Volume 28 — Florida Reports

<p>1. A process emanating from a court of competent jurisdiction and not void upon its face should he executed by the officer to whom it is properly directed, according to its commands, and it does not comport with Iris duty as an executive officer to pass judgment upon the validity of such process and execute it or not as he may judge best.</p> <p>2. A writ of attachment emanating from a court of competent jurisdiction. returnable on the day of its issuance, or to the next term of the court, instead of the next rule day, is not void, and the officer to whom it is directed will he protected in executing it according to its exigency.</p> <p>3. A general exception to the charge of (he court to the jury will not be sustained if the charge contain a single correct proposition of law applicable to the case.</p> <p>4. Where the exception to a portion of the charge is, that the court failed to give an additional or qualifying- clause, if the portion of the charge excepted to is good so far as it goes, the ohly way the party excepting- can avail himself of such an exception is by requesting the court to give the additional or qualifying clause, and if it be refused to except to the ruling of the court.</p> <p>5. A charge to the jury which does not submit for their consideration any facts which they may not consider as proven by the testimony introduced in the case, is not erroneous as assuming facts not proven.</p> <p>6. Property claimed to be fraudulently conveyed as to creditors may be seized on proper proceedings instituted by them for that purpose, and such seizure may be defended by showing that the conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors, and in such case the title to the property does not pass to the fraudulent grantee as against said creditors, and said property may be subjected to the payment of their demands. But the case is different whenever the conveyed property has been sold by the grantee and its identity gone. The proceeds arising from such sale cannot be levied upon as the property of the fraudulent debtor.</p> <p>1. The. constitutional exemption of one thousand dollars worth of personal property enures to the head of a family residing in this state, and before a party can avail himself of such exemption, he must show that he is in a condition to claim the exemption.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Osceola county.</p> <p>Tlie facts of tlie case are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>This is a case of original jurisdiction.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Suwannee county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Volusia county.</p> <p>Tlie facts of tlie case are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to tlie Circuit Court for Jackson county.</p> <p>Tlie facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>

Writ of Error to the Circuit Coiirt for Suwannee county. STATE:.! ENT.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The. facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to tlie Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts of tlie ('ase are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Leon county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Jackson county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of ' the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the ojúriion of the court.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss appeal.</p>

<p>Intercourse with Females within Prohibited Age. — Indictment — Constitutionality of law — Evidence.</p> <p>1. Chapter 8760, Laws of 1887, entitled “ An act to protect females of immature age and judgment from licentiousness,” held not to he obnoxious to that provision of section 16 of Article III, Constitution of 1885, that provides: “Each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.”</p> <p>2. A liberal rule of construction should be applied when the constitutionality of legislative enactments are questioned; and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act assailed.</p> <p>8. An indictment under the provisions of Chapter 8760, Laws of 1887, is sufficient if it charges the offense in the language of the statute, every necessary ingredient, of the crime being included in the words of the statute.</p> <p>4. It is unnecessary, in such an indictment, to allege that the act charged was with or without consent, or with or without force; ■ or that it was knowingly or wilfully committed.</p> <p>5. In such cases testimony as to the prior habits or character of the female is inadmissible, as it is immaterial.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The. facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Writ of Error to tlie Circuit Court for Suwannee county. Tlie facts of tlie case are stated in tlie opinion of the court.

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Columbia county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Madison county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to tlie Circuit Court for Suwannee comity.</p> <p>Tlie facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>This is a case of original jurisdiction.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard county.</p> <p>STATEMENT.</p> <p>The Indian River Steamboat Company, appellant here, by attorneys presented to the Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, at chambers, on the 24th day of November, A. D. 1890, a bill for an injunction against R. P. Paddison, George M. Robbins and Walter S. Graham, associated and doing business as the East Coast Transportation Company, at Titusville, Brevard county, Florida. The case made in this bill is this : That the Indian River Steamboat Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida, with its usual place of business at Titusville, Brevard county, Florida, and its business is and has been since the 7th day April, A. D. 1886, the transportation' of freight, passengers and mail matter upon Indian river; that in conducting said business it owns and uses seven steamboats, and during the winter season runs a daily line of steamers between Titusville and all points south and between Titusville and Melbourne on said river and during the other portion of the year a daily line between Titusville and Melbourne, and a tri-weekly line between Titusville and all joints south on said river; that the nature and extent of its business render the erection and maintenance of docks and piers at Titusville and elsewhere on said river necessary, and the right to do so is one of its charter privileges; that on the 9th day of February, A. D. 1889, it leased from the Jacksonville,.Tampa and Key West Railway Company so