the defendants were the proprietors of a certain railroad, a part of which runs from said…

Bill for a forclosure. The plaintiffs were a corporation organized under the act authorizing the establishment of savings banks and. building… Held: by reason of the taking of a monthly bonus, “ usurious, illegal, or in any respect void,” but that, if otherwise legal, they were thereby “ confirmed and declared to be valid, as to the principal, interest and bonus.” It was claimed on the part of the defendants that this act was unconstitutional and invalid, and that the loan…

Scire Facias. Boggs & Co., of the city of New York, recovered a judgment against the plaintiffs, in the superior court for New Haven county, and placed the execution issued thereon in the hands of the defendant, as sheriff of New Haven county, for collection. The plaintiffs paid the sheriff the amount of the execution, with his fees thereon, and he indorsed the execution as paid and satisfied.

Debt on a judgment. The judgment had been, rendered by the superior court, at its term in the county of New Haven, in October, 1852, and was for costs taxed in favor of the present plaintiff, upon the reversal, by the superior court, of a previous judgment of the county court in favor of the present defendant.

Assumpsit, brought originally before a justice of the peace, and appealed by the defendant to the superior court. The *suit was brought in 1854.

Scire facias, brought against the defendant as trustee of one Belden. The defense was assumed by one Elias Hotchkiss, who claimed to be the owner of the funds held by the defendant Huggins.

The case was referred to an auditor, who made a special report of the facts. The deceased was a resident of Suffield, in the county of Hartford, and died in January, 1856.

<p>Motion for a new trial by the defendant, upon exceptions to the charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Action on the ease, brought under the statute (Rev. Stat., tit. 1, sec. 283,) which provides that when any person shall be guilty of fraud in the contracting of a debt, or shall conceal or remove his property to prevent the same being taken by legal process, or shall refuse to pay a debt admitted or established by a judgment, while having money, or property exempt from.execution, sufficient to discharge the same, concealed or withheld, &c., any creditor aggrieved thereby may…

Assumpsit, upon an indorsement, by tbe defendant, by the name of Savage & Co., of a note made by one Dan Gaines for $220, dated July 30, 1856. The defense was, that [ *147 ] the *note was indorsed for the accommodation of Gaines, and delivered to the plaintiffs under a composition agreement between Gaines and his creditors, and that the note was void by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the plaintiffs in the transaction.

Bill for a foreclosure of a mortgage of household furniture. The respondent, Welch, defended as the trustee in insolvency of the estate of the mortgagor, J. S. Rood, which was assigned to him under the insolvent act, after the mortgage was made.

Replevin. The defendant had impounded the cow of the plaintiff, which was grazing in the highway in front of the defendant’s land. The plaintiff claimed the right to depasture his cow in the public highways of the town, under a by-law of the town and a license of the selectmen.

Action on the case for selling to the plaintiff unwholesome meat. On the trial to the jury the plaintiff introduced, two witnesses, named Lampson and Griswold, who testified that they had purchased a part of the animal slaughtered by the defendant, and from which the meat sold the plaintiff was taken, and that it was unsound and unwholesome.

Trespass, for an assault and battery. On the trial to the jury the plaintiff offered one Josiah Terrill as a witness, to whom no objection was made, who testified that he was an eye-witness of the transaction, and made a statement of what he saw.

<p>The facts of this case are fully stated by the judge who gives the opinion of the court.</p>

Assumpsit upon a promissory note, with the common counts. The note was signed by the partnership name of the defendants, payable to the plaintiff’s order, four months from date, and dated November 12, 1855, for the sum of $825. The defendant Muzzy was defaulted. Huntly, the other defendant, pleaded the general issue, which was closed to the court, with notice of the special facts below stated. • • Upon the trial, the following facts were found by the court.

„ Action of debt, brought under the provisions of the 7th section of the “ act concerning fences and common fields.” to recover the expense of erecting a fence for the defendant. The section is recited in full in the opinion of the court.

Action on the case for- damage caused to the plaintiffs by an illegal alteration of their assessment list by the.defendant, by means of which the tax of the plaintiffs was increased. The declaration .contained two. counts., not essentially different, one of which is given in full in a former report of the case, 27 Conn., 221.

The facts which were agreed on by the parties, were as follows. Capen, the appellant, was the treasurer and agent of the company, and, as such treasurer, made sundry notes in the name of the company, payable at bank to his own order, and indorsed the same in his own name, on which notes he obtained the money for *his own use and benefit, and never made any entry [ *221 ] of the same on the books of the company.

The facts which were agreed on by the parties, were as follows. Capen, the appellant, was the treasurer and agent of the company, and, as such treasurer, made sundry notes in the name of the company, payable at bank to his own order, and indorsed the same in his own name, on which notes he obtained the money for his own use and benefit, and never made any entry of the same on the books of the company.

[ *226 ] Information against the defendant under the' act, (Rev. Stat., tit. 6, § 96,) which provides that every person who shall, within this state, sell any lottery ticket or tickets, or any part, portion, or interest therein, * * * * or shall set up, exhibit or publish, or cause to be set up, exhibited or published, within this state, any written or printed proposals to buy, sell or procure any such ticket or tickets, or any part, portion or interest therein, shall be…

Information against the defendant under the act, (Rev. Stat., tit, 6, § 96,) which provides that every person who shall, within this state, sell any lottery ticket or tickets, or any part, portion, or interest therein, * * * * or shall set up, exhibit or publish, or cause to be set up, exhibited or published, within this state, any written or printed proposals to buy, sell or procure any such ticket or tickets, or any part, portion or interest therein, shall be punished,”…

Complaint for theft, by a grand-juror to a justice of the peace, appealed by the defendant to the superior court.

Grand-juror’s complaint to a justice of the peace, appealed by the defendant to the superior court.

[ *238 ] *Trover, for-a quantity of lumber, brought ; by the plaintiff as trustee in insolvency of the estate of Isaac Gr. Ford. Ford was the owner’ of thedumber on the 2d day of Decern-. ber, 1856, at which ■ time it was attached by the defendant Thayer, asa con stable, upon a writ in favor of Prentice,, .the other defendant, the property being at the time in the hands of Thayer as a constable under a prior attachment.

Trover, for a quantity of lumber, brought by the plaintiff as trustee in insolvency of the estate of Isaac G. Ford. Ford was the owner of the lumber on the 2d day of December, 1856, at which time it was attached by the defendant Thayer, as a constable, upon a writ in favor of Prentice, the other defendant, the property being at the time in the hands of Thayer as a constable under a prior attachment.

Assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff as trustee in insolvency of the estate of Isaac G. Ford, to recover the amount- of an indebtedness of the defendant to Ford at the time of-his assignment. The defense was that the debt had been attached by process of foreign attachment, by one Prentice, and paid over by the defendant on the execution issued upon the .judgment obtained in the factorizing suit. - The factorizing process was- served on Woodward on the 1st day of January, 1857.

Action on the statute with regard to paupers,- (Rev. Stat., tit. 42, \ 16), brought against the defendant, as a selectman of the town of Stonington, to recover a penalty for refusing to furnish support to one Miller,- a pauper.

Assumpsit, on a receipt given by the defendants to the plaintiff, as deputy of the sheriff of New London county, for certain property attached by the plaintiff in a suit against one Maynard.

Action on the case, for injuries sustained by Betsey Williams, one of the plaintiffs, by reason of the neglect of the defendant to erect a railing along an embankment on a public highway.

district of Killingworth, allowing the account of Hibbert Francis for services and disbursements as conservator of the appellant. Francis, claimed to have been legally appointed such conservator by the probate court of the district of Killingworth.

Francis claimed to have been legally appointed such conservator by the probate court of the district of Killingworth.

Bill in equity. The plaintiffs were assignees in insolvency, under the laws of the state of Massachusetts, of the property of William Mason, a resident of Massachusetts, and sued as such.

Scitus Facias, brought against the defendant as debtor of the New York and Boston Railroad Company.

Assumpsit. The plaintiffs’ testator was, at the time of his death, on the 14th of March, 1857, a stockholder of the Middlesex Savings Bank and Building Association, which was a corporation organized under the general law with regard to building associations.

Bastardy suit. On the trial to the jury the plaintiff introduced the testimony of Olive J. Dowd, the mother of the child, who testified that the child was born on the first day of August, 1856, and that the defendant was the father ; that he had criminal connection with her on the 28rd day of October, 1855 and on the 1st -and 29th days *of November [ *310 ] following, in different places specified by her.

Bastardy suit. On the trial to the jury the plaintiff introduced the testimony of Olive J. Dowd, the mother , of the child, who testified that the child was born on tb : first day of August, 1856, and that the defendant was t' father; that he had criminal connection with her on the 23rd day of October, 1855 and on the 1st and 29th days of November following, in different places specified by her.

