¶1Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Lorenzo Rodriguez pled guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of marijuana. The trial judge accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Rodriguez to serve fifteen years in confinement and ten years on probation. Rodriguez moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but the trial court denied the motion. Rodriguez appeals.
¶2Rodriguez claims that the trial court erred in denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not correctly informed of either the maximum sentence he faced for both offenses or the mandatory minimum sentence for the methamphetamine trafficking charge. Indeed, under Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8 (C), a trial judge should not accept a guilty plea without first informing the defendant of the maximum possible sentence and any mandatory minimum sentence. But contrary to Rodriguez’s claims, he was properly informed of the maximum possible sentence for both charges and the mandatory minimum sentence for the methamphetamine trafficking charge.
¶3As Rodriguez notes in his brief, he faced a maximum prison sentence of 31 years: 30 years for trafficking because he possessed *424more than 200 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine,
¶4It is true that the waiver of rights form signed by Rodriguez incorrectly states that the maximum term of imprisonment he faced was 30 years, rather than 31 years. Nevertheless, given that Rodriguez was correctly informed of the maximum sentence at the plea hearing and that he acknowledged his understanding that the maximum possible sentence was 31 years, we find that the mistake on the waiver of rights form is not a manifest injustice requiring reversal of the trial court’s refusal to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea. “After sentence is pronounced, withdrawal of a guilty plea is allowed only to correct a manifest injustice, and the trial court’s refusal to allow withdrawal will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”
¶5Likewise, the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in finding that Rodriguez had been properly advised that the trafficking charge carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment.
¶6It certainly would have been the better practice for the prosecutor to have used the word “mandatory” in describing the minimum sentence. But we do not find error based on mere semantics.
¶7Judgment affirmed.
¶8 See OCGA § 16-13-31 (h).
¶9 See OCGA § 16-13-2 (b).
¶10 (Citations omitted.) Voils v. State, 266 Ga. App. 738, 741 (2) (598 SE2d 33) (2004).
¶11 See OCGA § 16-13-31 (e) (2).
¶12 See, e.g., Ranson v. State, 198 Ga. App. 659, 662 (7) (402 SE2d 740) (1991).
¶13 See Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 89, 90 (1) (a) (528 SE2d 861) (2000).
¶14 See Bess v. State, 235 Ga. App. 372, 373 (1) (508 SE2d 664) (1998).