Case: 21-20404 Document: 00516235197 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/11/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 11, 2022
No. 21-20404
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Derek Allen; Leandre Bishop; John Burns,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Vertafore, Incorporated,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:20-CV-4139
Before Southwick, Haynes, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs, Texas driver’s license holders, brought this action against
Vertafore, Inc., for a violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2721, et seq., after Vertafore announced that unauthorized users had
gained access to personal information protected by the statute that Vertafore
had stored on unsecured external servers. The district court granted
Vertafore’s motion to dismiss. We AFFIRM.
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No. 21-20404
I.
On November 10, 2020, Vertafore, an insurance software company,
announced that three data files that it had “stored in an unsecured external
storage service” had been accessed without authorization sometime between
March and August 2020. Those files contained the driver information of
approximately 27.7 million people holding Texas driver’s licenses issued
before February 2019. As of November 2020, Vertafore’s investigation had
not turned up any evidence that the information accessed without
authorization had been misused.
On December 4, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint
against Vertafore for a violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.
Plaintiffs alleged that “Vertafore knowingly disclosed the Driver’s License
Information of Plaintiffs and approximately 27.7 million other Class members
by storing that information on unsecured external servers.” On January 29,
2021, Vertafore filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing, and under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
The magistrate judge held a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2021
and subsequently recommended that the district court find that Plaintiffs had
standing but that they failed to state a claim. The magistrate judge noted that
“absent from [Plaintiffs’ complaint] is any factual allegation describing how
[Vertafore’s] purported mismanagement of information amounts to a
knowing disclosure of personal information for an improper purpose.”
Therefore, he concluded that “Plaintiffs’ allegation that Vertafore knowingly
disclosed their personal information for an improper purpose is nothing
more than a conclusory allegation or legal conclusion masquerading as a
factual conclusion.”
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Plaintiffs objected to the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and
Recommendation and asked for an opportunity to amend their complaint if
the district judge was not inclined to deny Vertafore’s motion. 1 On July 23,
2021, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and
Recommendation in its entirety and granted Vertafore’s motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs timely filed this appeal.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d
833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In
reviewing a motion to dismiss, we “accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true and
view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings v.
Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.,
948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal
citation omitted). But “a complaint’s allegations must make relief plausible,
not merely conceivable, when taken as true.” Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co.,
920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal citation
omitted). “The court’s review is limited to the complaint, any documents
attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to
dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone
Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC,
594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.
2010).
1
Plaintiffs have not renewed this request in their briefs on appeal.
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III.
A.
The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) “regulates the
disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor
vehicle departments.” Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000). The DPPA
was enacted in 1994 to respond to at least two concerns: “The first was a
growing threat from stalkers and criminals who could acquire personal
information from state DMVs. The second concern related to the States’
common practice of selling personal information to businesses engaged in
direct marketing and solicitation.” Maracich v. Spears,
570 U.S. 48, 57
(2013).
The DPPA makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or
disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not
permitted under section 2721(b) of this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). “A
person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from
a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under [the DPPA] shall
be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring
a civil action in a United States district court.”
18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). “The
court may award . . . actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in
the amount of $2,500 . . . .” § 2724(b). To state a claim for a violation of the
DPPA, the complaint must adequately allege that “(1) the defendant
knowingly obtain[ed], disclose[d] or use[d] personal information; (2) from a
motor vehicle record; and (3) for a purpose not permitted.” Taylor v. Acxiom
Corp.,
612 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2010).
B.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Vertafore knowingly disclosed
Plaintiffs’ personal information “by storing that information on unsecured
external servers.” The complaint further states that “the unsecure servers
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disclosed” Plaintiffs’ personal information “[i]n response to the commands
of unauthorized individuals and consistent with the manner in which they
were programmed and configured by Vertafore.” In their motion to dismiss
and before us, Vertafore has argued that Plaintiffs failed to allege both that
the company acted with an impermissible purpose and that the company
made a knowing disclosure. Because we conclude that Plaintiffs have not
alleged a “disclosure” within the meaning of the DPPA, we need not reach
whether Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Vertafore acted knowingly and
with an impermissible purpose.
We turn, then, to whether any of the allegations in Plaintiffs’
complaint amount to a disclosure, as that word is used in the DPPA. When
interpreting statutes, we begin with the text’s plain meaning, “ascertained by
reference to ‘the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
and design of the statute as a whole.’” United States v. Renda, 709 F.3d 472,
481 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Frame v. City of Arlington,
657 F.3d 215, 224 (5th
Cir. 2011)). The DPPA makes it unlawful to “obtain or disclose personal
information,” and Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Vertafore “disclose[d]”
Plaintiffs’ personal information. § 2722(a). The statute does not define
“disclose,” see
18 U.S.C. § 2725, but Black’s Law Dictionary defines the
word as “[t]o bring into view by uncovering; to expose; to make known; to
lay bare; to reveal to knowledge; to free from secrecy or ignorance, or make
known.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
The Plaintiffs argue in their briefs to us that Vertafore’s disclosure
was the act of “plac[ing] the information onto a server that was readily
accessible to the public,” but this assertion is nowhere in Plaintiffs’ complaint,
nor is it supported by the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint. The
complaint does not allege, for example, that Vertafore published Plaintiffs’
personal information on a public website or otherwise placed the information
in plain view of any digital “passer-by.” See Senne v. Village of Palatine, Ill.,
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695 F.3d 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that a police officer’s
placement of a parking ticket on a car windshield was a disclosure within the
meaning of the DPPA because “[t]he real effect of the placement of the ticket
was to make available Mr. Senne’s motor vehicle record to any passer-by”).
Instead, the only facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint are that
Vertafore stored personal information on “unsecured external servers” and
that unauthorized users accessed that information. Without more, these
facts do not plausibly state a “disclosure” consistent with the plain meaning
of that word. Nothing about the words “unsecured” or “external” implies
exposure to public view, and the mere fact that unauthorized users managed
to access the information does not imply that Vertafore granted or facilitated
that access. After all, we would hardly say that personal information was
“disclosed” if it was kept in hard copy and the papers were stolen out of an
unlocked, but private, storage facility. See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F.
Supp. 3d 654, 658-59, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (concluding that “privately holding
[personal information], even in an unsecured manner, does not constitute a
‘voluntary disclosure’ under the DPPA” where personal information was
stored unencrypted on laptops that were stolen from company property by
an employee), aff’d,
739 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2018).
Though at this stage of the proceedings we draw all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the inference Plaintiffs ask us to draw—from
“stored on unsecured external servers” to “disclosed”—is not reasonable.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 2 Because Plaintiffs have not alleged a disclosure
within the meaning of the DPPA, their complaint fails to state a plausible
claim for relief.
2
Plaintiffs cite no case in which insufficiently secure data storage constituted a
“disclosure” within the meaning of the DPPA.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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