Schweitzer v. Brewer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 88 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 90 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to effectuate the actual intention of the legislature ... The primary source from which we glean the legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. When the intent is expressed in clear and unambiguous language, [an appellate court] will carry it out, if no constitutional guarantees are impaired. Words are granted their ordinary signification so as to construe the statute according to the natural import of the language used without resorting to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of extending or limiting its operation. If reasonably possible the parts of a statute are to be reconciled and harmonized, the intention as to any one part being found by reading all the parts together, and none of its words, clauses, phrases, or sentences shall be rendered surplusage or meaningless. Results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language. In other words, an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead to absurd consequences.”

   10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Marietta Aggregates v. Citizens for the Preservation of the South Mountain-Antietam Environment · Supervisor of Assessments v. Sloan

2. ““The general rule regarding the standard of conduct applied under our decisions to measure ... negligence does not supersede a prescription of conduct by the legislature. As we have indicated, what governs is the legislature’s intention ... not necessarily what a ‘reasonably prudent’ person would do under such circumstances. We said in Md. Medical Service v. Carver, 238 Md. 466, 478 , 209 A.2d 582, 588 (1965): “If the legislative intent is expressed in clear and unambiguous language, this will be carried into effect by this Court even if this Court might be of the opinion that the policy of the legislation is unwise, or even harsh or unjust, if no constitutional guarantees are impaired by the legislation.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Brown v. Dermer

3. ““[t]he general rule regarding the standard of conduct applied under our decisions to measure contributory negligence does not supersede a prescription of conduct by the legislature. As we have indicated, what governs is the legislature’s intention regarding a person who has partially completed his crossing while the ‘Don’t Walk’ signal is showing, not necessarily what a ‘reasonably prudent’ person would do under such circumstances.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 900 F. Supp. 788 - Parker v. Davis