<p>Assumpsit. Motion for a new trial by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>While a suit was pending against A as administratrix of B, the plaintiff and A made a written submission of all matters of controversy between them then in suit, and an award was made in favor of A. The submission was signed by A only in her individual name. A afterwards pleaded the submission and award in bar of the further prosecution of the suit. Held that the suit against her as administratrix was properly described as a suit between the plaintiff and herself, and that parol evidence was admissible, in connection with the submission and award, to show that there was no other suit at the time pending between them, and that the subject matter of the present suit was in fact heard before the arbitrator and embraced in his award.</p> <p>Parol evidence is always admissible for the purpose of applying a written instrument to its proper subject matter.</p>

Action on the case for a nuisance. The declaration contained two counts, the first for the keeping of a privy and pigsty so near to the dwelling-house of the plaintiff as to be a nuisance, the second for the keeping of the pig-sty only.

Ejectment. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice of a claim of title. The demanded premises were originally a part of the common and undivided lands of the town of Norfolk.

<p>Motion in error. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which were agreed upon by the parties, were as follows : The respondent was the committee of the North School District of the town of Torringford, which had a school-house legally located in a portion of the-town known as Torringford street. The school-house was reasonably convenient, and sufficient to accommodate the children of the.district.

*Book debt. The plaintiff was a counsellor at [ *335 ] law, and brought the suit to recover for professional fees and disbursements.

The facts which were agreed upon by the parties, were as follows :*—Eli Terry died in 1852, leaving eight children or their legal representatives by his first wife, and two children, Stephen and Edwin, by his second wife, and no widow. Stephen and Edwin, at the time of his death, were aged respectively ten and eight years. He left a will, by which he gave to Ins son Edwin certain personal property, and certain specified real estate.

Assumpsit, for a quantity of pork in barrels sold to the defendant. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice that he should show on the trial that the barrels, which were sold with the pork, were warranted not to leak, and that they prove to be leaky, and that considerable part of the pork was lost-in consequence, and that he should claim damages for [ *344 J *the breach of the warranty, to be applied in reduction or extinguishment of the plaintiffs’ demand.

Assumpsit. The declaration contained three counts, the first a special one upon the memorandum check set out below, the *second a special one on a promissory note of the same amount and date, and the third a general count for money lent. The defendant moved for a bill of particulars and the plaintiff filed the following: “ Memo. $500. Hartford, July 28, 1854. City Bank of Hartford. Pay to John Dean or order Five Hundred dollars, value received.

Assumpsit. The declaration contained three counts, the' first a special one upon the memorandum check set out below, the second a special one on a promissory note of the same amount and date, and the third a general count for money lent. The defendant moved for a bill of particulars and the plaintiff filed the following: “Memo. $500. Hartford, July 28, 1854. City Bank of Hartford. Pay to John Bean or order Five Hundred dollars, value received.

<p>Under the statute (Rev. Stat., tit. 1, § 150,) which provides that in all actions against two or more defendants, the plaintiff may recover judgment against a part of the defendants, if he shall make out a case against a part but not • against all, it is no objection to a recovery against a part of the defendants in an action of assumpsit, that the promise is declared on as the joint promise of all.</p> <p>Nor is it necessary that the promise should have been in fact made by all the defendants and that the non-liability of a portion of them should be owing to some personal disability or exemption. - It was the intent of the statute to apply to all actions founded on contracts the same rule, with regard to the right of recovery against a part of the defendants, which prevails at common law in the case of actions founded on torts.</p> <p>After the dissolution of a copartnership, one of the partners, without authority, endorsed in the copartnership name a note payable to the firm, and delivered it to the plaintiff, who advanced his money on the credit of the indorsement. In a suit brought against both partners on' the indorsement, it was held—1st. That a several judgment could properly be rendered under the statute against the defendant who made the indorsement. 2d. That this- defendant was estopped from denying that the legal title to the note passed by the indorsement to the plaintiff.</p>

Assumpsit, to recover a sewer assessment paid by the plaintiff. The case was tried on the general issue dosed to the court and the following facts found:—The plaintiff paid to the collector of. the city the sum of $102.41, to prevent the sale of bank stock belonging to him, on which the collector had levied a warrant for the assessment.

Bill in equity, brought by the plaintiff as trustee of the assigned estate of C. B. Conant, Dodge & Company.