much of a certain dock and pier at Titusville as then and now lies on the easterly side of a line drawn twenty feet west of the most westerly building now and then constructed on said pier, to the easterly line of the bulkhead, with all the rights and privileges thereunto appertaining, the same being about three hundred and ninety-six f°et of the east end of the said dock, and that said dock and pier extend only to such depth of water in said river as affords a safe landing to such boats as said company possesses, and one suitable to its- business, and that said dock and juer do not interfere with the use or construction of other docks which are or may be constructed and maintained on adjacent property along the extensive water front at Titusville; that said leased dock and buildings thereon have been constantly occupied and used by said Indian River Steamboat Company for the purpose aforesaid and for its offices, headquarters, and place of transacting most of its general business since the first day of March, A. D. 1889, and that said company has agreed to pay an annual rental for said dock and pier of five hundred dollars, payable quarterly, for the term of three years, and longer, unless a contrary agreement should be reached in the manner provided by the terms of said lease, and to keep said leased property in good repair, and perform certain other conditions enumerated therein at great expense; that said rental has been paid, and all the other conditions fully performed, and said lease is in full force; that large and expensive additions have been made to said dock and pier by said Indian River Steamboat Company, at a cost of three thousand dollars, and still said dock and pier and the accommodations thereon are inadequate fully to accommodate the increasing business of said company.</p> <p>A copy of the lease bearing date February 9th, 1889, is attached to the bill as an exhibit.</p> <p>It is further alleged in said bill that the sole object of said appellant company in entering into said lease was that it might control premises adequate to the transaction of its business, and since the first day of March A. D. 1889, it has so occupied and controlled said leased property, and no other person or company has occupied the same, except by the consent of the said Indian River Steamboat Company, and that said company has never held itself out as a general wharfinger, or permitted the public use of said leased property.</p> <p>Further, that during the summer or fall of 1890, said Paddison, Robbins and Graham purchased or procured a steamboat, and are advertising to make regular trips upon said Indian River with one or more steamboats for the carriage of passengers and freight, and are seeking to make their headquarters and landing point at said leased dock or pier, and that they have been repeatedly informed by appellant company that said dock and pier were its private property, and that it could not and would not conduct the business of a wharfinger, or permit their boat to land thereat, but notwithstanding such notification they have persisted and still persist in landing, and do land their said boat at said dock through force of threats made by them that if they were deterred from landing or hindered in anyway in the transaction of their business at said dock they would cause to be arrested the agents or employes of said steamboat company, and that for each package or shipment of freight or other matter refused to be received upon said dock they would sue said steamboat company for damages, and they threatened to continue daily to land at said dock and use the same freely for all purposes connected with their business without paying wharfage or other charges, and claim that said dock is public property, and they in common with all other persons are entitled to all the rights and privileges of said steamboat company in and about said leased property; that if the saidPaddison, Eob bins and Graham are permitted to succeed in freely using and occupying said leased property the entire public will also insist on doing so, and said premises will become worthless as a franchise right and a place for transacting its said business.</p> <p>It is further alleged that said steamboat company possesses the exclusive right' to use and occupy said dock and pier for the purposes of its business, and that said respondents, Paddison, Eobbins and Graham have no shadow of title or right to the use or occupation of said property, except through the courtesy, of said steamboat company, and that this cannot be extended to them because said dock and pier are inadequate to accommodate the business of said company, and that there is neither dock frontage or storage room sufficient to accommodate even the boats of said company, and one or more of them must needs be moved to permit the landing of respondent’s boats.</p> <p>It is further alleged that there is another dock at Titusville not owned or possessed by said steamboat company, at which said respondent’s boats can and frequently do land and transact business; that the winter business of said steamboat company is larger than its summer or fall business, and such winter business has begun and is rapidly increasing, and said company is .soon to add other steamboats to its present service, and thus render imperative the use of all its dock room; that it is under contract to carry the United States mail upon said Indian river according to stated schedules and fixed time, and any violation thereof would subject said company to heavy penalties, and it is frequently necessary for said company to load and unload freight with the greatest dispatch and to employ thereon a great number of men in order to prevent delays in the carriage of perishable articles, and at the same time to comply with its said mail contract; that the use of said dock and pier by said respondents for any considerable time would cause inconvenience, delays, possible loss of connections, and prevent said company from properly conducting its business, and would cause it irreparable damage; that said complainant company believes that said respondents cannot be deterred from using said dock and pier except by the daily use of superior force, and that if such force be used, or if packages of freight earned by or consigned to said respondents be refused to be allowed a landing on said dock said steamboat company would be subjected to a multitude of vexatious suits, and that said company" lias no adequate remedy at law to prevent such immediate and irreparable injury.