Wheeler v. Wheeler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Under certain conditions, a child who has only one living parent ‘may be adopted by the spouse of that parent. ...’ OCGA [Official Code of Georgia Annotated] § 19 — 8—6(a)(2). See also In re C.N.W., [ 274 Ga. 765 , 768, 560 S.E.2d 1 , 1 (2002)]. However, [the same-sex ex-partner] is not the spouse of [the biological mother], as ‘[m]arriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state.’ OCGA § 19—3—3.1(a). See also Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, § IV, Par. 1(a) (approved in 2004); In the Interest of Angel Lace M., [ 184 Wis.2d 492, 507 , 516 N.W.2d 678, 682 (1994)]. Under OCGA §§ 19-8-5(a) and 19-8-7(a), a third party who is not a stepparent, such as [the same-sex ex-partner], may adopt the child only if the parent’s rights are surrendered, or are terminated pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-10. However, neither the surrender nor termination of [the biological mother’s] parental rights was ever sought or ordered. Instead, the adoption petition was based on [the biological mother’s] consent to the adoption, wherein she expressly refused to relinquish or surrender her parental rights, and the trial court declared that the child would have ‘two legal parents’ and awarded permanent custody to both. OCGA § 19-8-19(a)(1) specifically proscribes such an order: ‘Except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the spouse, a decree of adoption terminates all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his relatives, including his parent....’ ‘If the le”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ex parte E.L.

2. ““[The adoptive mother] argues that the motion to set aside is time-barred by OCGA [Official Code of Georgia Annotated] § 19-8-18(e), although the trial court did not rely on that statute. It reads as follows: ‘A decree of adoption issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section shall not be subject to any judicial challenge filed more than six months after the date of entry of such decree.’ OCGA § 19-8-18(e). Subsection (b) provides for the entry of a decree terminating all parental rights in those cases where the rights of each living parent or guardian have been surrendered or terminated, or where termination of parental rights is appropriate pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-10. As previously noted, however, subsection (b) obviously does not apply here, because neither surrender nor termination of [the biological mother’s] rights was ever sought or accomplished, and the trial court entered a decree specifically preserving her rights. Because subsection (b) is inapplicable, the six-month limitation in subsection (e) clearly does not bar the motion to set aside.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ex parte E.L.