Debt, on a bond given by the defendant, John W. Seymour, as principal, and by the other defendants, Charles Seymour Jr., Austin Dunham and Henry Z. Pratt, as his sureties, for the faithful discharge, by the principal, of the office of treasurer of the Hartford County Savings Association. The plaintiffs were the trustees in insolvency of the association.

<p>Trespass qu. cl.fr. Defendant pleaded title. The issue was closed to the court and the following facts found :—</p> <p>The locus in quo was a part of a lot containing about an acre and half, known as the Montague lot—described in the following plan by A B CD.</p> <p> </p> <p>Some time prior to the year 1810 this land had become vested, by the death of George Montague and Sarah his wife, who had been the owners of it and who died intestate, in their children, Martha, Abigail, Justus and Sarah, as tenants in common. In 1816 a distribution of the land was made, with other estate of George and Sarah Montague, by order *of the court of probate, by which a strip 72180 links [ '*398 ] in width \yas set to Martha on the north side of the lot, a strip of equal width, next south, to Abigail, one of equal width next south to Justus, and one of less width next south, and embracing all that remained of the lot, to Sarah. In the year 1810, prior to the distribution, a strip one rod wide at the North end of the lot had been exchanged with one Robbins, who owned the lot next south, for a strip of the same width at the south end of the lot. The strip at the North end constituted at the time of the distribution what was known as Warner’s lane', and the Montague lot as then occupied and treated by the parties was the lot represented by the letters E F G H on the plan. The shares of Martha and Abigail had, at the time of the alleged trespass, become vested in the defendant, and those of Justus and Sarah in the plaintiff. The locus was a strip one rod wide, represented on the plan by ah r, d, and this strip belonged to the plaintiff, if the distribution was to be considered as embracing the Montague lo.t as originally bounded, and to the defendant'if it was to be considered as applying to the lot as practically defined at the time of the distribution ; and the question as to the application of the distribution was the principal question in the case.</p> <p>The court found, with regard to the exchange of the rod at the north end of the lot, for a rod from the Robbins lot at the south end, that in the year 1810, one Robert Robbins, who then owned the lot next south of the Montague lot, made an arrangement for the exchange with the guardian of the Montague heirs, who were then minors; that Robbins took possession of the rod at the north end, and the guardian of the Montague children of the rod from the Robbins lot, but that no conveyances were made ; that Robbins soon after conveyed the. north rod to one Warner, and that the guardian, from the time of the exchange, treated the rod thus taken by him as a part of the Montague lot, and that it was occupied as a part of that lot at the time of the distribution ; that the fence at the north end of the lot had been moved *down one rod, so as to ex- [ *399 J elude the rod taken by Robbins, and that there was no fence on the south line between the Montague lot and the Robbins lot; that the distributors, in the vear 1816, distributed the Montague lot as it was then occupied by the guardian of the Montague children, and in setting their respective shares* to the heirs commenced at the south line of the Warner lane ; and that the distributees always afterwards understood and treated the distribution as applying to the lot thus changed,* and as a. just and legal distribution of the lot, and while they retained their interest in the land occupied their several shares in. severalty under it.</p> <p>Upon these facts the court, was of opinion that the locus in quo was to be considered as falling within the share of Abigail Montague, and so as belonging to the defendant, and' accordingly rendered judgment for the defendant.</p> <p>Upon the* trial the plaintiff objected to proof of the exchange of the two rods, on the ground that the contract was by parol only, and that no written memorandum thereof was shown to have ever been made.. But the court overruled the objection, and received the evidence for the purpose of showing title in the defendant to the locus in quo, in. connection with the other facts set forth in the finding.</p> <p>The plaintiff further- objected to* the admission of the distribution in evidence, and asked that it should be ruled- out,, on the ground that in law it must be held to refer only to the legal title of the Montague lot, and, inasmtich as it designated no other line for the location of their distributive shares than the “north side of the Montague lot,” that that expression, by legal construction, must be taken to mean- the north line of the lot as the legal title thereof then stood, without reference to the parol exchange, which could not convey any title. But the court overruled the objection,, and received the distribution, in connection with the other facts set forth in the-finding, as establishing in Martha Montague a title to a share of the Montague lot, 72-/0 links wide, commencing at the south side of said north rod.</p> <p>For the purpose of rebutting the claim of the defendant, that the south rod was a part of the Montague lot',, and that the defendant, as grantee of Abigail Montague,, had a* legal [ *400 ], title to the locus in quo, the plaintiff offered, to- *prove that, in September, 1858, a judgment was recovered in an* action off ejectment in the superior court for Hartford county, by the present plaintiff, against one Charles Wolcott,, in which said south rod was adjudged to be the. property of the plaintiff in severalty,, and not to be a part of the Montague lot, (of the two south distributive shares of which the plaintiff and defendant were then owners in common,) and in which, the south distributive share was adjudged to commence at the north line of said south, rod. And to- prove the judgment, and that the suit was in reality between the parties to the present suit, (between whom the plaintiff claimed that the same would be conclusive evidence of the facts evidenced thereby,) and that the present defendant was the real defendant therein, the plaintiff offered in evidence a bill in chancery of the present defendant and the said Charles Wolcott against him, in which he claimed that sundry admissions were made by the present defendant as to the said Charles Wolcott’s being his tenant, and as to his being himself the real party in interest in the suit. This bill may be found substantially set forth in the report of that ease in 26 Conn. R., 236. The court however received the evidence 'only as containing admissions of the defendant against his interest, and as establishing, by itself, the fact that such a judgment had been recovered by the plaintiff against the said Charles Wolcott, but refused to receive it-for the other purposes for which it was offered by the plaintiff, and held that the judgment was not conclusive on the present defendant.</p> <p>The plaintiff excepted to these- rulings of the court and moved for a new trial.</p>

