28 Kan. App. 2d 128 - State v. Sharp’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The elements of endangering a child are as follows: “1. That the defendant intentionally and unreasonably caused or permitted [K.H.] to be placed in a situation in which there was a reasonable probability that [K.H.j’s life, body or health would be injured or endangered; “2. That [K.H.] was then a child under the age of 18 years; and “3. That this act occurred on or about the 25th day of March, 2008, in Sedgwick County, Kansas.” (Emphasis added.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 45 Kan. App. 2d 15 - State v. Cummings · State v. Cummings

2. “"Although the Fisher court goes on to conclude the statute `is clear and understandable; that ordinary persons can determine what conduct is proscribed by a common-sense reading of the statute,' its earlier discussion on the different meanings of the word `may' iterates why it is important that that particular word be defined in the context of this statute. [Citation omitted.] Simply saying a child `might' be injured, in its ordinary meaning, is not sufficient to convict someone of endangering a child. [Citation omitted.] The logical conclusion of this analysis means the term `might,' as used in the jury instruction, must be judicially defined in the same manner." Sharp, 28 Kan. App. 2d at 134-35 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 33 Kan. App. 2d 391 - State v. Patton

3. ““The ordinaiy or normal meaning of the word ‘may was specifically rejected by the Fisher court in favor of a definition containing a legal standard: reasonable probability. 230 Kan. at 195 . There is a very real possibility, especially under the facts of this case, that the jury would have returned a different verdict had the term ‘might’ been properly defined as more than a faint or remote possibility, a reasonable probability, a likelihood that harm to the child will result or that the child will be placed in imminent peril. See Comment to PIK Crim. 3d 58.10.” 28 Kan. App. 2d at 135 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Cummings