Public-domain · open source

281 Ark. 13

Campbell v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided November 21, 1983

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1983-11-21

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently January 1996

2 district · 5 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“THE COURT: Mr. Simpson, [Defense Counsel] I didn’t recognize Ms. Campbell until she walked up here. I used to represent Ms. Campbell. Do you have any objections to me entering this plea? Is it a plea? DEFENSE ATTORNEY: She is going to throw herself on the mercy of the Court. It’s not a negotiated plea, although there are some circumstances that she would like to make the court aware of. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Campbell, I have represented you for some time and your husband, Freddie, and have some knowledge about you and your prior involvement with the law. Would you rather somebody else hear this? DEFENDANT CAMPBELL: No. THE COURT: Gentlemen, I really feel uncomfortable about it, because I am aware of Ms. Campbell’s extensive involvement with the law. I will — if you would like, I will go ahead and do what I think the system requires and try to be as honest with Louise as I can under the system; or, I will do one or the other: I will take her guilty plea and satisfy myself with this plea and transfer her to the Fifth Division for sentencing or I’ll transfer the whole thing. Talk to her Mr. Simpson, and see what she wants to do. [Emphasis added.] DEFENSE ATTORNEY. I discussed this with her the other day and she indicated she had no objection to me. THE COURT: Well, do you want me to go ahead? DEFENSE ATTORNEY: She had no objection to you hearing it. What he’s saying is, if you want to transfer to another judge, he will do that. DEFENDANT CAMPBELL: No, that’s okay.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 598 F. Supp. 95 - Layer v. Lyles

“Justice Purtle, in single dissent, stated: The present controversy presents a classic case where a trial judge should have refused to hear the plea or to sentence the defendant because of the appearance of impropriety. Even though the appellant and her attorney both expressly agreed that the trial judge should not disqualify, it would have been better for him not to pass sentence on his former cliept. Appellant and her attorney both thought he would be at least as lenient as the plea bargain offer. They were sadly mistaken. It is not enough that a trial judge be fair and impartial; he must also appear to be such, [citation omitted]. The trial court should have voluntarily disqualified without request by the parties, [citation omitted]. The court stated at the hearing: Gentlemen, I really feel uncomfortable about it because I am aware of Ms. Campbell’s extensive involvement with the law ... I will go head and do what I think the system requires and try to be as honest with Louise as I can under the system ... I will take her guilty plea and satisfy myself with this plea and transfer her to the Fifth Division ... or I’ll transfer the whole thing.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 598 F. Supp. 95 - Layer v. Lyles

Relies on Edmonson v. Farris · Farley v. Jester

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-11-21

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

John I. Purtle, Justice,

¶1dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the view of my brethren. The present controversy presents a classic case where a trial judge should have refused to hear the plea or to sentence the defendant because of the appearance of impropriety. Even though the appellant and her attorney both expressly agreed that the trial judge should not disqualify, it would have been better for him not to pass sentence on his former client. Appellant and her attorney both thought he would be at least as lenient as the plea bargain offer. They were sadly mistaken. It is not enough that a trial judge be fair and impartial; he must also appear to be such. Farley v. Jester, 257 Ark. 686, 520 S.W.2d 200 (1975). The trial court should have voluntarily disqualified without request by the parties. Edmondson v. Farris, 263 Ark. 505, 565 S.W.2d 617 (1978).

¶2The court stated at the hearing:

Gentlemen, I really feel uncomfortable about it because I am aware of Ms. Campbell’s extensive involvement with the law ... I will go ahead and do what I think the system requires and try to be as honest with Louise as I can under the system ... I will take her guilty plea and satisfy myself with this plea and transfer her to the Fifth Division ... or I’ll transfer the whole thing.

¶3At sentencing, the trial court said:

Ms. Campbell, it would not have made any difference whether you had accepted the State’s recommendation or not. So it’s academic. If you had accepted it last week, I would not have.

Ms. Campbell, you are a thief. The court has known you for a long time and we’re tired of you stealing from us. So, we’re going to put you away so we won’t have to worry about you for a while.

¶4It is hard to keep from wondering how much information about appellant the trial judge obtained as her lawyer and how much of this went into the sentence. Only the present crime and prior convictions would have been before another judge. If the court’s relationship with the appellant was unpleasant the sentence may have been different than if the relationship had been a pleasant one. For appearance only, I think the court erred. I would remand for re-sentencing before another court.