Assumpsit upon the following note: “ ¡81,250. Hartford, May 4th, 1853. For value received I promise to pay to the Protection Insur anee Company or their order, my second installment on fifty shares of the stock of said company, being twelve hundred and fifty dollars, and the same shall be paid in whole, or from time to time in part, as the same shall be required, within thirty days after demand, or upon a notification of thirty days in any ■newspaper printed in Hartford. Wm.

Ejectment. The defendant, in 1854, had mortgaged the demanded premises, which he then owned in fee simple, to the Hartford Savings Bank and Building Association, to secure a loan of money. On the 12th of January, 1856, he mortgaged the same premises to the plaintiff, by a warranty deed with the usual covenants, hut excepting from the covenant against incumbrances the prior mortgage to the Savings Bank and Building Association.

Writ of error. The judgment below was rendered by the superior court in favor of the defendant, Terry, upon his appeal from a decree of the court of probate for the district of New Haven, allowing and settling the administration account of the plaintiff Burke, as administrator of Cornelius Burke.

<p>The 32d and 72d sections of the act with regard to estates, and the act of 1852 in addition thereto, (Comp. 1854, pp. 494, 495, 509,) which provide for pro'eeedings before the courts of probate against any party having property of an estate in his possession and refusing to deliver it up to the administrator or trustee, were not intended to apply to the case of a mere indebtedness of such a party to the estate, but only to the case of specific property belonging to the estate and withheld by such party.</p>

<p>P made an accommodation note for the benefit of A and delivered it to A. A procured W to endorse it for his accommodation and got it discounted at hank. At the same time A gave W a mortgage to secure him for this and sundry other liabilities assumed for him, the condition being that A should save W harmless from all the liabilities referred to. Before the note fell due A failed and went into insolvency, and W was compelled to take up the note when due. The trustee in insolvency afterwards sold the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property at public auction, giving notice at the sale what the mortgage was, and that the property was sold subject to it. W bid off the property at $700, took possession of it, and afterwards disposed of it. Held, in reversing a decree in equity, upon a bill brought by P, restraining W from enforcing a judgment obtained against him at law for the amount of the note:—</p> <p>1. That the fact that the note was, as between P and A, ail accommodation one on the part of P, did not, of itself, constitute any reason why he should not be held liable to pay it to W.</p> <p>2. That the mortgage being given to indemnify W for his liability on the indorsement, and not for the security of the note itself, the security did not in equity attach to the note, so as to entitle P to a pro rata application of the mortgaged property to its payment.</p> <p>3. That W was entitled to be fully indemnified, and, until he was so, had a right to compel the payment of the note.</p> <p>4. That the mere purchase of the equity of redemption by W was not in law a satisfaction and extinguishment of the mortgage debt.</p> <p>5. That the purchase of the equity, under the special notice given at the sale, and for the price paid, did not in law constitute a satisfaction and ex-tinguishment of the mortgage debt, but was merely evidence of the agreement of W to that effect, to be considered by the court below.</p> <p>6. That W was not estopped thereby from claiming that the property was of less value than the amount of the debt.</p> <p>7. That in the absence of a finding as to the value by the *court [ *421 j below, this court could not infer from the amount paid by W for the equity of redemption, that the value exceeded the amount of the debt.</p>

Bill in equity to restrain the respondents from enforcing a judgment obtained at law. The facts were specially found by the superior court. The plaintiff, Post, on the 15th day of October, 1856, made a promissory note, for the accommodation of the Volcanic Repeating Arms Company, a joint stock corporation, for the sum of $1,250, payable to the order of one Wheeler, by whom it was indorsed, also for the accommodation of the company.

