UNITED STATES V. ROGERS.
607
The questions and answers to a deposition were written out by the party to the suit, who was also a witness to the same facts, and the deponent adopted the answers as his own; but subsequently he was re-examined in the usual way, testifying substantially to the same, facts. On cross-examination the first deposition was exhibited, and the method of preparing it proved. So much of the opinion as relates to that point is given; the other portions not being reported because determining only a matter of fact. Randolph a Heath, for plaintiff. Poston a Poston and Metcalf <t Walker, for defendants. HAMMOND, J. · · · If the deposition so prepared were the one offered in evidence, I should find no difficulty in almost entirely excluding it. Perhaps it may not be a ground for the suppression of the deposition or exclusion of the evidence, but certainly it is so much of a discrediting circumstance that the testimony is entitled to but little weight. In Re Eldridge, 82 N. Y. 161, it was held a contempt of court to so prepare a deposition, and the court clearly sets forth the worthlessness of such proof. I held, in another case, that it was a contempt to prompt the witness, and advise her not to answer. U. S. v. Anon., 21 Fed. Rep. 771. But the deposition here offered was not that written out by the party, and the witness seems, in speaking to the notary, to be less under the influence of the plaintiff, than when he speaks directly through him. · · ·
(District Gowrt, 8. D. New York.
August 5, 188f}, )
1.
OFFICIAL BOND-VALIDITY-COMMON-LAW OBLIGATION.
In a bond with sureties, given by an officer to the government. it is sufficient to make the bond valid as a common-law obligation that it is voluntarily given. and that the office, and the duties assigned to the officer, and covered by the bond, are duly authorized by law.
2. SAME-SIGNAL-SERVICE CORPS-PROPERTY OFFICER-VOLUNTARY BOND.
The defendant executed a bond as surety for H. W. H., a lieutenant in the army, given by the lattjtt on being assigned to duty as property and disbursing officer of the signal service. United States army. Held, that this assignment must be deemed made on the application of H. W. fl.. and not o·oli· gatory on him as lieutenant merely; that the office of disbursing and propEt"ty officer of the signal service has been authorized by congress; and that the bond was not compulsory, but given voluntarily, to obtain the assig-nment to that duty, and was properly required, though not specially authorized by law, and was binding.
At Law. Stephen A. Walker, U. S. Atty., and G. E. P. Howard, Asst. U.S.' Atty., for the United States.
608
FEDERAL BEPORTER.
Oeo. Bliss, for defendant. BROWN, J. This suit is brought against the defendant as a surety .on an official bond for $12,000, dated March, 1878, and given by Henry W. Howgate, as a property and disbursing officer of the signal service in the United States army, conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of that office, and for the faithful expenditure and. honest accounting for all public moneys and public property which should come into Howgate's hands on account of the signal service. It was admitted that the condition of the bond was not fulfilled, and that Howgate became a defaulter to an amount largely in excess of the penalty of the bond. At the time of his appointment as property and disbursing officer, Howgate was first lieutenant, Twentieth infantry, of the United States army, and had been for some years attached to the signal service corpB. By special order 115, July 25, 1876, he was assigned to duty as property and disbursing officer in the office of the chief signal officer, under the department of war. The bond in question was subsequently given, under the requirements of that department. The only defense is that the bond was not given voluntarily, and that the -office is not one created or authorized by statute. Rev. St. 1191, 1192. There is no proof how Howgate came to be detached from ordinary duty in his regiment, and assigned to the signal corps, other than the naked order assigning him to that service. Tbe signal corps is, however, a branch of the army service, authorized by law, and under the direction of the department of war. Long prior to 1874 the signal corps had been organized, and had property and disbursing offi. ·cers, as appears from special order 246, May 14, 1867, issued by the secretary of war, making an assignment to this duty, which has been put in evidence under the stipulation in this case. By the army .appropriation act of June 16, 1874, (18 St. at Large, 72,) congress ·declared that the "signal service shall be maintained, as now organized, under the authority of the secretary of war." As this act has not beeu repealed, it furnishes a sufficient recognition and authority for the appointment of property and disbursing officers in the signal service. The duties of this office were, however, distinct from tbe ·duties of a first lieutenant; and Howgate was not bound, as a lieutenant in the army, to accept the appointment to the office of prop{lrty and disbursing officer in the signal corps, and to give the bond for the faithful discharge of his duties required in that situation. The words "assigned to duty," in the order above referred to, must be deemed, therefore, an assignment upon his own application, or upon his acquiescence; the position being a much more desirable one than that of his ordinary duty as first lieutenant. Failure to give a bond could not subject him to discipline, or los8 of rank, in the army. 'J'he bond must therefore be deemed voluntarily given by him and his sureties.
UNITED STATES tI. M'NELLY.
609
It has been repeatedly adjudged by the supreme court that bonds may be required by the government from officers appointed to places of trust, though there is no express statutory authority to take such bonds; and that they will be valid as common-law obligations. U. S. v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115; U. S. v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 360. It is sufficient to make the bond a valid obligation that it is voluntarily given. and that the office, and the duties assigned to the officer, and covered by the bond, are duly authorized by law. Such is the present case, and judgment should therefore be given for the plaintiff for $12,000, and interest.
UNITED STATES
v. MoNELLY.
(Diatrict Oourt, N. 1J. Ohio,
W. 1J.
January 14, 1885.)
I. INTERNAL REVENUE-COLLECTION DISTRICTS-REv. ST. § 2608. In defining collection districts, it is the policy of the government, In cases
of small hodies of water, not to divide the jurisdiction, by locating one lide of the water in one district and the other side in another.
9.
SAME-DECISIONS OF SECRETARY OF TREASURY.
The acts and decisions of the secretary of the treasury upon the question of boundaries of collection districts are not conclusive upon the courts, unless made so by statute.
The Opinion States the Facts. R. S. Shields, Dist. Atty., and Homer Goodwin, for the United States. R. Waite, for defendant. WELKER, J., (charging jury.) The defendant is the master of the Chief Justice Waite. a steamer duly licensed. plying between the pod of Toledo and the port of Put-in Bay, and the islands there located, and engaged in carrying passengers and freight from Toledo to the islands and back again. The plaintiff alleges that, at the time stated in the petition, the defendant, as such master, in leaving the port at Toledo, and. also in leaving the port of Put·in Bay. did not comply with the provisions of the statutes of the United States. by presenting to the collector of the port of departure duplicate manifests of the cargo of his vessel, as required to be presented before a departure of his vessel from a port in one collection district to a port in another collection district; alleging that the port of Toledo is in the collection district of Miami, and the port of Put-in Bay is in the collection district of Sandusky,whereby he became liable to pay certain penalties. for the recovery of which this action is brought. The defendant denies that he violated the provisions of the statute in that respect. He also denies that the port of Put-in Bay is located in the collecti.on district of Sandusky, and alleges that it is 10v.28F.no.11-39