</p> <p>It is further alleged in said bill that said steamboat company is the exclusive owner or lessee, and is in exclusive possession of a large number of other docks at various points on said Indian river, which were erected and are maintained at great expense to said company for its exclusive use and benefit; that these docks are not public, nor do they interfere with the free navigation of the river, and said company does not hold itself out as doing the business of wharfinger at any of them, as said respondents well know; that said docks differ from the docks- and pier at Titusville in this, that they are smaller and not well provided with storage room for the care and protection of freight, and are not intended to be used as the headquarters or places for conducting the business of said company, and do not afford facilities more than adequate to the needs of its business; that said respondents without any right or title whatever are making free use of such docks for all the purposes of their said business, and threaten to continue the same against the protests and express orders of said complainant company, and that they threaten to use said docks daily, or as often as their business may require by superior force, and to harrass and annoy said company by a multitude of suits should they in any manner be interfered with in the use of the same, or should wharfage be required of them.</p> <p>It is further alleged that such interference with said docks as above stated, would cause such litigation, expense, trouble and delays as seriously to affect its business, prejudice its interests and cause such irreparable damage that courts of law could not compensate it for the same, and that said complainant company believes that said respondents are not pecuniarily responsible for any and all damages which said company may suffer by reason of their repeated and threatened interferences with said docks, and that judgments that might be recovered at law would be nncollectable against said respondents, and that said steamboat company is under contract to transfer and deliver immediately large shipments of freight and materials which peculiarly tax all its facilities to the utmost, and render any interference with them especially harmful, and its rights would be unduly prejudiced if an injunction be not issued immediately and without notice to defendants.</p> <p>The prayer of the bill is that said respondents, their officers and agents be restrained by injunction from further using or occupying said dock and pier at Titusville, or the premises or appurtenances thereto belonging for the purpose of transacting thereat their business, except such business as they in common with all other citizens may properly transact with said company upon its private property, and from making said dock and pier the usual place for landing their boat, and for receiving and discharging freight and passengers thereat, and that said steamboat company be decreed the undisturbed and undivided' right of possession of said leased premises; and that said respondents, their officers and agents be enjoined from further using said other docks as their place for landing boats, and from receiving and discharing freight and passengers thereat, and for such other or further relief as the nature of the case may require.</p> <p>The president of the steamboat company makes oath that he is acquainted with the facts stated in the bill, and they are trae, except those alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters he believes they are true.</p> <p>On this bill the judge at chambers granted a temporary injunction as to the dock and pier at Titusville upon the filing of a bond in the sum of five hundred dollars, to be approved by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Brevard county. The bond was filed in the office of said clerk on the 25th day of November, A. D. 1890, and writ of injunction issued, restraining and enjoining said Paddison, Robbins and Graham, associated as the East Coast Transportation Company, from further using or occupying said dock and pier at Titusville for the purpose of receiving and discharging freight and passengers, and from making the same their usual place for landing their boats for said purpose, until the further order of the court.</p> <p>On the 26th day of November, A. D. 1890,the respondents filed in said clerk’s office their answer to the bill, and also mailed to the counsel for said steamboat company a notice that application would be made to the judge of said circuit on the 2nd day of December, A. D. 1890, for a dissolution of said temporary injunction.</p> <p>The material averments in the answer are as follows : That the East Coast Transportation Company was G. F. Paddison, George M. Robbins and Walter S. Graham, and not R. P. Paddison, as stated in the bill, and at the time of filing the answer, is a corporation existing under the laws of Florida, aridities of association having been duly filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Brevard county on November 22nd, A.D. 1890, and on same day forwarded to the Secretary of State at Tallahassee, Florida; but respondents waive any benefit or advantage of the failure to denominate them as a corporation in complainant’s bill, and appear in their corporate capacity as to the East Coast Transportation Company.</p> <p>Respondents admit that the Indian River Steamboat Company is a corporation under the laws of Florida, and that it is engaged in the business and employs the steamboats on the Indian river as alleged in its bill, and that the nature of its business renders the erection of docks and piers at Titusville and elsewhere on said river desirable, but respondents do not know, and pray proof to the extent of the charter rights of said steamboat company in the premises. . Respondents admit the lease by the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company to the said steamboat company, the use of the dock and payment of rent as alleged, but deny that .said lease is now in full force and effect, or ever was valid or effectual in law.</p> <p>Respondents admit that said steamboat company has made certain additions to the said wharf on the south side, but does not know whether or not said company is fully accommodated thereby, and asks proof of said allegation.</p> <p>Respondents deny tliat the sole object of said steamboat company in entering into said lease with the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company was to control premises adequate to the transaction of its business, but aver that its said object therein ivas also to control the terminal facilites of said Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company on the Indian river at Titusville, and thus to prevent the use of said railroad terminal facilities by any competing line of steamboats that might be put on said river, in order to preserve a monopoly of the transportation business of said river, and that said company has persistently denied the use of said railroad terminal facilities to re spondents or to the general public since the lease aforesaid.