[ *484 ] *Assumpstt upon sundry checks indorsed by the defendant. The defendant pleaded the general issue in the superior court, with notice, among other things, that lie should prove that, since the commencement of the suit, a judgment had been recovered by the plaintiffs against the defendant, upon.the same checks, in the state of New York, in the court of common pleas for the city of New York.

Bastardy suit. The suit was brought by the town of Seymour, under the provisions of the 31st section of the act with regard to domestic relations, (Rev. Stat., tit. 7,) which provides that upon such suit, if the defendant is found guilty the court shall make an order that he shall give a bond with surety to indemnify the town against all expense for the maintenance of the child.

Ejectment, to recover possession of two pieces of land. Both parties claimed title to the demanded premises under a certain deed from Elijah Wilmot, the important part of which is as follows :— To all Sfc.:— Know ye that I, Elijah Wilmot, of &c., for the consideration of love, good will and natural affection I have and bear to my daughter, Anna Kinney, do give, grant, bargain and confirm unto the said Anna Kinney, * * * * Also 1 give to her son Reuben Kinney, a piece of land…

Assumpsit. The plaintiffs sued as executors of one Aaron Turner. In 1852, a judgment was recovered against Turner, the defendant Bussing, and one Whitlock, for an injury to a pei’son traveling on the highway, caused by the negligent management of a public stage in the running of which the defendants were alleged to . be jointly interested. [ *456 ] *The defendant Bussing was the driver of the stage, and the injury was caused by his negligence.

■Action on the case, brought to. the city court of the city of Bridgeport. The'plaintiff obtained a verdict before that court, and. the court, on-the motion of the defendant, granted a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.

Bill in equity. The facts of the case are stated in former reports of it, 27 Conn. R., 68, 468. The superior court having, under the advice of this court, allowed certain amendments which are stated in the latter report of the case, (p. 469,) the plaintiffs moved for a decree in their favor, claiming that the new allegations of the bill had already been found to be true by the committee upon evidence received at the time of the hearing without objection.

Bill in equity. The facts were found by a committee. On the 18th of September, 1850, Beard, Church & Company, a copartnership consisting of John F. Beard, Abner Church, Samuel K. Header and Wellington Chapman, all of whom were made respondents to the bill, entered into a contract with the Danbury and Norwalk Railroad Company, who were also made respondents, by which they agreed to construct a railroad for the company.

Trespass, brought. originally. before a justice of the peace, and appealed by the defendant to the superior, court.

Bill in equity, for an injunction against the further prosecution of an action at law by the defendant.

Bill in equity, for an injunction against the further prosecution of an action at law by the defendant. The facts were specially found by the superior court.

Trespass de bonis asporlatis. The defendants pleaded in justification that the acts charged were lawfully done in the levy of an attachment upon the property by the defendant Clark, specially deputed as an indifferent person therefor, and in the sale of the same upon a foreclosure of a mortgage and upon a levy of an execution bv him as a constable, and that the acts of the other defendant., George Wheeler, were lawfully done in assisting him in the attachment and removal of…

.Debt, on a recognizance. The declaration ¿lleged that the defendant, on the 7th of August, 1855, entered into a recognizance in the sum of fifty dollars, before John H. Whiting, *Esq., then a justice of the peace for the county [ *528 ] of Fairfield', upon a writ of attachment issued by the justice in favor of one David B. Wells against the present plaintiff, for the payment of all damages to the defendant in the suit, if the plaintiff therein should fail to prosecute 1ns…

Assumpsit. On-the trial to the jury, in the superior court, on the plea of the general issue, with notice of payment, and accord and satisfaction, tlie defendant introduced himself as a witness, and was duly sworn and testified in the cause.

Assumpsit. On the trial to the jury, in the superior court, on the plea of the general issue, with notice of payment, and accord and satisfaction, the defendant introduced himself as a witness, and was duly sworn and testified in the cause.

Assumpsit. The declaration alleged that Mary Robbins, late of Rocky Hill, in Hartford county, in her life time made her last will and testament, whereby she devised and bequeathed to the defendant, as trustee of Richard Robbins, and to others, a large amount of property, real and personal; that after her death the will was presented to the court of probate for the district of Hartford for probate, and on the 21st of May, 1855, was by said court approved, and administration,…

Bill in Equity. The principal allegations of [ *553 ] the bill were as follows: that, on the 26th day of May, 1855, the plaintiff, together with David A. Mills and Martha G. Mills, his wife, of &c., took an appeal from a certain decree of the court of probate for the district of Hartford, passed on the 21st day of May, 1855, approving the will of Mary Robbins, late of said district, deceased, of whom the appellants were heirs at law, to the superior court then next to be…

Bill to redeem mortgaged premises. The plaintiffs were second mortgagees. The defendant Eldredge was the grantee of the premises from the Bridgeport bank, which was the first mortgagee.

Highway petition. A committee having laid out the highway, assessed the damages of one Greorge Rickard, over whose land a part of the road was laid, at $226. Rickard, moved in the superior court for a jury of six disinterested electors to reassess the damages, under the .provisions of the statute on the subject. (Rev. Stat., tit. 24, § 25.) A jury was summoned, who heard the parties, and reassessed the damages at $220.

Highway petition. A committee having laid out the highway, assessed the damages of one George Rickard, over whose land a part of the road was laid, at $226. Rickard moved in the superior court for a jury of six disinterested electors to reassess the damages, under the provisions of the statute on the subject. (Rev. Stat., tit. 24, § 25.) A jury was summoned, who heard the parties, and reassessed the damages at $220.

Trespass de bonis asportatis. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of certain live stock and farm produce, which the defendants had attached as the property of one John Brown, whom they claimed to be the owner thereof, and on the trial it became an important question whether Brown, who had been the plaintiff’s farm tenant and had had an interest in the stock and produce of the farm, had at the time of the attachment relinquished his interest to the plaintiff and abandoned…

Trespass de bonis asportatis. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of certain live stock and farm produce, which the defendants had attached as the property of one John Brown, whom they claimed to be the owner thereof, and on the trial it became an important question whether Brown, who had been the plaintiff’s farm tenant and had had an interest in the stock and produce of the farm; had at the time of the attachment relinquished his interest to the plaintiff and abandoned…

This was a proceeding upon the report of the receivers of the Litchfield Bank to the superior court, under the provisions of the statute… Held: 1st. That the Connecticut Bank had no right to sell the bills at a discount, either with or without notice to the Litchfield Bank, and charge the Litchfield Bank with the loss. 2d. That having so sold them, and their nominal value exceeding the amount of the debt and interest, the claim of the Connecticut Bank should be disallowed,…

This was a proceeding upon the report of the receivers of the Litchfield Bank to the superior court, under the provisions of the statute… Held: 1st. That the Connecticut Bank had no right to sell the bills at a discount, either with or without notice to the Litchfield Bank, and charge the Litchfield Bank with the loss. 2d. That having so sold them, and their nominal value exceeding the amount of the debt and interest, the claim of the Connecticut Bank should be disallowed,…

Bill in equity, for the removal of a cloud from the petitioner’s title to certain real estate. The facts were found by a committee. The premises in question, on the 8th of April, 1851, were owned by Cornelius Munson, and were on that day conveyed by him to the petitioner. The consideration of the conveyance was in part an indebtedness of the grantor to the petitioner, and in part a bond given by the latter for the support of the former during the remainder of his life.

The important parts of the will are as follows; “T give to my beloved wife, Marietta F. Pierce, the use and improvement of one-third part of all the real estate of which I may die possessed, to be for her use during her life time. * * * I give to my daughter, Lydia Pierce, one-half of all my real estate which may be left after paying my debts and funeral expenses, and being subject to the use and improvement or dower of my widow, to be hers and her heirs and assigns forever.

The important parts of the will are as follows: “ I give to my beloved wife, Marietta F. Pierce, the use and improvement of one-third part of all the real estate of which I may die possessed, to be for her use during her life time. * * * I give to my daughter, Lydia Pierce, one-half of all my real estate which may be left after paying my debts and funeral expenses, and being subject to the use and improvement or dower of my widow, to be hers and her heirs and assigns forever.

