Tellier v. Fields’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 76 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(c) Review of Inmates Housed in Administrative Detention. (1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section, the Segregation Review Official will review the status of inmates housed in administrative detention. The SRO shall conduct a record review within three work days of the inmate’s placement in administrative detention and shall hold a hearing and formally review the status of each inmate who spends seven continuous days in administrative detention, and thereafter shall review these cases on the record (in the inmate’s absence) each week, and shall hold a hearing and review these cases formally at least every 30 days. The inmate appears before the SRO at the hearing unless the inmate waives the right to appear. A waiver may be in writing, signed by the inmate, or if the inmate refuses to sign a waiver, it shall be shown by a memorandum signed by staff and witnessed by a second staff member indicating the inmate’s refusal to appear at the hearing. Staff shall conduct a psychiatric or psychological assessment including a personal interview, when administrative detention continues beyond 30 days. The assessment, submitted to the SRO in a written report, shall address the inmate’s adjustment to surroundings and the threat the inmate poses to self, staff and other inmates. Staff shall conduct a similar psychiatric or psychological assessment and report at subsequent one-month intervals should detention continue for this extended period. Administ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 173 F. App'x 664 - Hill v. Fleming · Magluta v. Fp Samples W

2. “As we have recognized previously, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin, our determination of “whether the plaintiff had a protected liberty interest in not being confined” also requires a two-part analysis. [Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47 , 51 (2d Cir.1997)] (citing Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313 , 317 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam)). “As a result of Sandin, a prisoner has a liberty interest only if the deprivation ... is atypical and significant and the state has created the liberty interest by statute or regulation.” Id. at 52. First, we examine whether the alleged deprivation was atypical and signifi-' cant.... Second, we must examine whether the state has created a liberty interest by statute or regulation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Chappell v. Mandeville

3. “Read together, Sandin, Wolff, and Meachum, all support the proposition that a statute or regulation which involves “state-created rightfs],” [Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) ], creates a protectable liberty interest when an official’s failure to adhere to the statute results in an “atypical, significant deprivation,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 [ 115 S.Ct. 2293 ], of “real substance,” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 [ 94 S.Ct. 2963 ], and not simply “ephemeral and insubstantial” violations. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228 [ 96 S.Ct. 2532 ],”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Chappell v. Mandeville