Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

281 Ga. 633

641 S.E.2d 543

State v. Glover

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided February 26, 2007

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2007-02-26

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“A judgment is not void so long as it was entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including In Re DL

Relies on Collins v. Billow · Smith v. Smith · 169 Ga. App. 232 - Stone v. George F. Richardson, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2007-02-26

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently August 2023

9 state decisions

70200720102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Sears, Chief Justice.

¶1On November 9, 2005, the trial court, relying on OCGA § 5-6-48 (c),1 dismissed the State’s appeal of a February 2001 ruling that barred the trial of the appellee, Maurice Glover, on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated.2 The State appeals from the order dismissing its appeal. We conclude, however, that an order dismissing an appeal is not an order that the State has a right to appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1. Although the State has a right to appeal from void orders, OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5), the order dismissing the State’s appeal, even if erroneous, is not void. A judgment “is not void so long as it was entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”3 For example, in Collins, this Court addressed an order of a trial court modifying a divorce judgment in a contempt proceeding. We held that, although the trial court did not have the authority to modify the divorce judgment in the contempt proceeding, the judgment was not void, but was erroneous, as it was entered by a court having competent jurisdiction to hear the dispute.4 In the present case, the dissent states that the trial court erroneously applied OCGA § 5-6-48 (c). Even assuming the trial court erred., however, the order is not void as it was entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

¶2Because the State does not have a right to appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) or under any other provision of OCGA § 5-7-1, the State’s appeal is hereby dismissed.5

¶3Appeal dismissed.

All the Justices concur, except Carley and Melton, JJ., who dissent.

¶4 Under OCGA § 5-6-48 (c), a trial court may dismiss an appeal when a party causes an inexcusable and unreasonable delay in the filing of the transcript or when a party causes an unreasonable delay in the transmission of the record to the appellate court that was “inexcusable and was caused by the failure of a party to pay costs in the trial court.”

¶5 Glover was indicted in Fulton County Superior Court on April 8,1997, for various crimes that allegedly were committed on February 25, 1994.

¶6 See Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 207 (2) (636 SE2d 519) (2006); Collins v. Billow, 277 Ga. 604, 605 (592 SE2d 843) (2004).

¶7Collins, 277 Ga. at 605-606. In Stone v. George F. Richardson, Inc., 169 Ga. App. 232, 233 (312 SE2d 339) (1983), on which the dissent relies, the Court of Appeals did not address the difference between a void and an erroneous judgment. However, to the extent Stonecan be read to hold that an erroneous judgment is void, it is hereby disapproved.

¶8 See Glenn v. State, 271 Ga. 604, 604-605 (523 SE2d 13) (1999) (the State has a right of appeal in criminal cases only from the types of orders specified in OCGA § 5-7-1, and OCGA § 5-7-1 must be construed strictly against the State).

/281/ga/633 · .json · Public domain