<p>Under the statute (Kev. Stat., tit. 12, § 22,) which provides that courts of equity may pass the title to real estate by decree, without any act of the defendant, and that sucli decree shall be as effectual to transfer the same as the deed of the defendant, the title passes by the decree only as of the date of the, decree, ami does not, as a legal title, relate back to the commencement of the suit.</p> <p>The title thus acquired is not available at Jaw against -a -prior legal title derived from the defendant in such suit "during its pendency, the remedy of the party acquiring his title under the decree against such prior legal title being solely in equity.</p> <p>And where a party who liad acquired a legal title from the defendant in such suit during its pendency, and with no knowledge of the suit, sought by a bill in equity to set aside the decree, it was held that there was not suflieipnt reason for the interposition of a court of equity, in his favor since the title¡conveyed' hy'thepdecree'Cpplii~hei .enforced, against him only by proceetUngs in equity, and whatever equity existed in his favor could be shown in his defense against such"proceedings whenever they should be instituted.</p> <p>The doctrine of lis pendens is purely a doctrine of equity, recognized and enforced in courts of equity alone, and can not be rendered available in proceedings at law.</p> <p>But whether the doctrine is recognized at.all in this state, and if at all, to what, extent: Quere. If "recognized" at all in regard to titles to real estate, it is very questionable whethér, considering our registry, system and its policy, and our mode of instituting chancery proceedings, it should not be so modified as not'to bear upon’ the honest’acquisition of' a title which appears upon the records to be. unincumbered, orTipon those proceedings in chancery of which it is not possible, under our present system, for the public to be informed.</p>

Action on the statute with regard to fences, (Rev. Stat., tit. 15,) to recover double the value of the repairs of a divisional fence, under the provisions of the 5th section of the act.* [ *601 ] *On the trial of the case to the jury, on the general issue, it was admitted that the fence viewers, at the time alleged in the declaration, gave notice in writing in due form to the defendant, of the insufficiency of the fence, and that the defendant did not, within fifteen days…

<p>A declaration averred in substance that the defendant without, right altered a tax list in such a manner as to increase the sum at which the-plaintiffs were assessed; that a rate bill was made out and warrant issued in conformity with the list as altered for the collection of the tax; that after the plaintiffs had paid the legal portion of the tax, the warrant was levied upon their property, and that to repossess themselves of it they paid the remainder of the tax; and that they were compelled to pay it by reason of the alteration of the list by the defendant; but did not aver that the defendant concealed the fact of the alteration, or represented that the list as altered was a valid one, or had by his conduct in any manner misled the authorities who issued or served the warrant, or induced them to issue or serve it. Held to be insufficient.</p> <p>The averment that by reason of the alteration the plaintiffs were compelled to make the payment, could not, in point of law, be true, inasmuch as the alteration was a void act, and invalidated, to tlie extent of the excess at least, the list itself; and being a legal nullity, it could not be said to have been life efficient cause of a compulsory payment.</p> <p>If the declaration set8 forth any iniurv to the plaintiffs, it consists solely in the taking of their goods and the detention of them for the exaction of the unlawful tax; and, as the proceeding wms void throughout, the defendant’s part in it was in the nature of private instigation merely, or an unofficial command to make the seizure. The remedy therefore should have been trespass and not case.</p> <p>There is a necessary distinction between injuries inflicted through the abuse of legal process and by the use of void process. In the former case, the injury is brought home indirectly, through the instrumentality of the law; in the lattpr, directly, through iio intervening agency whatever, the pretended process being a nullity. Bor the latter wrong, the remedy is trespass; for the.former, case.</p> <p>The list altered by the defendant was, at the time of alteration, void for in-formalities in the proceedings of the assessors. The alteration of such an instrument was, in itself, an act of no legal account and called for no legal redress.</p> <p>In the absence of any proof that the defendant had by words or conduct held out the list altered by him as a valid instrument, he was not estopped from showing its invalidity, although its informalities were the result of his own neglect of duty as an assessor. The maker of a void instrument *mav avail himself of its invalidity, unless he has held it out to [ *601 J be valid, and prejudiced some other person thereby.</p> <p>A statute, passed after the alteration^ for the purpose of validating the list, shoujd be construed as legalizing it only for the purpose of collecting taxes in pursuance of it, and not as operating to make the defendant liable for his previous act.</p> <p>It is not in the power of a legislature to create torts, and legal liabilities founded upon them, out of past transactions; and if the statute in question was intended to make parties responsible in suits for acts for which no remedy existed when they were committed, it is unconstitutional and void to that extent.</p>