</p> <p>Respondents deny that said complainant corporation has never held itself out as a general wharfinger, or permitted the public the use of said leased property.</p> <p>Respondents admit that they have purchased a steamboat and are advertising to make regular trips upon Indian river for the carriage of passengers and freight, but deny that they are seeking to make their headquarters at said dock, and say that they are landing at said dock for the purpose of receiving and delivering freight to and from the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company under authority of a decree of the Railroad Commission of the State of Florida securing respondents in that right, a certified copy of which is attached to the answer.</p> <p>Respondents admit that they were informed at one time by complainant corporation that it did not want to conduct the business of a wharfinger, but they aver that after the said decree of the Railroad Commission said corporation informed them that it would receive and receipt for all their freight at said dock on payment of a regular wharfage charge, and that respondents have continued to do business with said complainant corporation, as a general wharfinger for the past three weeks under said arrangement.</p> <p>Respondents admit that they have intimated to the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company and its employes that if it violated the decree of the Railroad Commission by refusing to accord to respondents at the end of its dock and railroad at Titusville the same privileges and advantages as it accords to said steamboat company, notwithstanding its lease, that said neglect or refusal would be a violation of law of which respondents would complain to the proper authorities of the State, but respondents have never threatened or otherwise intimidated the agents of said, steamboat company, except they have threatened to complain of said railroad company if the use of its terminal was not accorded to them, and they do not care) how the said railroad company and said steamboat company settle their differences in regard to the said dock, and have no concern except that said railroad company shall obey the said mandate of the Railroad Commission.</p> <p>Respondents admit that they propose to land daily at said dock, or as often as it has business to transact there with the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company, and that said dock constitutes the charter terminal of said railroad company.</p> <p>Respondents say they have paid wharfage to said steamboat company under protest for the use of said dock, but they only paid the same to prevent a breach of the peace and until they could obtain relief from the courts from such illegal exactions.</p> <p>Respondents admit that they claim that said dock is public property, and that the public is entitled to a free landing at it without wharfage or other toll, because said wharf occupies and is a part of a public street of the town of Titusville, as will appear by the further allegations of the answer.</p> <p>Respondents deny that said complainant corporation possesses the exclusive right to use and occupy said dock, or that respondents have no right to the use thereof, and they deny that any of said complainant’s boats have ever been moved to allow the landing of their boat, or that there will be any occasion therefor in the future.</p> <p>Respondents admit that there is another dock at Titusville at which their boat, frequently lands to transact other thíin railroad business, but respondents say that the water is frequently too low to admit of their boat approaching said wharf, and there is always great danger in so doing, and said dock is totally inadequate to the needs of respondents’ business.</p> <p>Respondents admit that said conrplainant’s present wharf privileges may be inadequate as alleged, and they suggest that said complainant get quarters of its own, instead of appropriating a public street and a railroad terminal.</p> <p>Respondents admit that they cannot be deterred from using said property except by the daily use of superior force, and that the use of such force' or the neglect by the railway company to properly conduct respondents’ business at said wharf would subject said railroad company and said steamboat company to a multitude of vexatious suits.</p> <p>Respondents deny that said complainant company is the exclusive owner or lessee of a large number of docks at various points on Indian river, or has not held itself out as a wharfinger at some of the docks it pretends to control, or-that respondents have ever landed at any dock of which said company was entitled to the exclusive use.</p> <p>Respondents say that the allegations of said bill as to wharf privileges, other than those at Titusville, are vague and uncertain, and they claim the same benefit in their answer as if they had demurred thereto for uncertainty.</p> <p>Respondents further deny that-they contemplate any such trespass upon said docks as the ordinary courts of law could not adequately compensate in damages for, or that they intend to trespass upon the rights, privileges of property in anyway whatever of said company.</p> <p>Respondents deny that they are not pecuniarily re - sponsible for any and all damages they may occasion said complainant company unlawfully, and they say they do not believe that said complainant company is solvent.</p> <p>Respondents deny that there was any occasion for the application to enjoin them without notice as alleged in said bill.</p> <p>Respondents further answering say that in July,. 1890, they complained to the Railroad Commission of the State of Florida., that the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company, a railroad corporation operating a railroad in the State of Florida, discriminated against respondents by attempting to lease the exclusive use of its dock and river terminal to coinplainant company, by which, said lease respondents operating a competing line of steambots had been discriminated against in the receipt and delivery of freight to said railway; that the said Commission by decision rendered on the 14th day of August, A. D. 1890, adjudged that the charter terminus of said railroad was the channel of Indian river, to which point said road had been constructed, and that the pier and dock at Titusville are a part and parcel of the main line of said railroad, and a necessary and indispensable facility which the law enjoins it to provide for the transportation of its business, and that said railroad company had attempted by said lease to the Indian River Steamboat Company to vest in it the exclusive use of said pier, and refused to grant the use of the same to the East Coast Transportation Company; further, it was considered and held by the said Railroad Commission that the said Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company was guilty of a violation of section 4, Chapter 3862, laws of Florida, and that said company do desist at once from such discrimination, and that it extend to the East Coast Transportation Company the same uses, services, facilities and privileges at the end of said pier or wharf, in delivering and receiving freights from such company, „as are extended by it to said Indian River Steamboat Company, a certified copy of said proceedings and decision of said Railroad Commission is. attached to the answer.