Brown v. Ford’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “For a private sale of collateral that is neither perishable nor threatens to decline speedily in value, nor is customarily sold on a recognized market, the creditor must inform the debtor of “the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made * * For such public sales, 9-504 requires different information: “the time and place of any public sale * * The contents of a notice for a private sale, then, are sufficient if the notice says: “The collateral will be sold at a private sale on or after (a particular date)”. Courts have, however, given effect to a notice that in substance says: “The collateral will be sold in a private sale ten days or more after the sending of this notice.” Both forms of notice give the debtor a minimum time in which to arrange alternate financing so to redeem, or to find a substitute buyer, or to solicit bids. Moreover, both alert the debtor to the date on which he should be concerned to oversee or inquire about any proposed sales. Despite the straightforward Code language, a few courts insist that the secured creditor provide still further information. For example, one court requires creditors to state explicitly in their notices whether the sale is to be public or private. We see no reason for such a requirement, assuming the contents of the notice are otherwise clearly worded, given that harsh consequences may flow from secured party’s failure to send proper notice, and the text of 9-504 adopts a minimalist approach.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 29 Ark. App. 166 - Jones v. Union Motor Co., Inc.

2. “Brown next argues that the notice given by Ford Credit was insufficient for a sale held by Lakeshore 16 months later. We do not agree. The secured party has only a duty to give reasonable notice of the time after which any private sale will be made. A second notice is not required even though a significant period of time passes before resale. See Ark. Stat. Ann. Section 85-9-504(3) (Supp. 1983). Brown also argues the notice was misleading in that it stated Lakeshore was to sell the car, but the car could be redeemed prior to sale from Ford Credit Company. We find no merit to this argument. Ford Credit was an assignee of the contract and was a secured party along with Lakeshore. Brown admits to receiving notice from Ford Credit. The fact that Brown went by and discussed with the dealer the possibility of getting the car back proves that the notice was sufficient to prevent her from being misled. This further shows that the notice was given in time to allow the appellant to exercise her right of redemption.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 29 Ark. App. 166 - Jones v. Union Motor Co., Inc.