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← 28 OR 354 - Morrell v. Miller

Morrell v. Miller’s Empirical Analysis

1896

Citation profile

9
cited by 9 later decisions
3
states following
June 1969
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently June 1969

3 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

4018961900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Boyd v. Dunlap · Watson v. Dundee Mortgage & Trust Investment Co. · Sellwood v. Gray · Philbrook v. Delano · Philbrick v. O'Connor

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “‘ ‘ There was some attendant indicia of fraud, such as the transfer of all Miller’s property of such considerable value to Lord; the declaration of a secret trust in connection therewith; and the inadequacy of consideration for the second deed. But, upon the other hand, Miller was deeply interested. He was in the toils of the law, charged with a grave offense, and his object was to extricate himself therefrom. The purpose of making such use of his property as to secure able counsel to conduct his defense, and to attend to other apprehended litigation, was perfectly legitimate. His right to he heard by counsel is a constitutional right, and he should be permitted, unless hindered by legal process, the free and untrammeled use of his property to obtain legal assistance, otherwise constitutional privileges would be invaded! Upon the whole, we believe the second deed was intended to be and operated as an absolute conveyance of the title to said premises, and we are unable to say from the evidence that it is fraudulent and void as to creditors. But the transaction is attended with such suspicious .circumstances that we ought not to permit the conveyance to stand, except as security for such liability as Miller legitimately incurred to meet the expenses of impending litigation, under the doctrine laid down by Chancellor Kent in Boyd v. Dunlap, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 478: ‘When a deed is sought to be set aside as voluntary and fraudulent against creditors, and there is not sufficient ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.