</p> <p>Respondents further aver that no proceedings have been had to set aside the said decision and order of said commission, and it is operative as a law of the State, and gives respondents the right to land at said dock and wharf for the purpose of receiving and delivering freight to and from said railroad; that said decision cannot be attacked in a collateral way, nor will an injunction lie to restrain the execution of the mandate of said commission, but the same can only be set ■aside or restrained by a court in a direct proceeding against said commission, as prescribed by section 21, Chapter 3862, laws of Florida.</p> <p>Eespondents allege the decision of said Eailroad Commission as a complete bar to the relief prayed in the complainant’s bill, so far as it relates to the railroad wharf at Titusville, and they pray the same advantage thereof as if the same had been urged by way of plea to the bill of complaint.</p> <p>Eespondents further allege that the said lease by the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Eailway Company to the said complainant company is not merely voidable, but the same is utterly void and worthless upon its face as repugnant to the common and statute laws of Florida, and a violation of the charter duties of said railroad in attempting to exclude the general public from the use of a portion of its road which is a public highway of the State, and a further violation of the law in that it attempts to give to said complainant corporation the exclusive use of said railroad terminal to the exclusion of all other competing lines of steamboats including that of respondents.</p> <p>Eespondents further allege that the threats charged to have been made by respondents in said bill of complaint consisted solely in notification sent by them to the president of said steamboat company that he should comply with the above decision of the Railroad Commission and the laws of the State of Florida, or stand a trial for their violation; that said president is the active and responsible manager of the said Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company, and it was in this latter capacity that it became his duty to obey the orders of said commission, and for the omission to do which, respondents threatened to prosecute.</p> <p>Respondents further say that they have a legal right to land at said wharf to receive and deliver freight to and from said railroad company, and that any interference with said right by complainant company, either by wharf charge or other restrictions, is a trespass upon their right, and that said lease from said railroad company is void in so far as it conflicts with their right to use said wharf.</p> <p>Further answering, and in reply to that portion of the bill alleging that respondents claim said dock and wharf to be public property and the public are entitled to the free use of same, they say that said wharf occupies and is a part of a public street of the town of Titusville, called Broad street; that a map of the town site of Titusville was placed on record by the proprietors thereof on the 9th day of February, A. D. 1878, when said town site was a part of Volusia county, and that upon this map Broad street was shown as at present located except that it was 106 feet instead of 100 feet wide; that a lot was purchased on the south side of said Broad street, by said map, and devoted to business purposes, and after that part of Volusia county including Titusville was joined to Brevard county, and in the year 1881, the original proprietors of said town site had a map of said town placed on record in Brevard county showing the streets substantially as on the first map, certified copies of portions of said maps being attached to the answer of respondents.</p> <p>Respondents further aver that upon the faith of the dedication of the streets shown on said maps, lots were bought, money invested and the town built up by the public, and that said dedication and use of Broad street vested the right thereto in the community beyond the subsequent control of said original proprietors.</p> <p>That the object in. locating the town of Titusville upon the river was to enjoy its facilities as a highway and Broad street being one of the only two avenues leading to the river by which it could be reached from the interior of the town without going over private property, the right to pass over said street to the river was dedicated b y said maps,, and the terminus of said street at the river was used by the public in accordance with the dedication by the original proprietors from 1876 until its use was interrupted by said complainant in this suit.</p> <p>Further, that in 1885 the Atlantic Coast, St. Johns & Indian River Railway Company procured from Mrs. Titus, the -original proprietor of the town site of Titus-ville, a deed to all of Broad street, notwithstanding said street had been dedicated to and accepted by the public in 1876, and that the lots fronting thereon had been nearly all disposed by said original proprietor prior to her sale of said street; that no dedication of Broad street for general railway purposes wms ever made, the oidy dedication of it being to the public to use as a street, as shown by said maps.</p> <p>Respondents further allege that the Atlantic Coast, St. Johns & Indian River Railway Company commenced business in January, A. D. 1886, and soon thereafter leased its road to the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company, and that during the years 1886, 1887 and 1888, the use of Broad street and the right to' pass over the end of it to Indian river was enjoyed equally by the railroad company and the public at large, although the street has been extended to the channel of the river by the railroad for the accommodation of its business, and the right of the public to a free landing at the end of said street according to its. original dedication was not interrupted until the year 1889, when the said Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company attempted to lease that part of the street where it had been extended to the channel of the river, to the complainant, the said Indian River Steamboat Company.</p> <p>Respondents also allege that no proceedings have ever been taken to condemn any portion of Broad street for railroad purposes; that the deed from Mrs. Titus to said railroad company in 1885 is void as far as it attempts to interrupt the easement of the public in said street, and that said railway company and its attempted lessee, the said complainant in this suit, are trespassers upon said' street, which is public property under the control of the town council of Titusville, and not in the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Company, or in said complainant.</p> <p>In conclusion respondents pray the same advantage of their answer as if they had pleaded or demurred to the bill of complaint.</p> <p>Affidavits of W. B. Watson and S. M. Lorimer were filed in behalf of complainant company before the judge at chambers on January 2nd, A. D. 1891. These affidavits will be referred to in disposing of the questions to which they relate in the discussion of the case.</p> <p>On the 3rd day of January, A. D. 1891, the said complainant company filed with the judge at cliambeis .a motion to strike from the files the answer of respondents, because it purports to be the answer of a corporation and is not under its corporate seal; that if said answer be considered the answer of individual stockholders, it is improper, as to some or all of them it was filed without leave first obtained; and because the mo '■ tion to dissolve is based upon the answer and must fail if there is no proper answer. Subsequent to the filing of this motion to strike, and without any action being had thereon by the court, complainant filed with the judge at chambers certain exceptions to the answer of respondents on the grounds of scandal and impertinence. The portions of the answer alleged to be scandalous and impertinent are pointed out. No disposition seems to have been made of the exceptions, but on the 7th of January, A. I). 1891, the judge made the following decision on the motion to dissolve the injunction, viz: “This cause coming on to be further heard on motion to dissolve the injunction, after hearing counsel for both parties, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the temporary injunction heretofore granted herein be dissolved, and further, that the bill be dismissed without prejudice.”</p> <p>The Indian River Steamboat Company, complainant below, appeals from the decree dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill.</p> <p>The other facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This is a case of original jurisdiction. STATEMENT. The alternative writ, the declaration in causes of this-character, states in substance that on the 22d day of September, of the present year, the relator, Francis P. Fleming, the Governor of this State, he having ascertained and determined that a vacancy existed in the office of United States Senator from this State, did, in exercise of the power conferred upon him by law, proceed to appoint Robert H. M. Davidson, a citizen…

<p>Writ, of Error to the Circuit Court for Columbia county.</p> <p>Tile facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Clay county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion”of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Motion to issue mandate for possession.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>Tlie facts of tlie (vase are stated in tlie opinion of tlie court.</p>

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval county. STATEMENT.

.STATEMENT. The complainants, James S. Slade and Charles A. Etheredge, copartners under the firm name and style of Slade & Etheredge ; Joseph S. Garrett, George J. Garrett and Robert Y. Garrett, copartners under the firm name and style of Garrett & Sons ; J. Pollock and L. Lowenstein, copartners under the firm name and. style of Pollock & Co. ; J. M. Eatherly, A. M. Young, George I. Waddey, Thomas Ellis, Will TV.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wakulla, county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Madison county.</p> <p>STATEMENT OF THE CASE.</p> <p>Plaintiff in error and Maggie Johnson were indicted at the .Fall Term, A. D. 1890, of the Circuit Court for Madison county, for lewd and lascivious association and cohabitation, and at the Spring Term, A. I). 1891, after arraignment and plea, were convicted of the offense charged in the indictment.</p> <p>The testimony, as certified to us by the bill of exceptions, was as follows :</p> <p>Randall Johnson, a witness for the State, testified : 1 know John Pinson and Maggie Johnson (the witness points them out); they are not now, nor have ever been married to each other. I lived for two or three years about one-fourth' of a mile from John Pinson. In February, 1889, Maggie Johnson came to live at Pin-son’ s house, and has lived there ever since, and is living there yet; she had then one child ; I have seen them together going to and coming from church and other places; I often called at the house ; Pinson always-occupied a room on the west end of the house. I do not know where Miss Maggie slept. About fifteen months after Miss Maggie came there she had a baby. About seven months after Mr. Pinson was married again ; just before he was married I had a talk with Miss Maggie ; she asked me if, the father could take her baby away from her if she were to swear the child to him; I said, “no, I don’t think so, since it is a girl; but why do you ask, does Pinson threaten to take it away from you?” she said, “ I did not say who the father was.” I went there one night, and Maggie- and Pinson were in his room ; Maggie got sleepy after awhile, and Pinson said, “go to bed Maggie;” I got up soon thereafter and went off; I left them there together. Cross-examination : I never saw anything indecent or suspicious between Maggie and Pinson ;. do not know whether Miss Maggie was hired or not by Pinson. Pinson’s mother-in-law and her son and Pin-son’s little girl by his first wife, and also my brother,, who was hired by Pinson, lived in the same house.