State v. McKay’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

78 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 78 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Gorman · State v. Kenney

2. ““The contemporary era furnishes even less support for the ‘imperative requirement’ interpretation, particularly in light of the fact that other provisions in the Declaration of Rights protecting defendants in criminal cases, however fundamental they have been regarded by our society, are subject to waiver. Article 22, which declares that ‘no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case,’ may, ‘like all other privileges,’ be waived. Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 612 , 39 A.2d 820 (1944). No less a right than trial by jury itself, as we have emphasized at length, could be waived well before independence. State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 14-19 , 273 A.2d 156 (1971). The poll of the jury, the very procedure by which unanimity is confirmed, is an ‘absolute right’ of ‘constitutional dimension,’ Ross v. State, 24 Md.App. 246, 253 , 330 A.2d 507 (1975) , rev’d on other grounds, 276 Md. 664 , 350 A.2d 680 (1976) , which can be waived by the simple failure to exercise it. Similarly, a mere failure to object to the admission of illegally seized evidence amounts to a waiver of that valuable right. Jenkins v. State, 232 Md. 529, 532-33 , 194 A.2d 618 (1963); Porter v. State, 230 Md. 535, 536-37 , 187 A.2d 870 (1963). Finally, the defendant can also waive the right to counsel, State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 575 , 366 A.2d 1026 (1976); State v. Fowler, 259 Md. 95, 103-04 , 267 A.2d 228 (1970); the right to confront the witnesses against him, State v. Collins,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Thanos v. State

3. “[McKay’s] paramount concern was apparent from the colloquy with the court: whether a mistrial for lack of unanimity on the third count would mean a new trial not only on that count, but also on the first and eighth, and possibly even on those which had been the subject of judgment of acquittal. This was evident from his repeated questions concerning the “whole trial.” Not only did the court remain silent when defense counsel advised his client that a retrial would mean “the whole trial,” but the court itself informed [McKay] that he had “an absolute right under the law to have the whole trial tried all over again” and asked him whether he wished to accept “a majority vote” on count three or “have the case retried?” Only then did appellee reply that he would “take the majority vote.” Given what we regard as a clearcut understanding on the part of [McKay] that a mistrial for lack of unanimity on the third count would have meant, at the very least, a retrial on counts one and eight as well, even though the jury had found him not guilty of those charges, his decision to accept a majority verdict on the third count was hardly surprising. His consent, however, did not amount to an intelligent and competent waiver, since it rested on a grossly inaccurate premise. That he could not be retried on the charges of which he had been acquitted, without being placed in double jeopardy, was settled in Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701, 706-707 , 319 A.2d 542 (1974).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Claybourne v. State