Hardeman v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he concept of prejudice in the Sixth Amendment sense is not the equivalent of the common law notion of harm. It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, (cit.), and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding. Since any error, if it is indeed an error, “impairs” the presentation of the defense, the showing of such an error is inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding. Strickland, v. Washington, supra at 693 (III) (B). “When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, supra at 695 (III) (B).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 303 Ga. App. 176 - Hammond v. State

2. “One of the applicable principles of law in [a capital] case is that defense counsel is entitled to two hours of closing argument. OCGA § 17-8-73. The right to make closing argument is an important one, the abridgement of which is not to be tolerated. Ricketts v. State, 276 Ga. 466, 470 (4) ( 579 SE2d 205 ) (2003). However, the record shows that Hardeman’s lawyer was under the misimpression that he was entitled to only one hour to make his argument and, thus, failed to object when, fifty-five minutes into his argument, the trial court erroneously informed him that he had five minutes left. Accordingly, the attorney was unaware of an important statutory right available to the defense and waived that right through inadequate preparation, rather than as a matter of trial tactics. Under these circumstances, Hardeman met his burden showing the deficient performance prong of his ineffectiveness claim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 303 Ga. App. 176 - Hammond v. State

3. “[n]one of those circumstances in which prejudice is presumed is present in this case. Instead, here, as in Ricketts v. State, supra at 471 (4), the “right to make a closing argument was not completely abridged.” See also Ricketts v. State, supra at 472 (5), citing Division 4 as authority for the proposition that, “assuming arguendo, that counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the one-hour limitation, there was no prejudice or harm.” In fact, since the attorney was unaware of his statutory right to an additional hour to argue, he presumably tailored his argument for presentation in one hour. There is no indication that, as a result of the time limit, the lawyer failed to argue a critical point or that the argument that he did present was not as reasonably effective as it otherwise would have been.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 303 Ga. App. 176 - Hammond v. State