Morales v. Artuz’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Even if we accept the idea, grounded perhaps more on tradition than on empirical data , that demeanor is a useful basis for assessing credibility, the jurors had an entirely unimpaired opportunity to assess the delivery of [the witness'] testimony, notice any evident nervousness, and observe her body language. Most important , they had a full opportunity to combine these fully observable aspects of demeanor with their consideration of the substance of her testimony , assessing her opportunity to observe, the consistency of her account, any hostile motive, and all the other traditional bases for evaluating testimony.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Romero v. State · 188 Conn. App. 481 - State v. Hutton

2. “The notion that special deference is owed to the determination of a trier of fact, whether judge, trial examiner, hearing officer (administrative law judge), or jury, because the trier sees the witnesses and hears them testify, while the [reviewing agency or] court look[s] only at cold records is deeply imbedded in the law. There must be thousands of appellate decisions that state and restate it in an infinite variety of ways. I am convinced, both from experience as a trial lawyer and from experience as an appellate judge, that much that is thought and said about the trier of fact as a lie detector is myth or folklore. Every trial lawyer knows, and most trial judges will admit, that it is not unusual for an accomplished liar to fool a [fact finder] because his demeanor is so convincing. Conversely, many trial lawyers, and some trial judges, will admit that the demeanor of a perfectly honest but unsophisticated or timid witness may be or can be made by an astute cross-examiner to be such that he will be thought by the jury or the judge to be a liar. He may be unable to face the cross-examiner, the jury, or the judge; he may slouch and squirm in the chair; he may be obviously tense and nervous; his answers to questions may be indirect, rambling, and inaudible; he may hesitate before answering; he may alternately turn pale and blush. In short, he may, to the trier of fact, be a liar, but in fact be entirely truthful. Again, however, another fact finder, seeing and hearing the sa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Dia v. Ashcroft

3. “[t]he trial judge found, after hearing the witness’s explanation and observing her demeanor and after extensive discussion with counsel, that [she] had a real and justified fear of testifying. The court noted that it was apparent [the witness] would not testify without the sunglasses and that she was prepared to defy the court’s order. The court found that she was terrified of the defendant. In order to obtain what the trial judge viewed as testimony “extremely relevant and material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,” he determined that it was “necessary” to allow her to testify with the sunglasses. Moreover, permitting [the witness] to wear sunglasses while testifying is a relatively modest imposition on the right to face-to-face confrontation that the trial court properly found was justified by the necessities of the case. Thus, the trial court identified the correct legal rule and determined that [the witness] could wear her sunglasses. This finding was not “contrary to” or an objectively unreasonable application of Coy and Craig’s Confrontation Clause doctrine.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Romero v. State