Reed v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 3 district · 11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We decline to extend the Wade rule to the examination by the victim of photographs of the accused and an out-of-court identification therefrom in the absence of the accused, as in the instant case. Under the growing weight of authority, there is no constitutional right to counsel at a post-arrest showing of photographs at which the defendant is not present; it being held that such photographic identification proceeding is not such ‘confrontation’ or ‘exhibition’ of the accused vis a vis the witness as to come within the rule of Wade and the related cases of Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 ] (1967). See People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal.3d 273 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 481 P.2d 212 (1971) ; People v. Martin, [ 47 Ill.2d 331 , 265 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1970) ]. 3 “We recognize that in some jurisdictions, including our own Third Circuit Court of Appeals, it has been held that there is no substantial difference between a line-up of photographs of persons in custody and a line-up of the person themselves, insofar as the constitutional safeguards required by Wade are concerned; that, otherwise, the line-up requirements of Wade are subject to easy evasion. See United States v. Zeiler (3 Cir.) 427 F.2d 1305 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205 , 266 A.2d 738 (1970); United States v. Marson (4 Cir.) 408 F.2d 644 (1968); Thompson v. Nevada, 85 Nev. 134 , 451 P.2d 704 (1969). We prefer, however, the r”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson

2. ““Ten photographs were shown to the victim, eight being photographs of others and two being photographs of the defendants. The evidence shows that, without aid or hesitation, the victim quickly identified the defendant’s photographs as those of his assailants. The defendant contends that impermissible suggestion arose from the fact that his photograph and that of Hawkins bore the dates they were taken on the day after the offense, whereas the other photographs bore dates of earlier years. When queried on voir dire about the dates on the photographs, the victim testified: T never gave it a thought, never bothered to look at that.’ He further testified: ‘As long as I am standing here and sworn on that Bible, I didn’t see that. I didn’t pay no attention to that.’ And to the statement ‘Of the batch given you, only two of them had a recent date on them’, the victim testified: ‘I didn’t know that at the time. I just found that out. This is the first time I am hearing or realizing it is put on that way. I didn’t know that at the time. I didn’t know until you pointed it out now.’ Considering the totality of the circumstances of the photographic identification in the instant case, we are satisfied that the proceeding was not so impermissibly suggestive as to violate due process under the rule of the Simmons case (Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 )” (Reed v. State, 281 A.2d 142, at 147 ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States Ex Rel. Reed v. Anderson

3. ““Despite the hazards of initial identification by photograph, this procedure has been used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eye witnesses to exonerate them through scrutiny of photographs. The danger that use of the techniques may result in convictions based on misidentification may be substantially lessened by a course of cross examination at trial which exposes to the jury the method’s potential for error. We are unwilling to prohibit its employment, either in the exercise of our supervisory power or, still less, as a matter of constitutional requirement. Instead, we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pre-trial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 13 Md. App. 361 - Crenshaw v. State