</p> <p>Webb Carraway, for the State, testified that Miss Maggie lived in Pinson’s house ever since February, A. D. 1889 ; that she came there with one child. Pin-son’s house is a double log-pen house with a passage-between and shed-rooms ; one of the shed-rooms was occupied as a bed room by the hired man, and the other served as a kitchen and dining room. The east-side of the house was a bed room, and Pinson’s mother-in-law and her son slept in it; and the west end of the house was also a bed room ; it had two beds ; Pinson r with his child, and Maggie Johnson and her child slept in that room; I knocked at the door of that room every morning to get the keys to feed the stock with, and Miss Maggie passed them to me through the crack in the door. About fifteen months after Miss Maggie came there she had a baby ; on the night of her confinement I went for the doctorPinson sent me, and gave me a horse to go on. He attended on Maggie. Miss Maggie often spoke to me about the baby; she told me sometimes that Pinson was the father of it, and sometimes Sam Johnson. Mr. Pinson was married some seven months ago. Miss Maggie stays there yet. Miss Maggie and Pinson are not married. Cross-examination : Miss Maggie was hired by Pinson ; she cooked and washed.</p> <p>Defendant Pinson made the following statement: T hired Miss Maggie to take care of my house ; my wife’s mother was too old, being sixty-five years oí age. I wanted some one to take care of her and my child. I had nothing wrong to do with Miss Maggie, and am not the father of her child.</p> <p>The defendant, Maggie'Johnson, stated that “the reason I slept in the same room with Mr. Pinson is, that it was the only room with a fire place, and I wanted one on account of my baby and child.” This was all the testimony.</p> <p>The court charged the jury as follows : The State of Florida by an indictment- ■ found by a grand jury of your county charge the prisoners at the bar with lewdly and lasciviously associating and cohabiting to getlier, by cohabiting and having carnal knowledge of each other, and that they were not married to each other. The statute under which these defendants are indicted and prosecuted reads as follows : “If any man and woman, not being married to each other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together; or if' any man or woman, married or unmarried, is guilty of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behaviour.” You will observe that this indictment is found under the first clause of the act, to-wit: “If any man or woman, not being married to each other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together,” shall on conviction be punished, &c. This offense, like offenses of a kindred character, and particularly offenses that, carried on or perpetrated, are perpetrated in secret, and the proof of its existence must of necessity depend in many cases largely on circumstances proven, going to show the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is not essential that the witnesses should be able to and should testify to having-seen the defendants in the actual act of cohabitation or coition, in order to find a verdict of guilty. It is sufficient if the facts and circumstances proven are such as to satisfy your minds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants associated and cohabited together habitually as husband and wife, or as though the marital or conjugal relation existed between them.</p> <p>If you believe from the evidence and are satified beyond a reasonable doubt that-the defendants were not married to each other, and should be further thus satisfied that the defendants within two years last before the 17th of October, 1890. lived together and habitually slept in the same room with only a young child each with them, that they so lived and slept for twelve or fifteen months ; that there were several other rooms in their said house other than the room they slept in ; and should further be satisfied that a child or children were borne by the defendant, Maggie Johnson, and that she laid them on, or the youngest one, to the defendant, John Pinson ; and should be further satisfied that during and at the time of Maggie’s confinement at the birth of said child or children, the defendant, John Pinson, had her attended to by a doctor and nursed during her said confinement as though she was his wife, then you may and should find the defendants guilty, unless those circumstances are explained by the evidence in some way consistent with the presumption of defendants’ innocence. But imoof of a single act of cohabitation of an occasional act of coition between the parties is not sufficient to constitute the offense. The object of our statute is to prohibit the public scandal and disgrace of such living together by persons of opposite sexes and unmarried to each other, and to prevent such evil and indecent examples with their tendency to corrupt public morals. You may and should consider all the facts and circumstances as proven, as, for instance whether the evidence shows the consent of the-woman, and the will and consent of the man, and whether or not there was an opportunity to gratify their natural passions for sexual intercourse. And to justify a verdict of guilty, the evidence must show that the defendants dwelt and cohabited together as if the conjugal relation existed between them, and that they habitually consorted together for weeks or months next before the finding of the indictment.</p> <p>-(«2.) And as before remarked, if the evidence satisfied your mind beyond a reasonable doubt that at the house at which the defendants lived had a number of rooms, and that the defendants chose to sleep to themselves in a room with only a young child with each, for twelve or fifteen months, or more, next before the finding of indictment in this case ; that a child or children was born to them ; that the defendant, Pinson, had a doctor, or nurse, or both, to attend Maggie during her accouchment; that the defendant, Maggie, said said child or children was the offspring of Pinson ; that on being so t-olcl, Pinson made no denial or stood silent, and then if there is no other explanation of this circumstance, or these circumstances, only that such last child may have possibly been begotten by a single act of cohabitation between the defendants, in the argument of counsel, then you may find the defendants guilty. You are the sole judges of the evidence and of its weight and credibility, and should found your verdict, upon evidence which, you believe to be true. The statement of the accused made under oath in their own behalf are to be considered by you, together with all the other evidence, and are entitled to such weight as you may deem it entitled to, and no more. In some States the jury are required to fix the penalty when they find a verdict of guilty, but in-this State the law fixes the penalty, and your responsibility ceases when you have found an honest verdict from the evidence, and you are not responsible for the penalty fixed by the law, and should not be affected by appeals made Jo your sympathy, or to the severity of the penalty; you have nothing to do with the penalty except to make you careful to find an honest verdict.</p> <p>Counsel for defendants asked the court to give the following additional charge, to-wit: In order to justify a verdict of guilty the State must prove not only that the defendants resided together but that they had illicit intercourse, and that such intercourse was habitual, and not occasional. This request was refused, in the the language of the Judge, “not given because more correctly given.”</p> <p>The juiy returned a verdict of guilty against defendants. They moved for a new trial, assigning the following reasons:</p> <p>1. Tire verdict of the jury is contrary to the law.</p> <p>2. The verdict of the jury is contrary to the evi deiice.</p> <p>3. Because the court erred in charging “that this offense, like offenses of a kindred character, are peculiarly offenses carried on or perpetrated and perpetrated in secret.</p> <p>4. Because the court erred in charging that if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants, within two years last before the 17th of October, 1890, lived together and habitually slept in the same room with only a yomig child with them; that they so lived and slept for twelve or fifteen months ; that there were several other rooms in their said house other than the room they slept in ; and were further satisfied that child or children were borne by the defendant, Maggie Johnson, and that she laid them, or one of them, to the defendant, John Pinson ; and should further be satisfied that during and at the time of Maggie’s confinement at the birth of said child or children the de fendant, John Pinson, had her attended by a doctor, and nursed her during said confinement as though she ivas his wife, then you may and should find the defendants guilty, unless those circumstances are explained by the evidence in some way consistent with the presumption of defendants’ innocence.</p> <p>fi. The court, erred in charging the jury that “you may and should consider all the facts and circumstances as proven, as, for instance, whether the evidence showed the consent of the woman, and the will and consent of the man, and whether or not there was an opportunity to gratify their natural passions for sexual intercourse.</p> <p>6. The court erred in giving charge marked (2) as given by the court.</p> <p>7. The.court erred in refusing to give the charge as asked by the defense.</p> <p>8. The court erred in telling the counsel for defendants in ojien court while he was consulting with them jirevious to placing defendants on the stand, that he nnist not suggest to the defendants what they must say.</p> <p>This motion was overruled, and defendant, Pinson, sentenced to the penitentiary for three years.</p> <p>lie nowr brings this cause here by writ of error, and signs the following as errors :</p> <p>1. The court erred in overruling motion for a newr trial. ■</p> <p>2. The court erred in charging that “this offense, like offenses of a kindred character, are jieculiarly offenses carried on or jierjietrated, and jierjietrated in secret.”</p> <p>3. The court erred in charging that “if the jury believed from the'evidence that the defendants, within two years last before the 17th of October, 1890, lived together, and habitually slept in the same room wdth only a young child with them ; that they so lived and slept for twelve or fifteen months ; that there were several other rooms in their said house, other than the room they slept in ; and were further satisfied that a child or children were borne by the defendant Maggie Johnson, and that she laid them, or one of them, to the defendant John Pinson ; and should further be .satisfied that during and at the time of Maggie’s confinement at the birth of said child or children, the defendant John Pinson had her attended by a doctor, and nursed during her said confinement as though she was his wife, then you may and should find the defendants guilty, unless those circumstances are explained by the evidence in some way consistent with the presumption of defendants’ innocence.”</p> <p>4. The court erred in charging that “you may and should consider all the facts and circumstances as proven, as, for instance, whether the evidence showed the consent of the woman, and the will and consent of the man, and whether or not there was an opportunity to gratify their natural passions for sexual intercourse. ’ ’</p> <p>5. The court erred in charging that ‘ ‘and as before remarked, if the evidence satisfies yóur minds beyond a reasonable doubt that at the house at which the defendants lived had a number of rooms, and that the defendants chose to sleep to themselves in a room with only a young child with each, for twelve or fifteen months, or before, next before the finding of the indictment in this case ; that a child or children was born to them ; that the defendant Pinson had a doctor, or nurse, or both, to attend Maggie during her accouchment; that the defendant Maggie said, said -child or children was the offspring of Pinson ; that on being so told, Pinson made no denial, or stood silent; and that if there is no other explanation of this circumstance, or these circumstances, onl-y that such last child may have possibly been begotten by a sing-le act of cohabitation between the defendants, in the argument of counsel, then you may find the defendants guilty.”</p> <p>6. The court erred in refusing to give ,the charge as asked by the defense, that in order to find the defendants guilty, the State must prove not only that they dwelt together, but that they had carnal knowledge of each other, and that such knowledge was not occasional, but habitual.</p> <p>7. The court erred in telling the defendants’ counsel in open court while he was consulting with them previous to placing them on the stand, that he must not suggest to defendants what they must say.</p> <p>The other facts in the case are stated in the opinion of lire court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Yolusia ■county.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss appeal.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Establishing Lost Papers — Notes.</p> <p>Under the provisions of Section 1, page 736, McClellan’s Digest, (Section 5, Act of November 21st, 1829.) the Circuit Courts have power to establish copies of promissory notes or other written papers in lieu of the lost originals thereof.</p>

STATEMENT. The bill iu this cause was filed October 15th, 1885. The complainants are Eli Haworth and his wife and Alphonso Haworth, their son, and its material allegations are in substance as follows: 1.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>