Thomas Willison v. Anderson Watkins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Had there been a formal lease, for a term not then expired, the lessee forfeited it, by this act of hostility; had it been a lease at will, froim. year to year, he was entitled to no notice to quit, before an ejectment. The landlord’s action would be as against a trespasser; as much so as if no relation had ever existed between them. * * * “As to the assertion of his claim, the possession is as adverse and as open to his action, as one acquired originally by wrong; and we cannot assent to the proposition, that the possession shall assume such character as one party alone may choose to give it. The act is conclusive on the tenant; he cannot make his disclaimer and adverse claim, so as to protect himself, during the unexpired term of the lease; he is a trespasser on him who has the legal title; the relation of landlord and tenant is dissolved, and each party is to stand upon his right “It is on this principle alone, that the plaintiff could claim to recover in this action. If there was, between him and the defendant, an existing tenancy, at the time it was brought, he had no right of entry. The lessee cannot be a trespasser, during the existence of the lease, and cannot be turned out, till its termination. At the end of a definite term, the lessor has his election to consider the lessee a trespasser, and to enter on him by ejectment; but if he suffers him to remain in possession, he becomes a tenant at will, or from year to year, and in. either case, is entitled to a notice to”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Comptograph Co. v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. · Sherrill v. Garth

2. ““It is an undoubted principle of law, fully recognized by this court, that a tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord, either by setting up a title in himself, or a third person, during the existence of the lease or tenancy. The principle of estoppel applies to the relation between them, and operates in its full force to prevent the tenant from violating that contract by which he obtains and holds possession. * * * He cannot change the character of the tenure, by his own act merely, so as to enable himself to hold against his landlord, who reposes under the security of the tenancy, believing the possession of the tenant to be his own, held under his title, and ready to be surrendered on its termination, by the lapse of time, or demand of possession. The same principles apply to mortgagor and mortgagee, trustee and cestui que trust, and, generally, to all cases where one man obtains possession of real estate belonging to another, by a recognition of his title.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. H. K. Porter Co. v. Boyd · Guenther v. Dennis-Simmons Lumber Co.

3. ““The relations created by a lease are not more sacred than those of a trust or mortgage. ... If he suffers the tenant to retain possession twenty years after a tenancy is disavowed, and cannot account for his delay in bringing his suit, why should he be exempted from the operation of the statute more than the mortgagor or the mortgagee ? We can perceive no good reasons for allowing this peculiar and exclusive privilege to a Ibssor. ... In the case in 1 Nott & McC. 374 [Wilson ads. Weatherhyl, the court decide that, where a defendant enters under a plaintiff, he shall not dispute his title while he remains in possession, and that he must first give up his possession, and bring his suit to try titles. To the correctness of this principle we yield our assent, not as one professing to be peculiar to South Carolina, but as a rule of 'the common law applicable to the cases of fiduciary possession before noticed. It is laid down as a general rule, embracing in terms tenants in common, trustees, mortgagees, and lessees, but disallowing none of the exceptions or limitations which qualify it and exclude from its operation all cases where the possession has become adverse, where the party entitled to it does not enter or sue within the time of the statute of limitations, or give any good reason for his delay; leaving the rule in full force wherever the suit is brought within the time prescribed by law. To this extent, and this only, the decision would reach. ... In relation to the limit”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz