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281 S.W.2d 114

James v. Gray

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided May 20, 1955

Court of Appeals of Texas · decided 1955-05-20

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently November 1998

3 state decisions

Relies on Howell v. Estes · Hoak v. Ferguson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1955-05-20

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¶1On Rehearing'.

¶2Appellant in her motion for rehearing insists that we erred in holding that the driveway in question was necessary.- for the use and enjoyment by appellees of their property since the evidence shows that ap-pellees could obtain ingress and egress by constructing a new driveway from the side street or from the alley in the rear. The garage could be altered to fit the new driveway. Of course such construction and alteration would require the expenditure of money and labor.

¶3Our Supreme Court has held adversely to appellant’s contention. We quote from the case of Howell v. Estes, 71 Tex. 690, 12 S.W. 62, 63: “In Ewart v. Cochrane, supra, the court say(s) the easement must be ‘necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed before the time of the grant.’ If, without alteration involving labor and expense, the convenience is necessary to the use of the property as it exists at the time of the conveyance, the easement passes. This seems to us the more reasonable doctrine. The reason of the rule, in case of an easement implied on account of strict necessity, is that the grantor shall not be permitted to derogate from his grant by denying to the grantee the means by which it is to be enjoyed. For the same reason he should not- be permitted to deny the use of open and usable improvements, which, without alterations involving labor and expense, are necessary to the use of the property granted. ⅜ ” (Emphasis supplied.)

¶4Appellant also points out that the evidence shows that appellees have at times contemplated making the alterations' in question. But certainly such tentative planning does not constitute an abandonment by appellees of their right to use the existing driveway, nor does it confer on appellant the right to compel appellees to accept, let alone create, other means of ingress and egress. Hoak v. Ferguson, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W.2d 258 (Ref. n. r. e.).

¶5Appellant’s motion for. rehearing is overruled.

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