¶1concurring specially.
¶2I concur fully in Division 1 and in the affirmance of Hamilton’s conviction and life sentence for malice murder. Although I agree that Hamilton is not entitled to reversal based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, my reasoning differs from that relied upon by the majority. Therefore, I concur specially as to Division 2.
¶3The alleged ineffectiveness was attributed to an unnamed public defender who initially represented Hamilton, but who was removed from the case prior to indictment. Thereafter, Hamilton was represented by new trial counsel and, after conviction and sentence, by new appellate counsel.
It is axiomatic that a claim of ineffectiveness of [pre] trial counsel must be asserted at “the earliest practicable moment.” [Cit.] In the present case, [Hamilton] through his new [appellate] counsel had the opportunity to raise a claim of ineffectiveness of [pre] trial counsel prior to this appeal in... the motion for new trial....
¶4Bailey v. State, 264 Ga. 300 (443 SE2d 836) (1994). However, a review of the record on appeal fails to show that the issue was raised by Hamilton’s new appellate counsel, either in the motion for new trial or in any amendment thereto. The “failure to raise a claim of ineffectiveness before appeal under the circumstances of this case is a procedural bar to raising the claim at a later date.” Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183, 184 (2) (465 SE2d 659) (1996).
¶5Therefore, I submit that the trial court correctly decided Hamilton’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because the record does not show that he raised that issue at the earliest practicable moment and, thus, he has procedurally waived that claim.
¶6I am authorized to state that Justice Melton joins in this special concurrence.