28 Md. App. 640 - Evans v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 15 district · 280 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 307 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"... granting ... that the evidence generated a fair jury question on the issue of mitigation, the jury's verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree cured any error in the instructions. Just as the evidence was arguably sufficient for the jury to find mitigation, it was bountifully sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, as they did, that the killing was deliberated and premeditated. As we said in Evans [v. State, 28 Md. App. 640 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975)]: `By the same token, any error in instructing as to the allocation of the burden of persuasion on the subject of mitigation (such mitigation, for purposes of holding the homicidal mens rea down to the manslaughter level, being fairly an issue in the case) will have been cured by a verdict of murder in the first degree. The evil aimed at by Mullaney v. Wilbur , where the issue is manslaughter versus murder, is that a presumption of malice unfairly relieves the State of the burden of proving non-mitigation (mitigation being fairly an issue in the case). Where the ultimate verdict is that of murder in the second degree, the presumption may, therefore, have been pivotal. Where, on the other hand, the verdict is murder in the first degree, the State will have proved every element, including the negating of hot blood, beyond a reasonable doubt and due process will not have been offended. [ 28 Md. App. at 658 .]'"”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dorsey v. State · 29 Md. App. 1 - Brown v. State

2. “If a fair reading of the instructions indicates that the “presumption of malice,” in that broader and unqualified form, operated to relieve the State of its burden of ultimate persuasion on the issue of non-justification and/or non-excuse (where either is a fair issue in the case), Mullaney v. Wilbur will require a reversal regardless of the degree of felonious homicide on which the conviction was had. Unlike the situation dealt with where the only issue in the case affected by the presumption was mitigation and the only advantage the defendant was denied was the possible lowering of murder in the second degree to manslaughter, the harm on the issues of presumed non-justification and presumed non-excuse operates across the entire spectrum of culpability. If the defendant had had the benefit of a fair allocation of the burden of persuasion on these issues, he might well have been found not guilty totally and not simply guilty to a lesser degree. Self-defense, for example, would relieve one of guilt for a premeditated and deliberated killing as well as for a killing in hot blood. Id. at 317 (emphasis added, footnote deleted). 6”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Guthrie v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary · 32 Md. App. 621 - Newkirk v. State

3. “‘Just as the word “malice” confuses and misleads, the word “aforethought” likewise muddles thinking: “The fact that malice aforethought means merely that malice must exist at the same time as the act, in effect makes ‘aforethought’ meaningless surplusage, since the requirement is satisfied by the presence of malice or ‘concurrent’ malice rather than an antecedent malice. The unimportant character of the adjective ‘aforethought’ is seen in the fact that in many opinions ‘malice’ and ‘malice aforethought’ are used interchangeably and that in many, ‘aforethought’ is itself omitted.” [Quoting from 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure §243, at 527 (Anderson Ed. 1957)] Since today “aforethought” may be “as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind” or “on the spur of the moment,” the word no longer serves its original function of drawing attention to the duration of the deliberation to kill as the criterion for distinguishing murder from other homicides.’”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 41 Md. App. 277 - Smith v. State · 518 F. Supp. 546 - Guthrie v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary